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  My	   thesis	   explores	   the	   question	   of	   how	   we	   should	   think	   of	   our	   duties	   to	   those	  worse	  off	  than	  us	  around	  the	  world.	  I	  assess	  ‘the	  harm	  approach’	  to	  global	  justice,	  which	   claims	   that	  we	   have	   duties	   of	   justice	   towards	   the	   global	   poor	   because	  we	  harm	   them,	   arguing	   against	   it.	   I	   first	   argue	   that	   Thomas	   Pogge	   puts	   forward	   the	  harm	   approach	  without	   specifying	   a	   plausible	   notion	   of	   harm.	   I	   then	   argue	   that	  there	   is	   no	   conception	   of	   harm	   in	   the	   literature	   that	   can	   support	   the	   harm	  approach.	  My	  thesis	  yields	  the	  conclusion	  that	  the	  harm	  approach	  fails	  to	  fulfil	   its	  key	  aim,	  which	  is	  to	  break	  the	  stalemate	  between	  proponents	  and	  opponents	  of	  the	  view	  that	  principles	  of	  distributive	   justice	  are	  appropriate	   in	   the	  global	  context.	   I	  suggest	   that	   the	   misconceived	   harm	   approach,	   and	   the	   state	   of	   impasse	   in	   the	  global	   justice	   debate,	   highlight	   the	   need	   to	   reconceive	   the	   global	   justice	   project.	  Instead	  of	  assessing	  whether	  or	  not	  our	   theory	  of	   justice	   for	   the	  state	  extends	   to	  the	   global	   sphere,	   our	   starting	   point	   should	   be	   the	   global	   situation	   itself.	   To	  formulate	   the	  most	   plausible	   approach	   to	   our	   duties	   to	   those	  worse	   off	   than	   us	  globally,	  we	  should	  build	  a	  theory	  of	  global	  justice	  based	  on	  the	  moral	  facts	  of	  the	  global	  situation	  and	  our	  pre-­‐theoretical	  convictions	  regarding	  it.	  	  I	   first	  outline	  Pogge’s	  harm	  approach	  and	  state	   its	  aims.	   I	   then	  point	  out	  why	  the	  way	  that	  Pogge	  uses	  the	  notion	  of	  harm	  cannot	  support	  the	  aims	  of	  the	  approach.	  I	  then	  turn	  to	  an	   investigation	  of	  moralised	  and	  non-­‐moralised	  theories	  of	  harm	  in	  the	  literature,	  finding	  that	  none	  can	  help	  support	  the	  harm	  approach.	  The	  last	  part	  of	  my	   thesis	   points	   towards	   the	   direction	  we	   should	   take	   in	   building	   a	   plausible	  approach	  to	  our	  duties	  to	  the	  global	  poor.	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Global	  Justice	  and	  Harm:	  What	  is	  the	  most	  plausible	  grounding	  of	  our	  duties	  to	  those	  worse	  off	  than	  us	  in	  the	  global	  sphere?	  	  
Introduction	  	  	  In	   this	   thesis,	   I	   pose	   the	  question	  of	  what	   are	   the	  most	   plausible	   grounds	  of	   our	  duties	   to	   the	   global	   poor.	   I	   frame	   my	   topic	   as	   a	   question	   within	   global	   justice.	  However,	  at	  the	  outset,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  ask	  what	  I	  mean	  when	  I	  refer	  to	  the	  topic	  of	  global	   justice.	  There	   is	  a	  vast	  and	  growing	  body	  of	   literature	  on	  the	  topic.	  This	  material	  addresses	  a	  range	  of	  different	  questions.	  There	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  be	   just	  one	  project	  of	  global	  justice.	  Some	  writers	  aim	  to	  answer	  the	  question:	  what	  would	  a	  just	  global	  society	  look	  like?	  Others	  are	  concerned	  with	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  Rawls’	  theory	  of	  justice	  is	  applicable	  to	  the	  global	  sphere.	  Some	  are	  more	  focused	  on	  working	   out	   the	  most	   plausible	   grounding	   of	   duties	   to	   the	   poor,	   while	   other	  theories	  attempt	   to	  provide	   the	  most	  effective	  philosophical	   response	   to	  poverty.	  Some	  of	  these	  questions	  leave	  open	  whether	  our	  duties	  are	  best	  framed	  as	  duties	  of	  justice	  or	  some	  other	  value,	  therefore,	  the	  label	  ‘global	  justice’	  may	  be	  a	  misnomer.	  	  Given	   that	   different	   theories	   are	   answering	   different	   questions,	   it	   is	   hard	   to	   say	  which	   features	   a	   good	   theory	  of	   justice	  would	  possess.	   If	  we	   are	   concerned	  with	  being	   effective	   against	   poverty,	   a	   good	   theory	   of	   justice	   should	   propose	   feasible	  policies.	   If	   we	   are	   trying	   to	   show	   that	   Rawls’	   principles	   of	   justice	   should	   apply	  globally,	  a	  good	  theory	  would	  accurately	  capture	  the	  key	  aspects	  of	  Rawls’	  theory	  and	  show	  how	   they	   feature	   in	   the	  global	   sphere.	  The	   initial	   task	   to	  assessing	   the	  merits	  of	  an	  approach	  to	  global	  justice	  is	  to	  clarify	  its	  aim,	  and	  the	  question	  it	  seeks	  to	  answer.	  I	  am	  interested	  in	  finding	  the	  most	  philosophically	  sound	  basis	  for	  our	  duties	   to	   those	  worse	   off	   than	   us	   in	   other	   parts	   of	   the	  world.	  My	   view	   is	   that	   a	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  theory	  is	  plausible	  when	  it	  accurately	  reflects	  the	  moral	  facts	  of	  the	  situation,	  and	  captures	  our	  pre-­‐theoretical	  convictions	  about	  the	  case.	  I	   refer	   to	   the	   global	   justice	   debate;	   however,	   there	   are	   various	   points	   of	   debate.	  First,	   there	   is	   a	   disagreement	   between	   egalitarians	   and	   libertarians.	   The	   former	  argue	  that	  we	  have	  duties	  of	  justice	  to	  aim	  for	  greater	  equality	  in	  society,	  the	  latter	  hold	   that	  our	  duties	  extend	  only	   to	  respecting	   the	  minimal	  rights	  and	   liberties	  of	  others.	  The	  disagreement	  between	  libertarians	  and	  egalitarians	  about	  what	  justice	  requires	  within	  a	  state	  repeats	   itself	   in	   the	  global	  context.	  Second,	   there	   is	  also	  a	  debate	   among	   egalitarians	   about	   what	   we	   are	   committed	   to	   in	   the	   global	   case.	  Cosmopolitans	  argue	  that,	  as	  all	   individuals	  are	  of	  equal	  moral	  worth	  and,	  as	   it	   is	  morally	   arbitrary	  which	   country	   one	   is	   born	   into,	   duties	   of	   justice	   should	   apply	  throughout	   the	   global	   sphere.1	   However,	   proponents	   of	   a	   relational	   justice	   view	  argue	  that	  considerations	  of	   justice	  only	  arise	  within	  a	  state	  where	  certain	  moral	  features	   are	   present.2	   Some	   proponents	   of	   the	   relational	   view	   argue	   that	   the	  relevant	  features	  within	  the	  state	  are	  also	  present	  globally.3	  This	  seems	  to	  progress	  the	  debate;	  arguing	  for	  duties	  of	  justice	  while	  taking	  seriously	  the	  context-­‐specific	  nature	  of	  justice.	  However,	  there	  is	  an	  impasse	  over	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  relevant	  features	  are	  present	  in	  the	  global	  sphere	  to	  a	  sufficient	  extent.	  This	  is	  the	  third	  main	  source	  of	  debate.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  See,	  for	  example,	  Beitz,	  C.	  1999,	  Political	  Theory	  and	  International	  Relations	  with	  a	  new	  afterword,	  (Princeton,	  NJ:	  Princeton	  University	  Press),	  Moellendorf,	  D.	  2002,	  Cosmopolitan	  Justice	  ,	  (Boulder,	  CO:	  Westview	  Press),	  Caney,	  S.	  2005,	  Justice	  beyond	  Borders:	  A	  Global	  Political	  Theory	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press),	  and	  Tan,	  K-­‐C.	  2004,	  Justice	  without	  Borders:	  Cosmopolitanism,	  Nationalism	  
and	  Patriotism	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press)	  	  2	  See,	  for	  example,	  Sangiovanni,	  A.	  2007,	  ‘Global	  Justice,	  Reciprocity,	  and	  the	  State’,	  Philosophy	  &	  
Public	  Affairs,	  Volume	  35,	  Issue	  1,	  Nagel,	  T.	  2005,	  ‘The	  Problem	  of	  Global	  Justice’,	  Philosophy	  &	  Public	  
Affairs,	  33,	  No.	  2	  Blake,	  M.	  2001,	   ‘Distributive	   Justice,	  State	  Coercion,	  and	  Autonomy’,	  Philosophy	  and	  Public	  Affairs,	  Vol.	  30,	  No.	  3,	  pp.	  257-­‐296	  	  3	  Julius,	  A.J,	  2006,	  ‘Nagel’s	  Atlas’,	  Philosophy	  &	  Public	  Affairs,	  34,	  No.	  2,	  Valentini,	  L.	  2011,	  ‘Coercion	  and	  (Global)	  Justice’,	  American	  Political	  Science	  Review,	  Volume	  105,	  Issue	  01,	  Wolff,	  J.	  2009,	  ‘Global	  Justice	  and	  Norms	  of	  Co-­‐operation:	  The	  ‘Layers	  of	  Justice’	  View’,	  Cohen,	  J.	  and	  Sabel,	  C.	  2006,	  ‘Extra	  Rempublicam	  Nulla	  Justitia?’	  Philosophy	  &	  Public	  Affairs	  34,	  no.	  2	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  My	  project	  is	  largely	  negative;	  I	  critique	  the	  dominant	  approaches	  to	  grounding	  our	  duties	  to	  the	  global	  poor.	  However,	  I	  also	  suggest	  how	  to	  proceed	  in	  working	  out	  a	  better	  approach.	  My	  critique	  focuses	  on	  the	  harm	  approach	  because	  it	  has	  received	  much	  attention,	  and	  purports	  to	  provide	  an	  effective	  approach	  that	  would	  bypass	  much	   of	   the	   disagreement	   within	   the	   debate.	   Yet,	   it	   has	   not	   been	   assessed	  sufficiently	   by	   either	   its	   proponents	   or	   opponents.	   The	   harm	   approach,	   most	  prominently	  proposed	  by	  Thomas	  Pogge,	   claims	   that	  we	  have	  duties	  of	   justice	   to	  the	  poor	  because	  we	  harm	  them	  (2008:	  14).	  The	  motivation	  of	  the	  approach	  is	  to	  persuade	   everyone	   that	  we	   have	   duties	   to	   the	   global	   poor,	   including	   intellectual	  opponents	  of	  global	  justice,	  libertarians,	  self-­‐interested	  governments	  and	  apathetic	  individuals,	  and	  to	  break	  the	  stalemate	  within	  the	  academic	  global	  justice	  debate.	  Pogge’s	   aims	   seem	   worthy,	   given	   that	   there	   is	   a	   need	   to	   make	   progress	   in	   the	  intractable	   global	   justice	   debate.	   However,	   we	  may	   doubt	   the	   need	   to	   persuade	  libertarians	  with	  our	  theory	  of	  global	   justice.	  This	   is	  a	  more	  demanding	  task	  than	  theorists	  of	  justice	  within	  the	  state	  set	  themselves;	  they	  put	  forward	  conceptions	  of	  a	   just	   society	   based	   on	   egalitarian	   premises,	   and	   it	   is	   no	   weakness	   of	   these	  accounts	   that	   they	   cannot	   appeal	   to	   libertarian	   principles.	   What	   is	   more	  noteworthy	  and	  perhaps	  troubling	  is	  that	  those	  who	  argue	  for	  demanding	  duties	  of	  redistribution	   within	   a	   state	   reject	   such	   duties	   in	   the	   global	   sphere.	   It	   is	   more	  fruitful	  to	  make	  progress	  with	  regards	  to	  this	  aspect	  of	  the	  debate.	  It	  does	  not	  seem	  a	   feasible,	   nor	   necessary	   task,	   to	   persuade	   libertarians	  with	   our	   theory	   of	   global	  justice.	   It	   seems	   that	   this	  aim	   is	  not	   linked	   to	   the	  philosophical	  project	  of	   finding	  the	   most	   plausible	   basis	   for	   our	   duties,	   but	   rather	   the	   motivational	   project	   of	  encouraging	   people	   into	   taking	   action	   against	   poverty.	   The	   former,	   and	   not	   the	  latter,	  is	  the	  appropriate	  focus	  for	  us.	  In	   the	   thesis,	   I	  will	   identify	   the	  aims	  of	  Pogge’s	   theory,	  and	  whether	  he	   is	  able	   to	  fulfil	   them.	   In	   particular,	   I	   will	   investigate	   whether	   the	   central	   claim	   of	   Pogge’s	  thesis,	   the	   claim	   that	   we	   harm	   the	   poor,	   can	   be	   upheld.	   The	   key	   problem	   with	  Pogge’s	   argument	   is	   that	   he	   does	   not	   provide	   an	   adequate	   account	   of	   harm.	   I	  suggest	   that	  Pogge	  equivocates	  on	   the	  notion	  of	  harm.	  He	  draws	  on	  an	  everyday	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  sense	  of	  harm	  where	  people	  can	  be	  harmed	  by	  accident,	  or	  through	  acts	  of	  nature,	  where	  it	  is	  more	  straightforward	  to	  show	  that	  harm	  occurs	  but	  does	  not	  necessarily	  ground	   any	  moral	   duties,	   at	   the	   same	   time,	   Pogge	   invokes	   a	  moralised	  notion	   of	  harm	  to	  claim	  that	  we	  have	  duties	  to	  the	  poor.	  The	  problem	  with	  using	  harm	  in	  the	  non-­‐moralised	  sense	  is	  that	  we	  must	  also	  show	  that	  this	  harm	  is	  wrongful,	  in	  which	  case	  there	  is	  no	  advantage	  to	  the	  harm	  approach,	  as	  the	  underlying	  task	  remains	  to	  argue	  that	  we	  wrong	  the	  poor.	   Invoking	  a	  moralised	  notion	  of	  harm	  presupposes	  more	   fundamental	   moral	   claims,	   meaning	   that	   the	   element	   of	   harm	   does	   no	  additional	  work.	  Additionally,	   it	  does	  not	   seem	   that	  basing	   claims	  on	  harm	  helps	  make	   an	   argument	   more	   widely	   persuasive	   as	   proponents	   of	   different	   moral	  theories	  define	  harm	  in	  different	  ways.	  I	  will	  explore,	  by	  looking	  in	  more	  detail	  at	  the	  concept	  of	  harm	  in	  the	  literature,	  whether	  we	  can	  provide	  a	  theory	  of	  harm	  that	  supports	   the	   idea	   that	   the	   rich	   harm	   the	   poor,	   and	   have	   duties	   in	   virtue	   of	   this	  harm,	   which	  would	   be	  widely	   persuasive.	   I	   will	   show	   that	   there	   is	   no	   notion	   of	  harm	  that	  can	  support	  the	  aims	  of	  the	  harm	  approach.	  The	  main	  conclusion	  of	  the	  thesis	  is	  that	  the	  harm	  approach	  is	  not	  successful.	  I	  will	  also	  tentatively	  suggest	  how,	  given	  this	  conclusion,	  the	  global	  justice	  debate	  should	  proceed.	  I	  assess	  the	  main	  alternative	  approaches	  to	  our	  global	  duties	  to	  the	  poor.	  Instead	  of	  arguing	  in	  support	  of	  one	  of	  these	  views,	  I	  argue	  that	  we	  need	  to	  rethink	  our	  global	  justice	  project.	  I	  suggest	  that	  the	  harm	  approach	  is	  reflective	  of	  what	  goes	  wrong	   in	   the	  debate.	  Much	  of	   the	   literature	   takes	   it	   that	   the	  project	  of	  global	  justice	  involves	  forming	  a	  basis	  for	  our	  global	  duties	  through	  a	  comparison	  with	  the	  state	  context.	  The	  assumption	  seems	  to	  be	  that	  either	  one	  argues	  that	  we	  have	   duties	   of	   justice	   because	   the	   global	   sphere	   is	   sufficiently	   equivalent	   to	   the	  domestic	   sphere,	  or	  one	  argues	   that	   these	  contexts	  are	  different,	   and	  so	  we	  have	  non-­‐justice	   based	   duties.	   My	   view	   is	   that	   we	   should	   not	   assess	   whether	   our	  approach	  to	  justice	  in	  the	  state	  context	  should	  be	  extended	  to	  the	  global	  case,	  but	  rather,	  we	  should	  start	  with	  the	  global	  situation	  itself.	  	  Viewing	  the	  global	  situation	  though	  the	  confines	  of	  a	  theoretical	  analysis	  obscures	  what	   is	   abundantly	   clear	   to	   us	   about	   it,	   namely,	   that	   there	   are	   unacceptable	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  inequalities	  between	  rich	  and	  poor.	  The	  much	  worse	  situation	  of	  the	  poor	  than	  the	  rich,	  in	  relative	  and	  absolute	  terms,	  seems	  unfair.	  It	  seems	  wrong	  that	  some	  people	  in	  the	  world	  should	  enjoy	  such	  high	  levels	  of	  well-­‐being	  while	  others	  suffer,	  due	  to	  morally	   arbitrary	   factors,	   particularly	   when	   the	   well-­‐off	   benefit	   from	   the	   same	  global	   arrangements	   under	   which	   the	   worse	   off	   do	   badly.	   Thus,	   from	   a	   pre-­‐theoretical	   perspective	   it	   seems	   obvious	   that	   there	   is	   injustice	   in	   the	   global	  sphere.4	  However,	  a	  theoretical	  analysis	  puts	  into	  question	  whether	  there	  is	  such	  a	  concept	   as	   global	   injustice.	   In	   order	   to	   develop	   the	  most	   plausible	   basis	   for	   our	  duties	  to	  the	  distant	  needy,	  we	  should	  start	  with	  what	  seems	  most	  plausible	  about	  the	  global	  situation	  and	  build	  our	  theory	  from	  there.	  	  In	  chapter	  one	  I	  present	  the	  harm	  approach	  and	  its	  aims.	  I	  outline	  how	  Pogge	  uses	  the	  notion	  of	  harm	  to	  support	  his	  claim	  that	  the	  rich	  states	  harm	  the	  global	  poor.	  I	  then	  raise	  several	  difficulties	  with	  his	  use	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  harm.	  In	  chapter	  two	  I	  explore	  different	  leading	  theories	  of	  harm	  in	  the	  literature	  to	  see	  whether	  the	  harm	  approach	   can	   be	   supported	   by	   drawing	   on	   these	  more	   thorough	   accounts.	   I	  will	  suggest	   that	   there	   is	   no	   notion	   of	   harm	   that	   would	   help	   the	   harm	   approach	   to	  achieve	   its	   aims.	   In	   the	   third	   chapter	   I	   address	   how	   we	   should	   proceed	   in	   the	  debate,	  given	  that	  the	  harm	  approach	  does	  not	  succeed.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Wolff	  claims	  that	  there	  is	  a	  common	  sense	  theory	  of	  global	  justice,	  according	  to	  which	  we	  have	  global	  duties	  of	  redistribution	  that	  are	  not	  as	  extensive	  as	  those	  within	  the	  domestic	  sphere,	  but	  are	  duties	  of	  justice	  and	  not	  charity	  (2009:	  4).	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Chapter	  One:	  Is	  Pogge’s	  harm	  approach	  a	  plausible	  basis	  for	  our	  duties	  to	  the	  
global	  poor?	  	  In	   this	   chapter	   I	   outline	   the	   harm	   approach,	   paying	   close	   attention	   to	   the	  arguments	   presented	   by	   Thomas	   Pogge.	   I	   discuss	   why	   Pogge	   puts	   forward	   the	  harm	   approach,	   and	   suggest	   what	   I	   think	   the	   possible	   advantages	   of	   the	   harm	  approach	  are.	  Identifying	  the	  aims	  of	  the	  harm	  approach	  reveals	  what	  is	  required	  of	  the	  notion	  of	  harm	  at	  its	  centre.	  I	  discuss	  why	  Pogge’s	  conception	  of	  harm	  cannot	  support	  the	  aims	  of	  his	  argument.	  	  	  The	  strategy	  of	  the	  harm	  approach	  is	  to	  claim	  that,	  while	  we	  may	  not	  always	  have	  a	  duty	  not	  to	  harm,	  harm	  does	  seem	  to	  be	  a	  prima	  facie	  wrong,	  so	  whatever	  else	  we	  take	  to	  be	  wrong,	  if	  we	  can	  show	  that	  harm	  occurs,	  we	  have	  an	  overlap	  with	  other	  views	  of	  wronging.	  Therefore,	  if	  we	  can	  identify	  harm	  in	  the	  global	  order,	  we	  have	  a	  foundation	  for	  duties	  of	  justice	  that	  can	  find	  agreement	  among	  proponents	  of	  any	  moral	  theory.	  There	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  stalemate	  regarding	  whether	  ideas	  of	  domestic	  justice	  are	  applicable	  to	  the	  global	  sphere.	   It	   is	  not	  straightforward	  to	  extend	  our	  notions	  of	  justice	  from	  the	  state	  context	  to	  the	  global	  sphere.5	  The	  aim	  of	  the	  harm	  approach,	   as	   I	   take	   it,	   is	   to	   base	   our	   duties	   on	   harm	   as	   a	  way	   of	   grounding	   our	  duties	   to	   those	   worse	   off	   than	   us	   around	   the	   world	   as	   duties	   of	   justice,	   while	  bypassing	   this	  debate.	  However,	   attempts	   to	  put	   forward	   this	   approach	  have	  not	  succeeded,	  as	  this	  chapter	  will	  bring	  out.	  	  	  	  Pogge	  intends	  for	  his	  approach	  of	  basing	  duties	  of	  justice	  on	  negative	  duties	  not	  to	  harm	   to	   be	   persuasive	   to	   all.	   To	   achieve	   this	   aim,	   Pogge’s	   notion	   of	   harm	  must	  appeal	  to	  libertarians	  as	  well	  as	  egalitarians,	  and	  meet	  most	  people’s	  convictions	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  There	  are	  issues	  of	  feasibility;	  the	  global	  sphere	  seems	  to	  lack	  an	  appropriate	  agent	  to	  administer	  duties	   (Meckled-­‐Garcia	   S.	   2008,	   'On	   the	   Very	   Idea	   of	   Cosmopolitan	   Justice',	   Journal	   of	  Political	  
Philosophy,	  Vol.	  16,	  3).	  Cultural	  differences	  and	  different	  ways	  of	  life	  across	  the	  globe	  make	  the	  idea	  of	  global	  equality	  hard	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  (Miller,	  D.	  2007,	  National	  Responsibility	  and	  Global	  Justice,	  Oxford	  University	  Press).	   It	   is	   also	   argued	   that	   the	  moral	   features	  which	   trigger	  duties	   of	   justice,	  such	  as	  coercion	  and	  cooperation,	  are	  missing	  in	  the	  global	  sphere	  (Nagel	  2005,	  Blake	  2001,	  Rawls	  1999,	  Sangiovanni	  2007).	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  what	   harm	   is.	   In	   this	   chapter,	   I	   identify	   three	   main	   problems	   with	   Pogge’s	  argument.	   First,	   Pogge	   largely	   defines	   harm	   in	   terms	  of	   other	  moral	   concepts,	   in	  particular,	  injustice.	  	  	  These	   concepts	   are	  defined	   and	   employed	  differently	  by	  proponents	   of	   different	  moral	   theories.	  Pogge	   thinks	  he	   invokes	  a	  minimal	  sense	  of	   injustice	   that	  anyone	  could	   agree	  with;	   however,	   I	  will	   show	  why	   this	   is	  mistaken.	   Secondly,	   as	   Pogge	  draws	  on	  several	  associated	  moral	  concepts,	  it	  is	  unclear	  what	  harm	  is	  taken	  to	  be.	  Thirdly,	   Pogge’s	   statements	   about	   harm	   lead	   to	   implausible	   implications	   about	  what	  would	  be	  a	  case	  of	  harm.	  Pogge	  argues	  that	  anyone	  can	  agree	  that	  if	  we	  harm,	  we	  have	  duties	  of	   justice	  arising	   from	  this.	  The	  problem	   is	   that	  not	  everyone	  can	  agree	  that	  we	  harm	  the	  poor.	  	  	  Pogge	  is	  faced	  with	  a	  dilemma.	  He	  could	  rest	  his	  argument	  on	  a	  moralised	  notion	  of	  harm	   based	   on	   the	   concept	   of	   injustice.	   However,	   what	   injustice	   is	   is	   the	   very	  question	  debated	  by	  libertarians	  and	  egalitarians.	  Even	  the	  less	  contested	  notion	  of	  ‘wrong’	  is	  still	  identified	  in	  different	  ways,	  so	  a	  moralised	  account	  may	  not	  gather	  widespread	   agreement.	   Instead,	   Pogge	   could	   rely	   on	   a	   non-­‐moralised	   account	   of	  harm.	   However,	   the	   idea	   of	   a	   non-­‐moralised	   conception	   of	   harm	   may	   not	   be	  plausible.	  Moreover,	   a	   non-­‐moralised	   account	   of	   harm	  would	   not	   necessarily,	   by	  itself,	  give	  rise	  to	  duties.	  Later	  chapters	  will	  explore	  ways	  of	  resolving	  this	  dilemma	  by	  considering	  alternative	  accounts	  of	  harm.	  However,	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  no	  account	  of	  harm	  helps	  make	  the	  harm	  approach	  more	  plausible.	  	  	  The	  main	   aim	  of	   this	   chapter	   is	   to	   show	   that	  Pogge	  does	  not	   offer	   an	   account	   of	  harm	   that	   can	   support	   his	   aims.	   This	   sets	   up	   my	   argument	   that,	   as	   the	   harm	  approach	   fails,	   the	   best	  way	   of	   grounding	   our	   duties	   to	   the	   poor	   is	   to	   start	  with	  what	   seems	   to	   be	   most	   clear;	   namely	   that	   there	   are	   inequalities	   and	   unjust	  practices	  in	  the	  global	  sphere	  which	  need	  addressing.	  This	  avoids	  the	  main	  points	  of	  conflict	  in	  the	  global	  justice	  debate,	  not	  by	  positing	  an	  alternative	  theory,	  but	  by	  not	  setting	  out	   to	  prove	   that	  a	  particular	   theory	   is	  correct.	  The	  way,	   I	   suggest,	   to	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  develop	  a	  plausible	  theory	  of	  our	  duties	  to	  the	  distant	  needy	  is	  through	  evaluating	  the	   global	   situation;	   identifying	   injustice	   and	   assessing	   ways	   of	   reducing	   it.	  Disagreement	   may	   remain,	   as	   some	   would	   deny	   that	   there	   is	   global	   injustice,	  insisting	  that	   justice	   is	  a	  concept	  that	  only	  has	  meaning	   in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  state.6	  However,	  our	  aim	  should	  not	  be	  to	  eradicate	  all	  disagreement,	  but	  to	  best	  capture	  the	  moral	  facts	  of	  the	  situation.	  	  I	  will	  first	  outline	  what	  the	  harm	  approach	  is.	  Then	  I	  discuss	  the	  difficulties	  of	  the	  way	  that	  Pogge	  employs	  the	  notion	  of	  harm.	  	  	  What	  is	  the	  harm	  approach?	  	  What	   I	   refer	   to	   as	   the	   harm	   approach	   is	   the	   project	   of	   basing	   our	   duties	   to	   the	  global	   poor	   on	   negative	   duties	   of	   justice	   not	   to	   harm.	   This	   may	   be	   seen	   as	  encompassing	  two	  different	  elements:	  1. Duties	  are	  based	  on	  harm	  2. Duties	  are	  duties	  of	  justice	  According	  to	  some	  conceptions	  of	  harm	  and	  justice,	  the	  second	  point	  follows	  from	  the	  first.	  If	  by	  harm	  is	  meant	  wrongful	  harm,	  and,	  if	  by	  justice	  is	  meant	  reparative	  justice,	  harm	  always	  gives	  rise	  to	  prima	  facie	  duties.	  However,	  if	  by	  justice	  is	  meant	  social	  justice,	  the	  connection	  between	  the	  two	  premises	  is	  less	  straightforward.	  	  	  Pogge’s	  argument	  can	  be	  expressed	  as	  follows:	  1. We	  have	  duties	  not	  to	  harm	  others	  2. We,	  citizens	  of	  the	  world’s	  affluent	  states,	  harm	  the	  poor	  Therefore,	  3. We	  have	  duties	  of	  justice	  to	  stop	  harming	  the	  poor7	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Nagel	  ‘The	  Problem	  of	  Global	  Justice’	  	  7	  Pogge,	  World	  Poverty	  and	  Human	  Rights,	  pp.	  15-­‐18,	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  One	  may	  question	   the	   first	   premise	   of	   Pogge’s	   argument.	   There	   are	   situations	   in	  which	  the	  duty	  not	  to	  harm	  seems	  not	  to	  apply.	  For	  example,	  an	  authority	  may	  have	  a	   right	  and	  a	  duty	   to	  harm	  perpetrators	  of	  moral	  wrongs	   through	  punishment.	  A	  duty	  not	  to	  harm	  may	  be	  absent	  in	  a	  situation	  where	  I	  must	  harm	  in	  self-­‐defence.	  One	  may	  also	  question	   the	   third	  premise.	  Perhaps,	   even	   if	  we	  have	  a	  duty	  not	   to	  harm,	   this	   is	   not	   specifically	   a	   duty	   of	   justice.	   My	   focus,	   however,	   is	   the	   second	  premise.	  This	  premise	  requires	  both	  an	  empirical	  account	  of	  the	  behaviour	  of	  the	  rich	  states	  towards	  the	  poor,	  and	  a	  philosophical	  explanation	  of	  how	  this	  counts	  as	  harm.	  	  	  In	   relation	   to	   the	  empirical	   aspect,	  Pogge	   frequently	   cites	  data	  which	   reveals	   the	  desperate	  situation	  of	  the	  poor;	  showing	  how	  badly-­‐off	  they	  are	  in	  absolute	  terms,	  and	  also	  how	  much	  worse	  off	  they	  are	  relative	  to	  others.8	  This	  makes	  clear	  that	  the	  poor	  are	  in	  a	  morally	  urgent	  state,	  and	  have	  unmet	  claims.	  However,	  the	  data	  does	  not	   itself	   reveal	   that	   anyone	  harms	   the	  poor.	  To	   support	   the	   factual	  basis	  of	   this	  claim,	   Pogge	   draws	   on	   several	   examples	   of	   the	   rich	   states	   enacting	   policies	   and	  decisions	  with	  global	  ramifications	  that	  are	  detrimental	  to	  the	  poor	  (2011:	  29-­‐30).	  Pogge	   discusses	   how	   affluent	   countries	   and	   their	   companies	   buy	   resources	   from	  rulers	  of	  developing	   countries,	   even	  when	   they	  maintain	   their	  power	  using	   force	  and	  corruption.	  Affluent	  countries	  and	  their	  banks	  lend	  money	  to	  such	  rulers	  and	  enforce	  debt	  against	  the	  people	  even	  after	  the	  original	  ruler	  is	  no	  longer	  in	  power.	  Western-­‐owned	   banks	  may	   accept	   funds	   that	  may	   have	   been	   amounted	   through	  embezzlement	   and	   corruption.	   The	   global	   system	   allows	   for	   multi-­‐national	  corporations	   to	   avoid	  paying	   tax	   in	  developing	   countries	  where	   they	   extract	   and	  manufacture	   resources,	   instead	   reporting	   their	   profits	   from	   tax	   havens	   through	  transfer	   pricing	   and	   setting	   up	   subsidiaries.	   Additionally,	   affluent	   countries	   and	  their	  companies	  contribute	  disproportionately	  to	  environmental	  damage,	  to	  which	  a	   large	   portion	   of	   the	   global	   poor	   are	   particularly	   vulnerable.	   Another	   example	  Pogge	   provides	   is	   that	   affluent	   countries	   have	   set	   up	   a	   system	   of	   international	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Pogge,	  World	  Poverty	  and	  Human	  Rights,	  p2,	  11,	  ‘Response	  to	  Critics’,	  p	  177,	  ‘Are	  we	  Violating	  the	  Human	  Rights	  of	  the	  Poor’,	  p2	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  trade,	   supposedly	   beneficial	   to	   all,	   through	   open	  markets	   and	   free	   trade,	   yet	   use	  their	   influence	   to	   essentially	   bar	   poor	   countries	   from	   enforcing	   protectionist	  measures,	  while	  the	  rich	  states	  protect	  their	  own	  markets	  through	  tariffs	  and	  anti-­‐dumping	  duties.	  They	  also	  subsidise	  their	  industries	  to	  gain	  a	  larger	  market	  share,	  which	  poor	  countries	  are	  unable	  to	  do	  (2011:	  29-­‐30).	  	  These	  practices	  may	  strike	  us	  as	  unjust.	  Pogge	  frames	  them	  as	  harms	  to	  convince	  everyone	   that	   they	   are	   unjust.	   Pogge	   thinks	   that	   these	   harms	   implicate,	   not	   just	  governments	   and	   companies,	   but	   all	   citizens	   of	   affluent	   countries.	   Pogge	   claims	  that	  we	   collaborate	   in	   imposing	   institutions	   that	   foreseeably	   cause	  human	   rights	  deficits,	   through	   our	   participation	   in	   them	   (2008:	   26).	   As	  we	   have	   a	   duty	   not	   to	  produce	  these	  harms,	  we	  owe	  the	  poor	  our	  fair-­‐share	  of	  compensation	  (2011:	  32).	  Pogge	  does	  not	  spell	  out	  how	  we	  would	  meet	  our	  duties	  to	  the	  poor.	  However,	  our	  focus	   is	   the	   prior	   question	   regarding	   the	   grounding	   of	   these	   duties.	   Before	  addressing	  whether	  Pogge’s	  philosophical	  account	  of	  the	  situation	  is	  correct,	  I	  will	  discuss	  and	  assess	  the	  reasons	  Pogge	  advances	  for	  focusing	  on	  harm.	  	  Why	  the	  harm	  approach?	  An	  obvious	  initial	  question	  to	  ask	  is:	  why	  base	  our	  duties	  on	  harm?	  It	  is	  intuitive	  to	  most	   that	   if	   someone	   is	   in	   great	   need,	   and	   we	   are	   able	   to	   help	   them,	   then	   we	  should.9	   It	  does	  not	  seem	  necessary	  to	  bring	  harm	  into	  the	  picture	   for	  us	  to	  have	  duties.10	  Perhaps,	  however,	  basing	  duties	  on	  harm	  has	  advantages.	  Nagel,	  who	  we	  might	  label	  an	  opponent	  of	  global	  justice,	  writes	  that	  ‘states	  are	  entitled	  to	  be	  left	  to	  
their	   own	   devices,	   but	   only	   on	   the	   condition	   that	   they	   not	   harm	   others’.11	   This	  illustrates	  a	  common	  viewpoint;	  that	  there	  is	  something	  particularly	  serious	  about	  harm	   that	   demarcates	   the	   parameters	   of	   our	   rights	   and	   liberties.	   If	   a	   ruler	   is	  harming	   its	   people,	   other	   nations	   may	   override	   the	   right	   of	   sovereignty	   to	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  David	  Wiggins	  argues	  that	  needs,	  conceived	  as	  objective	  and	  as	  morally	  compelling,	  provide	  a	  superior	  basis	  for	  duties,	  to	  considerations	  of	  rights,	  utility	  or	  capabilities	  (1991:	  319).	  10	  p.52,	  Satz	  D.	  2005,	  ‘What	  Do	  We	  Owe	  the	  Global	  Poor?’,	  Ethics	  and	  International	  Affairs,	  19,	  no.1	  11	  Nagel	  ‘The	  Problem	  of	  Global	  Justice’	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  intervene.	  If	  my	  actions	  would	  harm	  someone,	  this	  limits	  my	  liberties	  and	  rights	  to	  pursue	   this	   course	   of	   action.	   This	   suggests	   a	   promising	   strategy	   to	   appeal	   to	  opponents	  of	  global	   justice.	   If	  we	  can	  make	  the	  case	  that	  the	  rich	  states	  harm	  the	  poor,	   we	   can	   show	   that	   the	   rights	   of	   these	   states	   are	   curtailed	   and	   they	   must	  change	  their	  actions	  in	  order	  to	  stop	  harming.	  This	  may	  be	  plausible,	  but	  one	  may	  still	  ask	  why	  this	  idea	  should	  ground	  the	  general	  duties	  that	  we	  have	  to	  the	  global	  poor.	  I	  shall	  list	  some	  reasons	  Pogge	  may	  have	  for	  basing	  our	  duties	  on	  harm,	  and	  discuss	  each	  one	  in	  turn.	  	  a) Necessary	  to	  ground	  claim	  	  Perhaps	  we	  must	  show	  that	  we	  harm	  the	  poor	  for	  there	  to	  be	  a	  claim	  on	  us.	  	  b) Rhetorical	  force	  Harm	   is	   usually	   considered	   a	   normative	   concept	   and	   thus	   framing	   our	   duties	   as	  harm	  may	  have	  rhetorical	  force	  and	  motivate	  people	  more	  effectively.	  	  c) Wide	  appeal	  Pogge	  may	  base	  our	  duties	  on	  harm	  as	  these	  are	  duties	  anyone	  recognises	  we	  have,	  thus	  libertarians,	  as	  well	  as	  egalitarians,	  would	  be	  committed	  to	  these	  duties.	  	  d) Duties	  of	  justice	  	  Basing	  duties	  on	  harm	  may	  make	  these	  duties	  of	  justice	  rather	  than	  merely	  duties	  of	  charity	  or	  assistance.	  e) Negative	  duties	  	  Basing	  duties	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  we	  harm	  the	  poor	  makes	  these	  negative	  rather	  than	  positive	  duties.	  	  	  f) Captures	  the	  true	  moral	  picture	  	  We	  may	  base	  our	  duties	   to	   the	  poor	  on	  the	   fact	  we	  harm	  them,	  as	   if	  we	  do	  harm	  them,	  our	  moral	  theory	  should	  capture	  this.	  	  g) Efficiency	  If	   we	   harm	   the	   poor,	   it	   may	   be	   more	   efficient	   to	   stop	   harming	   than	   to	   provide	  assistance	  to	  the	  poor.	  	  These	  reasons	  seem	  related	  to	  different	  objectives.	  Some	  seem	  to	  be	  reasons	  if	  we	  are	  concerned	  with	  being	  effective	  against	  poverty,	  for	  example,	  b)	  and	  g).	  Others	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  are	  more	  relevant	  to	  forming	  a	  plausible	  basis	  for	  our	  duties,	  for	  example	  f),	  while	  others	   are	   related	   to	   the	   ecumenical	   aims,	   namely	   c)	   and	   e).	   I	   shall	   now	   assess	  which	  are	  the	  strongest	  reasons	  for	  adopting	  the	  harm	  approach.	  	  a) Necessary	  to	  ground	  claim	  	  Pogge	  does	  not	  make	  clear	  whether	  he	  thinks	  that	  demonstrating	  that	  we	  harm	  the	  poor	  is	  necessary	  to	  ground	  claims	  that	  the	  poor	  have	  on	  us,	  or	  whether,	   instead,	  the	   existence	   of	   harm	   only	   changes	   the	   nature	   of	   these	   claims,	   or,	   provides	  additional	  duties	  on	  top	  of	  these	  claims.	  It	  would	  not	  be	  plausible	  to	  claim	  that	  we	  must	  show	  that	  we	  harm	  the	  poor	  for	  us	  to	  have	  obligations.	  Most	  theorists	  would	  agree	  that	  if	  someone	  is	  in	  severe	  need,	  this	  is	  sufficient	  to	  ground	  a	  claim	  on	  us	  to	  help,	  even	  if	  this	  claim	  is	  not	  enforceable	  or	  can	  be	  overridden.	  Pogge	  himself	  is	  a	  cosmopolitan.	  Pogge	  argues	  that	  Rawls	  is	  wrong	  to	  take	  such	  a	  different	  approach	  to	   justice	   in	   the	   global	   context	   than	   in	   the	   domestic	   sphere	   (Pogge	   2004).	   This	  indicates	   that	   Pogge	   does	   not	   put	   forward	   the	   harm	   approach	   because	   the	  existence	   of	   harm	   is	   necessary	   to	   ground	   a	   claim	   to	   help	   the	   poor,	   but	   rather,	  because	  there	  are	  distinct	  advantages	  to	  the	  harm	  approach.	  	  	   b) Rhetorical	  force	  Pogge	   is	   concerned	   that	   our	   theory	   of	   global	   justice	   should	  motivate	   people	   into	  action	   (2010:	  179).	   Framing	  duties	   in	   terms	  of	  harm	  gives	   them	  rhetorical	   force.	  However,	  one	  might	  reject	  this	  as	  a	  good	  reason	  for	  focusing	  on	  harm.	  At	  least	  from	  a	  philosophical	  perspective,	  what	  matters	  is	  that	  our	  duties	  are	  based	  on	  plausible	  grounds	   rather	   than	   politically	   efficacious	   grounds.	   In	   any	   case,	   instead	   of	   being	  motivated	  by	  the	  idea	  that	  we	  harm	  the	  poor,	  we	  might	  instead	  be	  psychologically	  resistant	  to	  allegations	  of	  moral	  culpability.	   It	   is	  noteworthy	  that	  charities	  mostly	  do	  not	  base	  their	  appeals	  for	  support	  on	  the	  idea	  that	  we	  are	  harming	  the	  poor,	  but	  rather	  that	  minimal	  sacrifice	  from	  us	  could	  be	  of	  significant	  assistance	  to	  people	  in	  need.	   This	  may	   be	   because	   basing	   claims	   on	   need	  more	   effectively	  motivates	   us,	  which	  would	  undermine	  Pogge’s	  strategy.	  Or	  perhaps	  the	  idea	  that	  we	  should	  help	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  is	  more	   intuitive	   and	  more	   plausible	   to	   people	   than	   the	   claim	   that	  we	   harm	   the	  poor.	  	  	  c) Wide	  appeal	  There	  is	  somewhat	  of	  an	  impasse	  within	  the	  topic	  of	  global	  justice.	  Some	  argue	  that	  the	   principles	   of	   justice	   that	   Rawls	   develops	   in	   the	   context	   of	   a	   state	   should	   be	  extended	   and	   applied	   to	   the	   global	   sphere.	   Others,	   including	   egalitarians	   about	  domestic	   justice,	   deny	   that	   the	   global	   context	   bears	   the	   features	   that	   make	  principles	  of	  social	   justice	  appropriate.	  Libertarians	  also	  object	  to	  duties	  of	  global	  justice	   for	   the	   reasons	   for	  which	   they	   oppose	   domestic	   distributive	   justice;	   only	  recognising	   negative	   duties	   of	   forbearance.	   The	   reason	  why	   Pogge	  may	   focus	   on	  harm	   is	   because	   while	   people	   disagree	   over	   whether	   we	   have	   positive	   duties	  towards	  the	  poor,	  anyone	  can	  agree	  that	  we	  have	  negative	  duties	  not	  to	  harm	  the	  poor.	  This	   is	  Pogge’s	  ecumenical	  strategy.	  Pogge’s	  aim	   is	   to	  make	  headway	   in	   the	  debate	   by	   putting	   forward	   a	   theory	   compatible	  with	   all	   the	   leading	   positions	   on	  social	   justice.	   Pogge’s	   intention	   also	   seems	   to	   be	   to	   persuade	   as	  many	   people	   as	  possible	   that	   we	   have	   duties	   to	   the	   poor,	   in	   order	   to	  make	   a	   greater	   impact	   on	  addressing	  poverty.	  	  However,	  the	  ecumenical	  strategy	  does	  not	  require	  the	  harm	  approach.	  Proponents	  of	  almost	  any	  theory	  of	  justice,	  including	  libertarians,	  and	  those	  who	  reject	  duties	  of	  justice	  in	  the	  domestic	  sphere,	  accept	  that	  we	  have	  demanding	  positive	  duties	  of	  charity	  to	  aid	  others.	  	   d) Necessary	  to	  ground	  duties	  of	  justice	  	  However,	  Pogge	  may	  want	  our	  duties	  towards	  the	  poor	  to	  be	  duties	  of	  justice,	  not	  mere	  charity.	  Although	  there	   is	  agreement	  that	  we	  have	  positive	  duties	  of	  charity	  towards	  the	  poor,	  there	  is	  disagreement	  about	  whether	  we	  have	  positive	  duties	  of	  
justice	  towards	  the	  global	  poor.	  However,	  most	  agree	  that	  we	  have	  negative	  duties	  of	   justice.	  Therefore,	   it	  would	  be	  useful	   to	   frame	  our	  duties	  as	  negative	  duties	  of	  justice.	  Bringing	  harm	  into	  the	  picture	  makes	  the	  link	  with	  justice,	  rather	  than	  only	  beneficence.	   Two	   further	   questions,	   however,	   arise.	   First,	   one	  may	   ask	  why	   it	   is	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  important	  that	  our	  duties	  to	  the	  poor	  be	  duties	  of	  justice.	  Secondly,	  if	  our	  duties	  are	  duties	  of	  justice,	  one	  may	  question	  whether	  it	  is	  necessary	  that	  these	  be	  grounded	  on	  harm.	  	  	  It	   is	   often	   suggested	   that	   framing	   duties	   as	   duties	   of	   charity	   or	   assistance	   is	  inadequate;	  that	  we	  have	  settled	  for	  lesser	  duties	  if	  they	  are	  based	  on	  mere	  charity	  rather	   than	   justice.	  However,	   this	  may	   be	   a	  misconception.	  Our	   duties	   of	   charity	  may	  be	  as	  stringent	  and	  extensive	  as	  duties	  of	  justice.	  Pogge	  does	  not	  say	  what	  the	  difference	   is	   between	   charity	   and	   justice,	   or	  why	   it	   is	   important	   that	   our	   duties	  should	   be	   duties	   of	   justice.	   Pogge’s	   approach	   is	   not	   compelling	   without	   an	  explanation	  of	  why	  duties	  of	  charity	  are	  inadequate	  for	  his	  aims.	  It	  is	  necessary,	  on	  Pogge’s	   behalf,	   to	   explore	   this	   distinction.	   The	   key	   difference	   is	   that	   duties	   of	  charity	   are	   regarded	   as	   imperfect	   duties,	   whereas	   duties	   of	   justice	   are	   perfect	  duties.	  We	  are	  able	  to	  specify	  what	  it	  is	  for	  a	  perfect	  duty	  to	  be	  fulfilled,	  whereas,	  there	   is	   no	   upper	   or	   lower	   limit	   on	   what	   complying	   with	   an	   imperfect	   duty	  requires.	   I	   shall	   further	  discuss	   the	  distinction	  between	   justice	  and	  charity	   in	   the	  third	  chapter.	  	  I	  do	  not	  think	  that	  it	  is	  implausible	  to	  argue	  from	  a	  conviction	  that	  considerations	  of	  justice	  arise	  in	  the	  global	  sphere.	  However,	  Pogge	  does	  not	  explain	  why	  he	  holds	  this	  conviction.	  Perhaps,	  Pogge’s	  view	  is	  simply	  that	  duties	  of	  justice	  arise	  because	  we	  harm	  distant	  others.	  However,	   it	  seems	  that	  Pogge	  draws	  on	  harm	  in	  order	  to	  argue	  that	  we	  have	  duties	  of	  justice.	  Pogge’s	  approach	  is	  to	  find	  a	  way	  of	  convincing	  most	  people	  that	  we	  have	  duties	  of	  justice;	  ‘confronting	  these	  people	  with	  negative	  
duties….may	  well	  have	  a	  much	  greater	  positive	  impact	  on	  many’	  (2010:	  179).	  Pogge	  starts	  with	   the	  aim	  of	   showing	   that	  we	  have	  duties	  of	   justice,	  not	  with	   the	  belief	  that	   harm	   occurs.	   However,	   the	   basis	   of	   our	   theory	   should	   be	   what	   is	   most	  plausible,	   not	   what	   is	   most	   politically	   efficacious.	  What	   seems	  most	   true	   is	   that	  there	  are	  unfair	  inequalities	  between	  rich	  and	  poor	  in	  the	  global	  sphere.	  This	  is	  the	  appropriate	  starting	  point	  in	  developing	  an	  account	  of	  global	  justice.	  I	  shall	  further	  press	  this	  argument	  in	  the	  third	  chapter.	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   e) Negative	  duties	  I	  have	  been	  exploring	  why	  Pogge	  would	  base	  duties	  to	  the	  poor	  on	  harm	  when	  it	  seems	   intuitive	   that	   we	   have	   positive	   duties	   to	   help	   people	   in	   need.	   However,	  Pogge	  does	  not	  deny	  that	  we	  have	  positive	  duties	  to	  the	  poor.	  Rather,	  Pogge	  thinks	  it	  advantageous	  to	  frame	  our	  duties	  as	  negative	  duties	  (2010:	  195).	  	  Pogge	  puts	  forward	  a	  view	  which	  can	  resist	  the	  objection	  that	  principles	  of	  social	  and	   economic	   justice	   on	   the	   global	   scale	   would	   be	   too	   demanding	   (2007:	   18).	  Pogge	   adheres	   to	   the	   view	   that	   negative	   duties	   are	   less	   demanding;	   they	   only	  require	  our	  forbearance	  (2007:	  20).	  However,	  this	  is	  not	  always	  the	  case.	  A	  positive	  duty	  may	  require	  an	  action	  that	  is	  very	  easy	  to	  carry	  out;	  for	  example,	  lifting	  a	  baby	  out	  of	  a	  puddle.	  Additionally,	  at	  times,	  refraining	  from	  acting	  may	  be	  difficult.	  We	  can	  draw	  on	  Pogge’s	  own	  theory	  to	  illustrate	  this	  point.	  Pogge	  claims	  that	  we	  harm	  the	  poor	  through	  participating	  in	  the	  global	  commercial	  system,	  which	  has	  harmful	  effects	  on	  the	  poor	  (2007:	  16).	  Accepting	  that	  we	  harm	  the	  poor	  in	  this	  way	  for	  the	  sake	   of	   argument,	   these	   harms	   are	   a	   result	   of	   a	   complicated	   interplay	   of	   factors,	  and	  the	  actions	  of	  many	  different	  agents.	  It	   is	  hard	  to	  foresee	  the	  ramifications	  of	  our	  actions	  and	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  what	  alternative	  ways	  of	  acting	  are	  available	  to	  us.	  It	  is	   not	   straightforward	   to	   simply	   remove	   our	   harmful	   contribution	   to	   the	   global	  order.	  Negative	  duties	  are	  not	  always	  easy	  to	  fulfil.	  	  	  The	  other	  key	  feature	  of	  negative	  duties,	  which	  Pogge	  emphasises,	  is	  that	  they	  are	  often	  considered	  to	  be	  more	  morally	  stringent	  that	  positive	  duties	  (2008:	  203).	  For	  example,	   it	  would	   be	  wrong	   of	  me	   not	   to	   help	   the	   victim	   of	   a	   car-­‐cash	   if	   I	   am	   a	  bystander,	  but	  it	  would	  be	  even	  more	  wrong	  if	  I	  am	  the	  driver	  responsible	  for	  the	  victim’s	  harm	  (Pogge	  2011:	  16).	  This	  is	  not	  always	  the	  case;	  the	  positive	  duty	  to	  lift	  a	   child	   out	   of	   a	   puddle	   seems	   stronger	   than	   the	   negative	   duty	   not	   to	   steal	   my	  classmate’s	   pen.	   Perhaps	   the	   idea	   is	   that	   negative	   duties	   are	   stronger	   than	   their	  positive	  counterparts;	  my	  duty	  to	  not	  drown	  a	  child	  in	  a	  puddle	  is	  stronger	  than	  my	  duty	   to	   rescue	  a	   child	  drowning	   in	  a	  puddle.	  Or	  my	  duty	  not	   to	   steal	  your	  pen	   is	  stronger	  than	  my	  duty	  to	  lend	  you	  one.	  Even	  this	  may	  be	  doubted,	  refusing	  to	  lend	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  you	  a	  pen,	   if	   I	   have	  one	   spare,	  may	  display	  a	   cold-­‐heartedness	   that	   seems	  worse	  than	  stealing	  your	  pen,	  when	  I	  have	  need	  for	  one.	  	  	  Perhaps,	   however,	   even	   if	   negative	   duties	   are	   not	   always	   stronger	   than	   positive	  duties;	  they	  do	  seem	  to	  be	  in	  the	  case	  we	  are	  considering.	  Pogge	  writes	  that:	  	  ‘Nearly	  everyone	  in	  the	  affluent	  countries	  would	  agree	  that	  our	  moral	  duty	  not	  
to	  contribute	  to	  the	  imposition	  of	  conditions	  of	  extreme	  poverty	  on	  people	  and	  
our	  moral	  duty	  to	  help	  protect	  people	  from	  harm	  in	  whose	  production	  we	  are	  
implicated	   in	   this	  way	  are	  each	  more	   stringent	   than	  our	  moral	  duty	   to	  help	  
protect	   people	   from	   harm	   in	   whose	   production	   we	   are	   not	   materially	  
involved.’12	  Our	   duties	   to	   the	   poor	   would	   seem	   to	   be	   stronger	   if	   we	   are	   in	   some	   way	  responsible	   for	   their	  situation	  than	   if	  we	  are	  not.	  However,	   this	  conviction	  seems	  weakened	  when	  we	  reflect	  on	  how	  Pogge	  suggests	  we	  are	  responsible.	  Our	  duties	  to	   the	  poor	  would	  be	  minimal	  as	  our	  contribution	   to	   the	  global	  order,	  and	   to	   the	  situation	  of	  the	  poor,	  is	  negligible.	  Our	  positive	  duties	  to	  help	  the	  poor,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  given	  their	  desperate	  situation,	  may	  be	  very	  demanding;	  they	  may	  be	  more	  extensive	   than	  our	  negative	  duties	   in	   this	  case.	  Some	  agents	  have	  a	   larger	  role	   in	  shaping	   the	   global	   order.	   However,	   as	   a	   general	   claim,	   it	   seems	   false	   that	   our	  negative	  duties	  are	  necessarily	  stronger	  than	  our	  positive	  duties	  towards	  the	  global	  poor.	  f) Captures	  the	  true	  moral	  picture	  Our	   concern	  with	   harm	  may	   not	   just	   be	   strategic.	  We	  may	   concentrate	   on	   harm	  because	  we	  do,	   in	   fact,	  harm	  the	  poor,	  and	  our	  moral	   theory	  should	  capture	   this.	  While	  Pogge	  does	  not	  emphasise	  this	  as	  a	  key	  reason	  for	  focusing	  on	  harm,	  Pogge	  suggests	  that	  it	  is	  misleading	  to	  only	  focus	  on	  our	  positive	  duties	  to	  the	  poor,	  and	  ignore	  how	  we	  are	   implicated	   in	   their	  adverse	  situation	  (Pogge	  2005:	  35-­‐6).	   It	   is	  not	   clear	   if	   Pogge	   encourages	   this	   attention	   on	   harm	   because	   it	   is	   important	   in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  p46,	  Pogge,	  T.	  2005,	  ‘Real	  World	  Justice’	  The	  Journal	  of	  Ethics,	  9:	  pp.29–53	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  itself	   to	   accurately	   represent	   the	   situation,	   or	   because	   highlighting	   that	   harm	  occurs	   allows	   Pogge	   to	   base	   duties	   on	   harm	   for	   the	   reasons	   mentioned	   above.	  Capturing	   an	   accurate	  moral	   picture	   of	   the	   global	   reality	   is	   one	   of	   the	   strongest	  reasons	   for	   taking	   the	   harm	   approach.	   However,	   I	   would	   add	   an	   important	  qualification	   to	   this	   regarding	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   harm	   approach.	   There	   are	  many	  cases	   of	   affluent	   countries’	   governments,	   companies,	   and	   at	   times,	   their	   citizens	  harming	   the	   poor.	   However,	   I	   do	   not	   think	   that	   these	   instances	   should	   form	   the	  basis	  of	  our	  duties	  to	  the	  poor,	  as	  these	  are	  isolated	  cases.	  Relative	  to	  the	  entirety	  of	  the	  interactions	  between	  rich	  and	  poor	  in	  the	  global	  sphere,	  these	  cases	  are	  too	  few	   to	   ground	   the	  duties	   that	   each	  one	  of	  us	  has	   towards	   the	  poor.	  Nonetheless,	  when	   citizens,	   companies	   or	   governments	   harm	   the	   poor,	   they	   have	   duties	   of	  justice	  to	  stop	  harming	  or	  to	  compensate	  for	  the	  harm,	  or	  both.	  Our	  duties	  should	  be	   based	   on	   the	   most	   relevant	   moral	   concept	   in	   the	   situation.	   It	   may	   also	   be	  paradoxical	   to	  act	  upon	  a	  positive	  duty	   to	  help	  while	  continuing	   to	  actively	  harm	  the	  poor.	  	  	   g) Efficiency	  There	  is	  also	  a	  pragmatic	  reason	  for	  focusing	  on	  harm.	  If	  we	  harm	  the	  poor,	  it	  may	  be	  most	  efficient	  and	  effective	   to	   focus	  our	  efforts	  on	  simply	  not	  harming,	   rather	  than	   to	  persist	   in	  harming	  while	  providing	  humanitarian	  assistance.	   If	  our	  duties	  are	  framed	  as	  charitable	  duties	  to	  help,	  rather	  than	  duties	  of	  justice	  not	  to	  harm,	  we	  may	  fail	  to	  attend	  to	  the	  way	  we	  harm	  the	  poor,	  and	  merely	  give	  help	  in	  the	  form	  of	  aid.	  	  	  These	  are	  the	  advantages	  of	  the	  harm	  approach	  to	  which	  Pogge	  makes	  reference.	  I	  take	   Pogge’s	   key	   reasons	   for	   taking	   the	   harm	   approach	   to	   be	   first,	   to	   break	   the	  stalemate	  between	  proponents	  of	  different	  theories	  of	  justice	  by	  putting	  forward	  a	  theory	   compatible	   with	   the	   views	   of	   all.	   Secondly,	   through	   this,	   Pogge	   hopes	   to	  persuade	  as	  many	  people	  as	  possible	   that	  we	  have	  duties	   to	   the	  global	  poor.	  The	  strongest	   reason	   for	   focusing	   on	  harm	   is	   to	   accurately	   represent	   relations	   in	   the	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  global	   sphere.	   This	   is	   a	   reason	   for	   focusing	   on	   harm	   even	   if	   we	   think	   duties	   of	  charity	  are	  largely	  adequate	  for	  grounding	  claims	  and	  meeting	  them.	  	  	  The	  necessary	  task	  is	  to	  assess	  how	  plausible	  it	  is	  to	  claim	  that	  we	  harm	  the	  poor.	  Highlighting	  the	  aims	  of	  Pogge’s	   theory	  reveals	   the	  criteria	  that	  Pogge’s	  notion	  of	  harm	   has	   to	   fulfil	   for	   the	   harm	   approach	   to	   be	   successful.	   Pogge’s	   definition	   of	  harm	  must	  meet	  with	  most	  people’s	  intuitions	  about	  what	  counts	  as	  harm,	  and	  be	  such	  that	  if	  harm	  does	  occur,	  duties	  of	  justice	  follow	  from	  this.	  I	  shall	  now	  turn	  to	  assess	  Pogge’s	  argument.	  	  	  Pogge’s	  argument	  	  In	   putting	   forward	   the	   harm	   approach,	   Pogge	   makes	   several	   instructive	   points	  about	  the	  global	  situation.	  Pogge	  presents	  data	  that	  clearly	  indicates	  that,	  whatever	  the	  basis	  and	  character	  of	  our	  duties	  to	  the	  poor,	  the	  claims	  that	  the	  poor	  make	  on	  us	  are	  not	  being	  adequately	  met.	  In	  addition,	  Pogge	  captures	  something	  distinctive	  about	  the	  global	  picture.	  Pogge	  refers	  to	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  rich	  countries	  levy	  their	  power	   and	   influence	   to	   make	   decisions	   and	   enact	   policies	   which	   work	   in	   their	  favour,	   while	   having	   detrimental	   consequences	   for	   poorer	   countries.	   These	   are	  pertinent	  features	  of	  the	  global	  order,	  which	  may	  have	  a	  bearing	  on	  the	  duties	  we	  have	  to	  the	  poor.	  However,	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  the	  harm	  approach	  is	  the	  right	  one	   to	   take.	  There	  may	  be	  certain	  additional	  moral	  duties	  based	  on	   these	  harms,	  but	  we	  should	  not	  derive	  all	  our	  duties	  towards	  the	  poor	  from	  these	  cases	  of	  harm.	  Moreover,	  these	  may	  not	  be	  situations	  of	  the	  rich	  harming	  the	  poor	  but	  rather	  the	  rich	   states	   failing	   to	  help	   the	  poor,	   or	  disadvantaging,	  or	   taking	  advantage	  of	   the	  poor.	  	  	  	  Above,	   I	   stated	   that	   the	   second	   premise	   of	   Pogge’s	   argument	   requires	   a	  philosophical	  as	  well	  as	  empirical	  explanation	  of	  why	  it	  is	  appropriate	  to	  label	  the	  behaviour	  of	   the	  rich	   towards	   the	  poor	  as	  harm.	   I	  briefly	  discussed	   the	  empirical	  aspect	   to	   this	   question.	   I	   shall	   now	   address	   Pogge’s	   philosophical	   case.	   I	   do	   not	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  think	   that	  Pogge	  gives	  a	  sufficient	  explanation	  of	  how	  it	   is	   that	   the	  rich	  harm	  the	  poor.	  However,	  this	  is	  not	  to	  rule	  out	  that	  a	  more	  thorough	  argument	  and	  analysis	  could	  be	  provided	  in	  support	  of	  the	  premise.	  	  	  Pogge’s	  discussion	  of	  harm	  	  Pogge	  notes	  that	  harm	  is	  usually	  a	  comparative	  notion;	  when	  we	  say	  that	  a	  person	  is	  harmed,	  we	  often	  mean	  that	  they	  are	  made	  worse	  off	  than	  they	  were	  before.	  The	  comparison	   is	   generally	  made	  with	   reference	   to	   a	   historical	   baseline	   (2008:	   19).	  However,	  Pogge	  finds	  a	  diachronic	  understanding	  of	  harm	  to	  be	  inappropriate.	  This	  is	  because	  a	  person	  may	  become	  better	  off	  compared	  to	  an	  earlier	  time	  period,	  and	  yet	  may	   remain	   in	   a	   situation	  we	  would	  want	   to	  describe	   as	  harm.	   For	   example,	  Pogge	  points	  out	  that	  if	  a	  man	  starts	  to	  beat	  his	  family	  less	  than	  he	  used	  to,	  he	  has	  not	   benefited	   them,	   rather,	   he	   continues	   to	   harm	   them	   (2008:	   23).	   If,	   in	   a	   slave-­‐owning	   society,	   new	   reforms	   improve	   the	   conditions	   of	   slaves,	   the	   institutional	  arrangements	   that	   allow	   slavery	   to	   persist	   still	   harm	   the	   slaves	   (2008:	   23).	  Historical	   baselines	   reveal	   that	   poverty	   is	   decreasing;	   however,	   while	   poverty	  persists,	  Pogge	  wants	  to	  say	  that	   the	  poor	  are	  harmed	  by	  the	  global	  order.	  Pogge	  insists	  that	  because	  people	  who	  are	  harmed	  by	  the	  global	  order	  can	  be	  shown	  to	  be	  benefitted	   according	   to	   a	   diachronic	   baseline,	   some	   other	   baseline	   is	   required	  (2007:40).	  	  Pogge	  claims	  that	  the	  poor	  are	  harmed	  because	  they	  are	  worse	  off	  than	  they	  would	  be	  under	  a	  feasible,	  reasonably	  attainable,	  alternative	  arrangement	  (2008:	  25).	  The	  claim	   is	   not	   that	   the	   poor	   are	   not	   as	   well-­‐off	   as	   they	   could	   be	   under	   different	  arrangements	   and	   are	   thereby	   harmed.	   Rather,	   it	   is	   that	   the	   current	   situation	  involves	  a	  human	  rights	  deficit;	   the	  poor	  do	  not	  have	  even	  their	  basic	  needs	  met,	  and	   these	   needs	   would	   be	   met	   under	   an	   alternative	   arrangement	   (2010:	   195).	  Moreover,	   this	   deficit	   is	   foreseeable	   and	   reasonably	   avoidable	   (195).	   The	   rich	  states	   harm	   the	  poor	   by	   contributing	   to	   the	   unjust	   global	   order,	  while	   there	   is	   a	  feasible,	   just	  alternative	  (2008:	  26).	  Using	  this	  subjunctive	  baseline,	  Pogge	  claims	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  that	  the	  poor	  are	  harmed.	  However,	  there	  are	  problems	  with	  Pogge’s	  analysis.	  First	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  way	  that	  Pogge	  identifies	  harm	  is	  ambiguous,	  second	  I	  discuss	  that	  Pogge’s	   notion	   of	   harm	   fails	   to	   meet	   the	   aims	   of	   the	   approach,	   first	   because	   it	  would	   be	   rejected	   by	   a	   libertarian,	   secondly	   because	   it	   presupposes	   the	   moral	  claims	   that	   the	   harm	   approach	   is	   intended	   to	   ground.	  	  	  Baselines	  	  First	   I	   discuss	   the	   baseline	   that	   Pogge	   employs	   against	  which	   to	  measure	   harm.	  Pogge	  quickly	   considers	   and	   rejects	   the	  historical	   baseline.	  However,	   a	   historical	  baseline	  may	  support	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  global	  order	  harms	  the	  poor.	  First,	  many	  empirical	   studies	   show	   the	   gap	   between	   the	   global	   rich	   and	   global	   poor	   has	  widened.	  Relative	  inequality	  does	  not	  only	  make	  the	  worse	  off	  feel	  more	  badly-­‐off,	  but	  also	  is	  a	  contributing	  cause	  of	  poverty	  (Van	  Treeck	  2013).	  In	  addition,	  many	  of	  the	  gains	  in	  wealth	  have	  not	  been	  felt	  by	  the	  absolute	  poorest,	  and	  there	  are	  some	  countries	   in	  which	  poverty	  has	  not	  diminished	   in	  recent	  years.	  Moreover,	  we	  can	  take	  a	  slightly	  different	  focus,	  assessing	  not	  just	  how	  the	  poor	  have	  fared	  over	  time	  as	   a	   result	   of	   interaction	   with	   rich	   states,	   but	   addressing	   specific	   instances	   of	  interaction.	   The	   powerful	   states	   pursue	   individual	   policies	   that	   make	   the	   poor	  worse	  off	  than	  if	  they	  did	  not	  impose	  these	  policies.	  For	  example,	  when	  a	  country	  puts	   in	  place	  a	  protectionist	  policy,	  restricting	  exports	   from	  poor	  countries,	   these	  countries	   are	   made	   worse	   off	   than	   before	   this	   protectionism	   was	   enforced.	  However,	   Pogge	  wants	   to	   ground	   a	   general	   set	   of	   duties	   based	   on	   harm,	   so	   it	   is	  important	  to	  show	  that	  the	  global	  worse	  off	  are	  harmed	  overall	  by	  the	  global	  order.	  Moreover,	  it	  may	  be	  right	  to	  reject	  the	  diachronic	  baseline.	  Someone	  can	  be	  harmed	  even	  if	  they	  are	  not	  made	  worse	  off	  than	  they	  were	  before.	  	  	  Though	   the	   diachronic	   baseline	   is	   flawed,	   we	   should	   not	   move	   from	   this	   to	  accepting	   Pogge’s	   subjunctive	   baseline.	   There	   are	   other	   possible	   conceptions	   of	  harm	  we	  should	  consider.	  A	  comparative	  sense	  of	  harm	  is	  only	  one	  way	  of	  thinking	  about	   harm.	   We	   may	   regard	   a	   person	   as	   being	   in	   a	   harmful	   state,	   without	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  comparing	   this	   state	   to	   a	   previous	   or	   a	   hypothetical	   state.	   I	   shall	   explore	   non-­‐comparative	  accounts	  of	  harm	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	  There	  are,	  moreover,	  difficulties	  with	  Pogge’s	  subjunctive	  baseline.	  Pogge	  claims	  that	  the	  poor	  are	  harmed	  by	  being	  subject	   to	   an	   unjust	   global	   order	  while	   a	  more	   just	   alternative	   is	   available.	  Does	  this	   mean	   that	   without	   this	   alternative,	   the	   poor	   would	   not	   be	   harmed,	   despite	  being	  subject	   to	  an	  unjust	  global	  order?	   If	   this	   is	   the	  case,	   the	  normative	  claim	   is	  greatly	   affected	  by	  empirical	  matters.	  This	   invites	   a	   line	  of	  questioning	  assessing	  how	   attainable	   this	   alternative	   is.	  When	  we	   consider	  what	  would	   be	   required	   to	  ensure	  stable,	  just	  global	  arrangements,	  we	  may	  doubt	  that	  this	  would	  be	  feasible	  to	   bring	   about	   (Risse	   2005:	   376).	   If	   this	   alternative	   would	   not	   be	   sufficiently	  feasible,	   this	   undermines	   the	   claim	   that	   the	   global	   order	   harms	   the	   poor	   by	  maintaining	  the	  status	  quo.	  	  	  The	   existence	   of	   an	   alternative	   situation	   under	   which	   the	   poor	   fare	   better	   is	  important	  for	  the	  argument.	  In	  other	  words,	  Pogge	  adheres	  to	  a	  comparative	  notion	  of	  harm,	  where	  the	  relevant	  comparison	   is	  a	   feasible	  alternative	  under	  which	  the	  poor	  are,	  at	  a	  minimum,	  able	  to	  meet	  their	  basic	  needs.	  I	   identify	  several	  possible	  scenarios	   that	   Pogge	   may	   have	   in	   mind	   in	   putting	   forward	   his	   explanation	   of	  harming.	  One	  issue	  is	  that	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  which	  scenario	  Pogge	  is	  referring	  to	  in	  his	  argument.	  The	  other	  key	  difficulty	  is	  that	  many	  of	  these	  scenarios	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  situations	  of	  harm.	  I	  shall	  outline	  the	  scenarios	  and	  then	  discuss	  each	  one.	  	  With	  respect	  to	  a	  feasible	  alternative:	  1)	  If	  A	  interacted	  with	  B,	  B	  would	  be	  at	  a	  higher	  level	  	  	  2)	  If	  A	  interacted	  differently	  with	  B,	  B	  would	  be	  at	  a	  higher	  level	  	  3)	  If	  A	  did	  not	  interact	  with	  B,	  B	  would	  be	  at	  a	  higher	  level	  4)	  If	  A	  interacted	  with	  B,	  B	  would	  be	  at	  a	  level	  above	  sufficiency	  	  	  5)	  If	  A	  interacted	  differently	  with	  B,	  B	  would	  be	  at	  a	  level	  above	  sufficiency	  6)	  If	  A	  did	  not	  interact	  with	  B,	  B	  would	  be	  at	  a	  level	  above	  sufficiency	  	  Scenario	  1	  would	  not	  strike	  most	  people	  as	  a	  situation	  of	  harm.	  We	  may	  ask	  why,	  just	  because	  someone	  is	  at	  a	  lower	  level	  of	  well-­‐being	  than	  they	  could	  be,	  they	  are	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  harmed.	  Merely	  being	  worse	  off	  than	  one	  would	  be	  in	  a	  feasible	  alternative	  is	  not	  to	  be	  harmed.	  For	  example,	   if	   you	  approach	  me	  with	  services	  or	  goods	   to	   sell	   and	   I	  decline	   the	   offer,	   leaving	   you	   without	   an	   additional	   customer,	   most	   would	   not	  agree	   that	   I	   have	  harmed	  you.	  The	   same	   can	  be	   said	   for	   Scenario	  2.	   If	   I	   agree	   to	  purchase	  your	  goods	  at	  a	  low	  rate,	  even	  though	  I	  have	  enough	  money	  to	  offer	  you	  a	  good	  price,	  most	  again,	  would	  not	  agree	  that	  I	  have	  harmed	  you.	  Perhaps,	  however,	  there	  are	  cases	  of	  omission	  which	  seem	  to	  be	  harms;	  as	  Mill	  states;	   ‘a	  person	  may	  
cause	   evil	   to	  others	  not	  only	  by	  his	  action	  but	  by	  his	   inaction’	   (Mill	  1982:	  70).	   For	  example,	   if	   I	   could	   stop	   you	   from	   being	   crushed	   by	   a	   huge	   weight	   simply	   by	  pressing	   a	   button,	   if	   I	   decide	   not	   press	   the	   button,	   some	   might	   say	   that	   I	   have	  harmed	   you.	   However,	   others	   would	   disagree.	   It	   is	   not	   straightforward	   to	   claim	  that	  an	  omission	  is	  a	  harm;	  further	  argumentation	  is	  required.	  I	  will	  discuss	  this	  in	  the	  next	  chapter	  	  Scenario	  3	   is	  different,	   it	   suggests	   that	  but	   for	  my	   interaction,	   you	  would	  be	  at	   a	  higher	   level	   than	   presently.	   Yet	   this	   still	   may	   not	   strike	   people	   as	   harm.	   For	  example,	   I	  open	  a	  shop	  next	   to	  yours,	   if	   it	  were	  not	   for	  my	  shop,	  you	  would	  have	  more	  business,	  and	  thus	  I	  keep	  you,	  or	  even	  bring	  you	  down	  to	  a	  lower	  level	  than	  you	   could	  be	   at.	   If	   you	   are	   still	  well-­‐off,	  many	  would	  deny	   I	   have	  harmed	  you.	   It	  seems	   to	  matter	  what	   level	  B	   is	   at.	  Merely	  being	  worse	  off	   than	  one	  could	  be,	  or	  was	  before,	  is	  not	  necessarily	  harm.	  	  	  Pogge	  states	  that	  the	  current	  global	  order	  does	  not	  even	  meet	  the	  minimal	  human	  rights	   of	   the	   poor,	   and	   these	   would	   be	   met	   under	   a	   feasible	   alternative	   set	   of	  arrangements.	  The	  relevant	  baseline	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  standard	  of	  basic	  human	  rights.	  Perhaps	  then	  Scenario	  4	  is	  the	  relevant	  one.	  However,	  many	  would	  maintain	  that	  if	  I	  fail	  to	  help	  you	  when	  you	  are	  badly-­‐off,	  I	  am	  culpable	  in	  some	  way,	  but	  I	  have	  not	  harmed	  you.	  In	  the	  scenario	  mentioned	  above,	  if	  I	  decline	  to	  buy	  your	  goods	  even	  though	  you	  are	  so	  poor	  that	  you	  are	  unable	  to	  meet	  your	  basic	  needs,	  many	  would	  still	  doubt	  that	  I	  harm	  you.	  Similarly	  in	  Scenario	  5,	  if	  I	  buy	  your	  goods	  but	  could	  buy	  them	  at	  a	  higher	  price	  which	  would	   lift	  you	  above	  sufficiency,	   I	   still	  do	  not	  harm	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  you	  by	  buying	  your	  goods	  at	  the	  lower	  price.	  Scenario	  6,	  where	  I	  interact	  with	  you	  in	   a	   way	   that	   brings	   you	   below	   a	   level	   of	   sufficiency	   would	   seem	   to	   meet	   our	  notions	   of	   what	   harm	   is.	   However,	   Pogge	   does	   not	   give	   an	   account	   of	   the	  interaction	   of	   the	   rich	   states	   with	   the	   poor	   that	   shows	   that	   this	   scenario	   fits.	   It	  seems	  that	  the	  poor	  would	  be	  better	  off	  if	  we	  interacted	  differently,	  but	  would	  not	  necessarily	  be	  better	  off	  if	  we	  withdrew	  our	  interaction	  with	  them.	  	  	  Failing	  to	  meet	  a	  person’s	  urgent	  needs	  is	  not	  necessarily	  harm	  or	  injustice.	  When	  we	   look	   closely	   at	   the	   possible	   claims	   that	   Pogge	   makes,	   the	   most	   plausible	  understanding	   of	   the	   situation	   is	   that	  we	   fail	   to	   help	   the	   poor,	   rather	   than	  harm	  them.	  Situations	  3	  and	  6,	  which	  suggest	  that	  the	  poor	  would	  be	  better	  off	  without	  our	  interaction,	  are	  not	  empirically	  plausible.	  Scenarios	  1,	  2,	  4,	  and	  5	  more	  closely	  fit	  the	  global	  picture,	  but	  if	  these	  describe	  situations	  of	  harm,	  the	  concept	  of	  harm	  is	  being	   used	   in	   a	  way	   that	   does	   not	   fit	  most	   people’s	   use	   or	   understanding	   of	   the	  notion.	  Some	  of	  these	  types	  of	  interaction	  for	  example,	  failing	  to	  bring	  someone	  to	  a	  level	   above	   sufficiency	  may,	   at	   times,	   count	   as	  harming.	  This	  depends	  on	   several	  factors,	   such	   as,	   the	   attitude	   of	   the	   person.	   Pogge	   cannot	   judge	   that	   harm	   has	  occurred	  merely	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  the	  affluent	  states	  contribute	  to	  an	  unjust	  global	  order	  when	  a	  more	  just	  alternative	  is	  feasibly	  attainable.	  An	  even	  more	  significant	  problem	  is	  that	  Pogge’s	  notion	  of	  harm	  would	  not	  be	  accepted	  by	  those	  whom	  the	  harm	  approach	  is	  intended	  to	  convince.	  I	  shall	  explain	  this	  next.	  	  	  Harm	  and	  positive	  duties	  	  Several	  critics	  have	  pointed	  out	  that	  although	  Pogge	  wants	  to	  base	  duties	  of	  justice	  only	  on	  violations	  of	  negative	  duties,	  the	  premises	  he	  relies	  on	  putting	  forward	  his	  argument	  that	  the	  affluent	  harm	  the	  poor	  presuppose	  that	  we	  have	  positive	  duties	  of	  justice	  to	  the	  poor	  (Tan	  2010,	  Patten	  2005:	  20,	  Satz	  2005:	  53).	  The	  affluent	  harm	  the	  poor,	   according	   to	  Pogge,	  because	   they	   fail	   to	  establish	  alternative,	  more	   just	  arrangements.	  This	  seems	  to	  assume	  that	  there	  is	  a	  positive	  duty	  to	  establish	  these	  arrangements.	   Many,	   however,	   would	   hold	   that	   the	   affluent	   owe	   no	   duty	   to	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  establish	  a	  more	  favourable,	  alternative	  set	  of	  global	  arrangements	  (Tan	  2010:	  60).	  The	  way	  in	  which	  the	  affluent	  might	  have	  violated	  a	  negative	  duty	  of	  forbearance	  towards	  the	  poor	  is	  if	  they	  force	  these	  arrangements	  upon	  them.	  However,	  the	  rich	  nations	  do	  not	  obviously	  and	   invariably	   force	   the	  poor	  countries	   to	   interact	  with	  them.	   The	   affluent	   countries	   opt	   to	   offer	   unfavourable	   rather	   than	   advantageous	  arrangements	  to	  the	  poor	  states.	  It	  seems	  true	  that	  the	  rich	  take	  advantage	  of	  the	  needy	   situation	   of	   the	   poor,	   however,	   being	   taken	   advantage	   of	   does	   not	  necessarily	   amount	   to	  being	   treated	  unjustly	  or	  being	  harmed.	  Pogge’s	   argument	  that	   the	   poor	   are	   treated	   unjustly	   by	   being	   harmed	   would	   not	   persuade	   a	  libertarian,	  which	  he	  aims	  to	  do,	  because	  the	  notion	  of	  harm	  that	  is	  being	  used,	  the	  baseline	  being	   invoked,	   goes	  beyond	  what	  a	   libertarian	  would	  accept	   (Tan	  2010:	  60,	  Patten	  2005:	  20,	  Satz	  2005:	  53).	  	  Harm,	  justice,	  and	  human	  rights	  	  Pogge	  points	  out	  that	  these	  critics	  misunderstand	  his	  approach.	  Pogge's	  strategy	  is	  not	   to	  provide	  an	   independently	  specified	  notion	  of	  harm,	  and	  then	  argue	   that	   in	  virtue	  of	  this	  harm,	  there	  is	   injustice.	   Instead,	  Pogge	  conceives	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  harm	  and	  injustice	  in	  the	  reverse	  way	  (2010:	  193).	  Pogge's	  approach	  is	  to	  provide	  an	   independently	  specified	  conception	  of	  social	   justice,	  and	  argue	   that	   in	  virtue	  of	  this	  injustice,	  the	  poor	  are	  harmed.	  Pogge’s	  argument	  can	  be	  stated	  as:	  	  1. We	  harm	  the	  poor	  in	  so	  far	  as	  we	  help	  perpetuate	  an	  unjust	  global	  order	  2. The	  global	  order	  is	  unjust	  because	  it	  does	  not	  even	  respect	  essential	  human	  rights	  	  (2010:	  193)	  	  It	   seems	   that	   there	   are	   several	   associated	   concepts	   that	   Pogge	   may	   be	   defining	  harm	  in	  reference	  to;	  harm	  as	  injustice,	  harm	  as	  human	  rights	  violations,	  and	  harm	  as	  wronging.	  I	  shall	  discuss	  each	  in	  turn.	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  Harm	  as	  injustice	  	  The	  way	   in	  which	  we	   unjustly	   disadvantage	   the	   poor,	   and	   not	   just	   disadvantage	  them,	   according	   to	   Pogge,	   is	   by	   upholding	   a	   global	   order	   that	   is	   unjust;	   ‘an	  
institutional	   order	   harms	   people	   when	   its	   design	   can	   be	   shown	   to	   be	   unjust	   by	  
reference	  to	  a	  feasible	  alternative	  design’	  (2008:	  5).	  Of	  course	  Pogge	  must	  make	  the	  philosophical	   case	   that	   the	   global	   order	   is	   unjust.	   Here	   there	   is	   scope	   for	  disagreement.	  Pogge	  invokes	  a	  minimal	  criteria	  of	  justice,	  namely,	  ‘any	  institutional	  
order	   is	   unjust	   if	   it	   foreseeably	   produces	   a	   human	   rights	   deficit’	   (2008:	   25).	   A	  libertarian,	   Pogge	   claims,	   would	   agree	   with	   this	   definition	   (2010:	   193).	   Pogge’s	  view	  is	  that	  the	  affluent	  harm	  the	  poor	  through	  contributing	  to	  the	  perpetuation	  of	  unjust	  institutional	  arrangements.	  	  	  Defining	  harm	  as	   injustice	  has	   several	   advantages.	   First,	   it	   offers	  Pogge	   a	  way	  of	  answering	  the	  baseline	  problem,	  and	  thus	  maintaining	  that	  the	  poor	  are	  harmed	  by	  the	  global	  order.	  Secondly,	  by	   invoking	  a	  moralised	  notion	  of	  harm,	  showing	   that	  the	  rich	  harm	  the	  poor	  is	  sufficient	  to	  ground	  prima	  facie	  duties	  of	  justice.	  Thirdly,	  this	  preserves	  the	  ecumenical	  approach.	  Not	  labelling	  the	  poor	  as	  harmed	  in	  virtue	  of	   falling	   below	   a	   specified	   threshold	   allows	   Pogge’s	   theory	   to	   be	   acceptable	   to	  egalitarians	   who	   may	   define	   a	   social	   order	   as	   unjust,	   even	   if	   it	   meets	   minimal	  human	   rights	   standards,	   if	   it	   engenders	   large	   inequalities.	   Pogge’s	   strategy	   is	   to	  argue	   that	  we	  harm	  the	  poor,	  defining	  harm	   in	   terms	  of	   injustice	  and	   injustice	   in	  terms	  of	  a	  human	  rights	  deficit.	  According	  to	  Pogge,	  this	  allows	  duties	  of	  justice	  to	  be	  based	  on	  minimal	  moral	  commitments,	  and	  makes	  the	  approach	  persuasive	  to	  all	  (2010:	  193).	  	  	  However,	  there	  are	  several	  problems	  with	  the	  way	  that	  Pogge	  conceives	  of	  harm	  in	  terms	   of	   injustice.	   First,	   it	   remains	   unclear	   what	   harm	   is	   taken	   to	   be,	   secondly	  many	  would	  not	  agree	  with	  this	  way	  of	  defining	  harm,	  thirdly,	  defining	  harm	  in	  this	  way	  seems	  to	  negate	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  harm	  approach.	  As	  I	  said	  of	  Pogge’s	  general	  strategy	  of	  basing	  claims	  on	  harm,	  it	  may	  be	  efficacious	  to	  define	  harm	  as	  injustice;	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  however,	  this	  argumentative	  strategy	  may	  not	  be	  persuasive.	  It	  seems	  that	  Pogge	  is	  really	  making	  three	  distinct	  claims,	  namely:	  	  1. We	  harm	  the	  poor	  2. The	  global	  order	  is	  unjust	  3. The	  global	  order	  fails	  to	  meet	  the	  human	  rights	  of	  the	  poor	  	  	  Pogge,	  in	  pressing	  his	  claims,	  helps	  himself	  to	  different	  moral	  concepts,	  which	  may	  be	  relevant,	  but	  change	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  argument.	  If	  Pogge’s	  argument	  is	  that	  we	  owe	  the	  poor	  duties	  because	  we	  harm	  them,	  it	  may	  be	  more	  helpful	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  concept	  of	  harm,	   rather	   than	   to	  define	   the	  central	   concept	   in	   terms	  of	  associated	  concepts.	  	  	  Defining	  harm	  as	  injustice	  may	  not	  be	  met	  with	  agreement.	  It	  does	  not	  fit	  with	  most	  people’s	  understanding	  and	  everyday	  use	  of	  the	  term.	  Harm	  and	  injustice	  seem	  to	  come	   apart.	   There	  may	   be	   occasions	   where	   someone	   is	   harmed	   but	   not	   treated	  unjustly.	  For	  example,	  a	  person	  rescuing	  me	  from	  a	  fire	  may	  break	  my	  arm	  to	  fit	  me	  through	  a	  window	  to	  escape.	  If	  this	   is	  the	  only	  way	  to	  save	  my	  life,	  the	  break	  is	  a	  harm,	   but	   is	   not	   unjust.	   Additionally,	   one	   can	   think	   of	   ways	   in	   which	   someone	  might	   be	   treated	   unjustly	   but	   not	   harmed.	   For	   example,	   if	   I	   receive	   an	   unjust	  distribution	  of	  a	  good	  that	  I	  do	  not	  want,	  it	  seems	  implausible	  to	  say	  I	  am	  harmed.	  It	   seems	   reasonable	   to	   insist	   that	   the	   concepts	   of	   harm	   and	   injustice	   be	   treated	  separately,	   and	   to	   maintain	   that	   one	   is	   not	   always	   harmed	   by	   being	   treated	  unjustly.	  Besides,	   it	   is	  not	  clear	  that	  claiming	  that	  the	  poor	  are	  treated	  unjustly	   is	  any	   more	   agreeable	   to	   the	   libertarian	   than	   the	   claim	   that	   they	   are	   harmed.	  Moreover,	   it	   should	   not	   be	   taken	   for	   granted	   at	   this	   stage	   that	   our	   duties	   to	   the	  poor	  are	  best	  thought	  of	  as	  duties	  of	  justice.	  	  	  Pogge’s	  argument	  is	  based	  on	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  global	  order	  is	  unjust.	  However,	  if	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  global	  order	  is	  unjust	  is	  the	  foundation	  of	  Pogge’s	  argument,	  the	  harm	   approach	   seems	   to	   be	   futile.	   If	  we	   are	   responsible	   for	   injustice,	  we	   do	   not	  need	  to	  invoke	  the	  idea	  that	  we	  harm	  for	  us	  to	  have	  duties	  of	  justice.	  If	  one	  would	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  agree	   that	   the	  global	  order	   is	  unjust,	   duties	  of	   justice	  would	   follow	  directly	   from	  this.	  If	  one	  did	  not	  agree	  that	  global	  order	  was	  unjust,	  they	  will	  not	  share	  the	  view	  that	   the	  global	  order	  harms	   the	  poor,	   and	  so	   the	  argument	  would	   fail.	  Moreover,	  there	  are	  difficulties	  with	  Pogge’s	  argument	  that	  the	  global	  order	  is	  unjust	  because	  it	  fails	  to	  meet	  minimal	  human	  rights	  standards,	  which	  I	  explain	  next.	  	  	  Harm	  as	  human	  rights	  violations	  	  Pogge	  thinks	  that	  tying	  harm	  to	  minimal	  human	  rights	  standards	  will	  allow	  anyone	  to	   find	  his	  approach	  agreeable	  (2010:	  195).	   It	   is	   true	  what	  Pogge	  considers	   to	  be	  basic	  human	  rights,	  such	  as	  a	  right	  to	  life,	  are	  things	  anyone	  could	  agree	  a	  person	  has	  claims	  to.	  However,	  the	  concept	  of	  human	  rights	   is	  highly	  contested.	  Drawing	  on	  human	  rights	  may	  make	  Pogge’s	  approach	  less,	  rather	  than	  more	  persuasive	  to	  many.	   Pogge	   relies	   on	   the	   assumption	   that	   a	   distribution	   is	   unjust	   if	   it	   fails	   to	  provide	  people	  with	  the	  means	  to	  meet	  their	  basic	  rights	  (195).	  Pogge	  thinks	  this	  idea	   is	   incontestable,	   however,	   libertarians	   may	   not	   agree.	   Respecting	   rights	   is	  paramount	   to	   libertarianism.	   However,	   this	   does	   not	   mean	   that	   a	   human	   rights	  deficit	   is	   an	   injustice.	   Libertarians	   only	   accept	   that	   we	   have	   negative	   duties	  towards	   others.	   A	   human	   rights	   deprivation	  would	   only	   be	   an	   injustice	   if	   one	   is	  interfered	  with	  by	  another.13	  Being	   in	  a	   state	  of	  deprivation	  because	  one	  has	  not	  been	   sufficiently	   provided	   for	   by	   another	   is	   not	   necessarily	   a	   human	   rights	  violation.	  Therefore,	  it	  does	  not	  seem	  that	  any	  reasonable	  person	  would	  agree	  that	  the	  rich	  wrong	  the	  poor	  in	  virtue	  of	  this	  deficit.	  	  Harm	  as	  wronging	  	  Perhaps	  Pogge’s	  view	  is	  that	  the	  poor	  are	  harmed	  because	  they	  are	  wronged.	  Pogge	  thinks	  that	  the	  global	  order	  is	  unjust	  towards	  the	  poor.	  To	  be	  treated	  unjustly	  is	  to	  be	  wronged.	  However,	  perhaps	  not	  all	  injustice	  is	  wrong.	  Justice	  is	  only	  one	  virtue;	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  We	  may	  draw	  a	  distinction	  between	  libertarians	  and	  left-­‐libertarians,	  the	  latter	  whom	  also	  recognise	  certain	  positive	  rights	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libertarian,	  harm	  approach	  may	  succeed,	  but	  then	  
also	  no	  need	  for	  harm	  approach,	  other	  more	  
plausible	  approaches.	  
32	  
	  I	  may	  forsake	  justice	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  a	  different	  value,	  such	  that	  I	  do	  not	  wrong	  you.	  For	  example,	  in	  a	  familiar	  scenario	  from	  the	  literature	  on	  equality;	  if	  some	  people	  in	   the	  world	   are	  born	  blind	  and	  others	   are	   sighted,	   it	  may	  be	  more	   just	   to	  make	  things	  more	  equal	  by	  making	  everyone	  blind.	  However,	  a	  blind	  person	  would	  not	  be	   wronged	   if	   this	   policy	   was	   not	   carried	   out,	   as	   there	   are	   other	   moral	  considerations	  against	  it.	  Moreover,	  it	  does	  not	  seem	  that	  all	  wrongs	  are	  harms.	  For	  example,	  if	  you	  make	  a	  promise	  to	  me,	  it	  is	  wrong	  to	  break	  it,	  however,	  I	  may	  not	  care	  about	  the	  thing	  you	  promised	  me,	  or	  breaking	  the	  promise	  may	  work	  out	  well	  for	  me.	  	  	  This	   is	   not	   to	   reject	   the	   suggestion	   that	   harm	   should	   be	   defined	   in	   relation	   to	  wronging.	  Many	  insist	  that	  we	  require	  a	  notion	  of	  wrong	  to	  understand	  the	  concept	  of	  harm,	   as,	   only	  when	  an	  act	   is	  wrong	  does	   it	   count	   as	  harm.	  All	   harms	  may	  be	  wrongs.	  However,	  Pogge	  would	  be	  incorrect	  to	  assume	  that	  all	  wrongs	  are	  harms.	  Moreover,	  if	  Pogge	  thinks	  the	  rich	  states	  wrong	  the	  poor,	  there	  is	  no	  need	  to	  argue	  that	  they	  harm	  the	  poor.	  Whoever	  wrongs	  someone	  has	  duties	  towards	  them.	  	  	  Harm	  as	  failing	  a	  duty	  	  Pogge	  may	   look	   to	  Mathias	  Risse’s	   suggestion	  of	  how	   the	  global	  order	  may	  harm	  the	   poor	   for	   support.	   Risse	   acknowledges	   a	   duty	   that	   affluent	   countries	   owe	   to	  assist	   other	   countries	   in	   establishing	   stable	   domestic	   institutions	   (Risse	   2005:	  358).	  Risse	   claims	   that	   the	   shortfall	   of	  meeting	   this	  duty,	   in	   so	   far	   as	   this	   can	  be	  attributed	  to	  the	  global	  order,	  is	  how	  the	  global	  order	  harms	  the	  poor	  (2005:	  366).	  Not	   assisting	   in	   institution	   building	   seems	   to	   be	   failing	   to	   help,	   however,	   not	  harming.	  Risse’s	   view	  may	  be	   that	   failing	   to	  help	   the	  poor	  causes	   harm.	  Perhaps,	  because	  we	   do	   not	   help	   the	   poor	   to	   build	   strong-­‐institutions,	   they	   are	   unable	   to	  sufficiently	  develop,	   and	  are	  vulnerable	   to	   economic,	  political	   and	  environmental	  catastrophes,	   and	   cannot	   overcome	   their	   disadvantaged	   position	   in	   the	   global	  order.	   If	   poverty	   results	   from	  weak	   institutions,	   and	  we	   fail	   to	   help	   build	   strong	  institutions,	  we	  may	   be	   responsible	   for	   this	   poverty.	   This	   is	   close	   to	   the	   type	   of	  
Eliana Zur-Szpiro  6/5/14 16:36
Eliana Zur-Szpiro  6/5/14 16:43
Eliana Zur-Szpiro  6/5/14 16:55
Comment: What	  about	  self-­‐defense?	  Not	  harm?	  
Comment: Very	  vague.	  First	  mean	  prima	  facie	  
duties.	  Also	  may	  be	  no	  more	  than	  apologising.	  May	  
not	  be	  case	  e.g	  child,	  but	  then	  may	  not	  consider	  this	  
to	  be	  wronging.	  Coincidental,	  that	  wronging	  bring	  
duties?	  Or	  definitional?	  To	  wrong	  is	  to	  have	  a	  duty?	  
No	  or	  conditional,	  if	  not	  have	  duty,	  not	  consider	  
wronging	  
Comment: Why	  bring	  in	  risse?	  Because	  is	  a	  form	  
of	  the	  harm	  approach,	  need	  to	  review	  all,	  and	  more	  
plausible,	  though	  also	  diff	  as	  not	  basing	  duties	  on	  
harm,	  so	  is	  form	  of	  harm	  approach?	  
33	  
	  argument	  that	  Pogge	  is	  making.	  Such	  an	  argument	  would	  seem	  to	  be	  stretching	  the	  idea	   of	   harm	   too	   far.	   Risse’s	   view	   is	   more	   likely	   that	   failing	   to	   fulfil	   the	   duty	  
constitutes	  the	  harm.	  	  Perhaps	  where	  we	  have	  a	  duty	  to	  act,	  failing	  to	  act,	  if	  this	  leaves	  a	  person	  worse	  off	  than	   before,	   or	   than	   they	  would	   be	   otherwise,	   is	   a	   harm.	   It	  may	   be	   plausible	   to	  claim	   that	   to	   harm	   is	   to	   violate	   a	   duty;	   I	   shall	   discuss	   such	   a	   view	   in	   the	   next	  chapter.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  violating	  a	  duty	  does	  not	  always	  seem	  to	  be	  harm,	  as	  illustrated	  in	  the	  promising	  example	  I	  supplied	  earlier.	  Risse	  claims	  that	  failing	  to	  assist	   in	   institution	  building	   is	  a	  harm,	  and	   it	   is	  a	  wrong	  because	   it	   is	  a	   failure	   to	  meet	  a	  duty	  (2005:	  376).	  Risse	  may	  be	  defining	  ‘harm’	  as	  a	  ‘wrong’	  here,	  or,	  Risse	  may	  be	  defining	  this	  failure	  as	  a	  harm,	  and	  then	  stating	  that	  additionally,	  this	  harm	  is	  wrongful	  as	   it	  coincides	  with	  a	  violation	  of	  a	  duty.	  It	   is	  more	  plausible	  to	  claim	  that	   violations	   of	   duties	   are	   wrongs	   than	   violations	   of	   duties	   are	   harms.	   Risse’s	  suggestion	  of	  how	  the	  global	  order	  harms	  the	  poor	  is	  more	  philosophically	  sound	  than	  Pogge’s.	  However,	  while	  Risse	  acknowledges	  that	  the	  situation	  of	  the	  poor	  is	  one	   of	   harm,	   he	   claims	   that	   we	   cannot	   clearly	   attribute	   this	   harm	   to	   the	   global	  order,	  so	  Pogge	  cannot	  make	  the	  case,	  based	  on	  Risse’s	  argument,	   that	   the	  global	  order	  harms	   the	  poor.	  Moreover	   the	  way	   in	  which	  Risse	   seems	   to	   argue	   that	  we	  harm	   the	   poor	   is	   by	   failing	   in	   our	   positive	   duty,	   the	   duty	   to	   assist	   in	   institution	  building.	  It	  is	  thus	  unclear	  what	  additional	  work	  the	  notion	  of	  harm	  is	  doing.	  If	  we	  hold	  that	  we	  have	  positive	  duties	  to	  people	  in	  need	  around	  the	  world,	  there	  is	  no	  need	  to	  base	  our	  duties	  on	  harm.	  	  	  An	  account	  of	  harm?	  	  I	  have	  suggested	  some	  problems	  with	  Pogge's	  account	  of	  harm.	  Pogge’s	  subjunctive	  moralised	   account	   of	   harm	  does	  not	   fit	  with	  people’s	   usual	   understanding	  of	   the	  concept.	  This	  may	  be	  one	  reason	  why	  there	  is	  often	  resistance	  to	  Pogge’s	  argument.	  A	  more	  significant	  concern	  may	  be	  that	  Pogge	  does	  not	  really	  provide	  us	  with	  an	  account	  of	  harm.	  Pogge	  explains	  what	  he	  takes	  harm	  to	  mean	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	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  harm	  to	  the	  poor	  by	  the	  rich	  states,	  but	  does	  not	  tell	  us	  what	  it	  is	  to	  harm	  generally.	  Pogge	  states	  that	  his	  approach	  is	  not	  to	  specify	  an	  independent	  notion	  of	  harm	  but	  rather	   to	   define	   harm	   in	   terms	   of	   injustice.	   However,	   without	   a	   more	   thorough	  analysis	   of	   the	   concept	   of	   harm,	   it	   remains	   unconvincing	   to	   claim	   that	   the	   rich	  states	  harm	  the	  poor.	  Relying	  on	  the	   idea	  that	   the	  global	  order	   is	  unjust	   to	  argue	  that	  it	  harms	  the	  poor	  does	  not	  help	  make	  the	  harm	  approach	  plausible.	  	  Conclusion	  One	   may	   expect	   Pogge,	   in	   proposing	   the	   controversial	   view	   that	   the	   rich	   states	  harm	  the	  poor,	  and	  drawing	  on	  this	  claim	  to	  ground	  duties	  of	  justice	  to	  the	  poor,	  to	  give	  a	  thorough	  explanation	  of	  how	  they	  harm.	  However,	  Pogge’s	  account	  of	  harm	  is	  deficient	   in	  several	  ways	   that	   I	  have	  highlighted	   in	   this	  chapter.	  Pogge	  offers	  a	  moralised	   conception	   of	   harm,	   defined	   in	   relation	   to	   a	   conception	   of	   injustice.	  However,	   Pogge	   intends	   his	   argument	   to	   have	  widespread	   appeal,	   which	   such	   a	  moralised	   account	   of	   harm	   will	   not	   allow.	   This	   is	   because	   not	   everyone	   would	  agree	  that	  that	  the	  rich	  states	  commit	  wrongful	  acts	  against	  the	  poor.	  Perhaps	  this	  does	  not	  demand	  an	  abandonment	  of	   the	  harm	  approach	  but	  only	   its	  ecumenical	  aims.	  There	  are	  other	  benefits	  to	  basing	  duties	  on	  harm.	  So	  perhaps	  if	  the	  argument	  is	  not	  aimed	  at	  appealing	  to	  libertarians,	  the	  harm	  approach	  can	  succeed.	  However,	  it	  is	  not	  only	  some	  that	  would	  not	  be	  convinced	  that	  the	  way	  Pogge	  thinks	  the	  rich	  harm	  the	  poor	  counts	  as	  wronging,	  most	  would	  not	  be.	  	  The	  strategy	  of	  the	  harm	  approach	  is	  to	  show	  that	  harm	  is	  a	  type	  of	  wrong	  and	  thus	  overlaps	  with	  other	  theories	  of	  wronging.	  However,	  Pogge	  seems	  to	  claim	  that	  the	  rich	  harm	  the	  poor	  because	  they	  wrong	  them.	  Pogge’s	  moralised	  baseline	  involves	  relying	  on	  premises	  that	  one	  should	  seek	  to	  prove.	  Moreover,	   if	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	   rich	   wrong	   and	   harm	   the	   poor	   is	   by	   treating	   them	   unjustly,	   then	   duties	   of	  justice	   follow	  directly	   from	   this.	   The	   claim	   that	   they	  harm	  does	  not	   seem	   to	   add	  anything.	  Pogge’s	  moralised	  account	  of	  harm	  does	  not	  support	  the	  aims	  of	  the	  harm	  approach.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  a	  non-­‐moralised	  account	  of	  harm	  would	  pose	  other	  difficulties.	   The	   claim	   that	   the	   poor	   are	   harmed	   according	   to	   a	   non-­‐moralised	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Chapter	   Two:	   Is	   there	   an	   account	   of	   harm	   that	   can	   support	   the	   harm	  
approach?	  
	  The	  key	  aims	  of	  the	  harm	  approach	  are	  to	  break	  the	  stalemate	  in	  the	  literature	  over	  the	   question	   of	   whether	   distributive	   justice	   applies	   at	   the	   global	   level,	   and	   to	  widely	  persuade	  people	  that	  we	  have	  duties	  of	  justice	  to	  the	  global	  poor.	  In	  the	  first	  chapter	   I	   discussed	   the	   problems	   with	   Pogge’s	   moralised,	   subjunctive	   notion	   of	  harm.	  Pogge	  does	  not	  provide	  an	  account	  of	  what	  he	  takes	  harm	  to	  be.	  Pogge	  only	  explains	   how,	   in	   this	   particular	   case	   of	   the	   interactions	   between	   rich	   and	   poor	  states,	   harm	  occurs,	   and	  explains	   this	  with	   reference	   to	   associated	  but	   contested	  moral	   concepts.	   Pogge’s	   analysis	   is	   imprecise,	   and	   does	   not	   fit	   with	   common	  understandings	   of	   what	   counts	   as	   harm.	   In	   order	   for	   Pogge’s	   approach	   to	   be	  persuasive,	   Pogge	  must	   draw	   on	   a	   theory	   of	   harm	   that	  we	  would	   find	   plausible,	  that	  would	  accommodate,	  within	  its	  conceptual	  framework,	  institutional	  harm	  as	  a	  case	  of	  morally	  significant	  harm.	  	  	  To	  assess	   the	  claim	  that	   the	  rich	  states	  harm	  the	  global	  poor,	  we	  must	  come	  to	  a	  clearer	  understanding	  of	  what	  harm	  is;	  my	  task	  in	  this	  chapter.	  Harm	  is	  a	  familiar,	  yet,	  amorphous	  notion.	  I	  will	  investigate	  different	  views	  of	  harm,	  assessing	  how	  far	  they	   fit	  with	  how	  we	  use	   the	   term,	  and,	  account	   for	  harm’s	  special	   status.	   I	   shall,	  alongside	  this,	  assess	  how	  well	  they	  might	  bolster	  Pogge’s	  argument.	  While	  we	  may	  struggle	   to	   put	   forward	   an	   account	   of	   harm	   which	   is	   not	   vulnerable	   to	  counterexamples	   or	   challenges,	   I	   try	   to	   suggest	   the	   type	   of	   account	   that	   is	  most	  promising.	  An	  analysis	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  harm	  has	  been	  neglected	  in	  the	  literature	  on	  global	  justice	  that	  focuses	  on	  the	  harm	  approach.	  In	  my	  view,	  it	  is	  a	  worthwhile	  pursuit	  to	  explore	  whether	  other	  versions	  of	  harm	  can	  support	  the	  harm	  approach,	  because	   if	  we	   can	  devise	  a	  more	  plausible	   formulation	  of	   the	  approach,	   this	  may	  make	   important	   progress	   in	   the	   global	   justice	   debate.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   if	   we	  think	  that	  the	  harm	  approach	  is	  best	  dispensed	  with,	  we	  should	  formulate	  the	  most	  plausible	  version	  of	  the	  harm	  approach	  and	  show	  how	  even	  this	  will	  not	  succeed.	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  In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  there	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  a	  notion	  of	  harm	  that	  can	  fulfil	  the	  aims	  of	  the	  harm	  approach.	  There	  are	  theories	  of	  harm	  that	  can	  support	  the	   claim	   that	   the	   rich	   states	   harm	   the	   poor,	   but	   not	   in	   a	   way	   that	   contributes	  anything	  to	  the	  debate.	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  harm,	  when	  we	  consider	  its	  importance	  in	  our	  moral	   theory,	   and	   its	   role	   in	   setting	   limits	   on	   action,	   should	   be	   conceived	   in	  moralised	  terms.	  Additionally,	  in	  order	  for	  the	  concept	  of	  harm	  to	  have	  content	  and	  to	   unify	   different	   cases	   of	   harm;	   harm	   must	   be	   defined	   in	   relation	   to	   a	   moral	  theory.	   However,	   there	   are	   two	   main	   problems	   with	   moralised	   accounts	   with	  regards	  to	  the	  aims	  of	  the	  harm	  approach.	  First,	  the	  question	  of	  what	  harm	  is	  gives	  rise	  to	  the	  same	  disagreements	  raised	  by	  the	  question	  of	  what	  our	  duties	  are	  to	  the	  global	  poor.	  For	  example,	   if	  harm	  is	  defined	  as	  the	  violation	  of	  rights,	  only	  people	  who	  share	  a	  view	  of	  what	  counts	  as	  a	  rights	  violation	  can	  agree	  on	  when	  something	  is	  harm.	  Secondly,	  moralised	  harm	  presupposes	  moral	  obligations,	  which	  negates	  the	   need	   for	   the	   harm	   approach.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   non-­‐moralised	   accounts	   of	  harm	  will	  not	  help	  the	  harm	  approach.	  The	  key	  difficulties	  with	  these	  accounts	  are	  first,	   specifying	   a	   baseline	   that	   is	   not,	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   too	   inclusive	   of	   cases	   of	  harm,	   nor,	   on	   the	   other,	   too	   exclusive,	  which	   can	   also	   provide	   a	  way	   of	   unifying	  what	  counts	  as	  harm.	  Secondly,	  non-­‐moralised	  accounts	  of	  harm	  do	  not	  necessarily	  generate	  duties.	  The	   harm	   approach	   is	   an	   attempt	   to	   ground	   duties	   of	   justice	  while	   avoiding	   the	  debate	   about	   whether	   we	   should	   extend	   our	   theory	   of	   justice	   within	   the	   state	  context	   to	   the	   global	   context.	  My	   view	   is	   that	   the	   harm	   approach	   is	   implausible,	  however,	   this	  should	  not	   lead	  us	   to	  pursue	  the	  project	  of	  arguing	  whether	  or	  not	  the	   state	   conception	  of	   justice	   is	   applicable	   to	   the	  global	   sphere.	  Rather,	   the	  best	  way	   to	   develop	   a	   theory	   of	   global	   justice	   is	   to	   start	   with	   our	  moral	   convictions	  about	  the	  global	  situation	  and	  build	  an	  account	  from	  these.	  The	  harm	  approach	  is	  symptomatic	  of	  the	  way	  that	  we	  misconceive	  the	  project	  of	  global	  justice.	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  Harm	  While	  there	  is	  some	  disagreement	  about	  the	  features	  a	  conception	  of	  harm	  should	  have;	  there	  is	  also	  a	  broad	  consensus.	  It	  is	  widely	  held	  that	  a	  theory	  of	  what	  harm	  is	  should	  account	  for	  the	  importance	  of	  harm	  in	  society	  and	  in	  moral	  theory,	  and	  thus	  not	  be	  excessively	  broad.	   It	  should	  accommodate	   the	  cases,	  and	  only	   those	  cases,	  that	  we	  usually	  count	  as	  harms,	  and	  should	  unify	  different	  cases	  of	  harm.	  	  Pogge	  discusses	  the	  need	  for	  a	  notion	  of	  harm	  besides	  the	  historical,	  comparative	  conception	   of	   harm.	   It	   is	   a	   common	  perception	   that	   to	   be	   harmed	   is	   to	   be	  made	  worse	  off	  than	  one	  was	  before.	  However,	  such	  an	  analysis	  of	  harm	  fails	  to	  take	  into	  account	   cases	   of	   harming	   that	   a	   theory	   of	   harm	   should	   include.	   For	   example,	   if	  someone	  decreases	   the	   intensity	  with	  which	   they	  hurt	   a	  person,	   they	  have	  made	  them	  better	  off	   than	   they	  were	  before,	  but	   they	  still	  harm	  them.	  Additionally,	  we	  are	   not	   harmed	   if	   we	   merely	   are	   made	   worse	   off	   than	   we	   were	   before.	   If	   I	   am	  sitting	   in	   a	  waiting	   room	  and	   I	   leave	   to	  do	   something	   and	   come	  back	   to	   find	  my	  former	  seat	  occupied,	   forcing	  me	  to	  now	  stand,	   I	  am	  worse	  off	   than	  I	  was	  before,	  but	  it	  does	  not	  seem	  fitting	  to	  say	  I	  have	  been	  harmed.	  	  According	  to	  a	  historical	  baseline,	  the	  poor	  are	  better	  off	  than	  previously,	  and	  thus,	  are	  not	  harmed	  by	  the	  global	  order.	  Pogge	  offers	  an	  alternative	  account	  of	  harm	  in	  terms	  of	  injustice.	  However,	  while	  we	  might	  agree	  that	  the	  historical	  comparative	  account	  is	  inadequate,	  Pogge’s	  own	  account	  is	  problematic,	  as	  discussed	  in	  the	  last	  chapter.	  Yet,	  there	  are	  other	  notions	  of	  harm	  in	  the	  literature	  that	  Pogge	  does	  not	  consider.	  I	  shall	  begin	  with	  discussing	  non-­‐moralised	  accounts	  of	  harm.	  	  Non-­‐moralised	  accounts	  of	  harm	  Non-­‐moralised	  accounts	  take	  the	  view	  that	  harms	  are	  not	  necessarily	  wrongs.	  This	  seems	   to	  capture	   the	  way	   that	  we	  often	  use	   the	   term	  harm.	  For	  example,	  we	  say	  that	   one	  was	   harmed	   by	   accident,	   or	   people	  were	   harmed	   in	   a	   natural	   disaster.	  Non-­‐moralised	  accounts	   take	  harm	  usually	   to	   involve	  either	  a	  worsening	  of	  one’s	  position,	  or	  being	  in	  a	  bad	  state.	  This	  seems	  to	  accommodate	  many	  cases	  that	  we	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  would	  wish	  to	  describe	  as	  harmful.	  However	  the	  main	  problem	  is	  that	  this	  would	  also	  identify	  many	  cases	  of	  harm	  which	  seem	  to	  lack	  moral	  significance.	  An	  account	  need	   not	   bring	   out	   the	  wrongfulness	   of	   harm,	   but	   it	  must	   capture	   its	   normative	  significance.	   I	   will	   discuss	   the	   counterfactual	   account	   of	   harm,	   the	   event-­‐based	  account,	   and	   then	   the	   non-­‐comparative	   conception	   of	   harm,	   before	   turning	   to	  moralised	  accounts,	  which	  I	  explain	  are	  more	  relevant	  to	  our	  purpose	  of	  assessing	  our	  duties	  to	  the	  poor.	  	  	  Counterfactual	  Harm	  According	  to	  the	  counterfactual	  account	  of	  harm,	  to	  be	  harmed	  is	  to	  be	  in	  a	  worse	  off	   state	   than	   one	   would	   be	   otherwise.	   The	   counterfactual	   account	   recognises	  harms	  that	  do	  not	  make	  a	  person	  worse	  off	   than	  they	  were	  before,	  such	  as	  being	  prevented	   from	  receiving	  a	  benefit.	  For	  example,	  A	   is	  blind	  and	   the	  only	  surgeon	  able	   to	  restore	  A’s	  sight	   is	  on	  her	  way	  to	  operate	  on	  him.	  B	  decides	   to	  detain	   the	  surgeon,	  so	  that	  the	  surgeon	  cannot	  perform	  the	  operation,	  and	  A	  remains	  blind.	  B	  has	   thus	   harmed	   A;	   were	   it	   not	   for	   B,	   A	   would	   have	   had	   his	   sight	   restored	  (Thomson	  2011:	  444).	  	  	  The	   counterfactual	   account	   seems	   to	  be	  promising	   for	  Pogge;	  providing	  a	  way	  of	  recognising	   the	   poor	   as	   harmed	   even	   though	   their	   situation	   has	   been	   slowly	  improving	   over	   the	   years.	   The	   counterfactual	   approach	   may	   provide	   a	   good	  structure	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  harm,	  however,	  it	  is	  not	  a	  full	  account,	  because	  it	  does	  not	  make	  clear	  what	  things	  are	  to	  count	  as	  harm.	  Merely	  being	  worse	  off	  than	  one	  would	  be	  otherwise	  is	  not	  necessarily	  harm.	  This	  would	  include	  too	  many	  cases	  as	  harm,	   and	  would	   undermine	   its	  moral	   significance.	   Perhaps,	   a	  worsening	   is	   only	  harm	   when	   one	   comes	   to	   be	   in	   a	   bad	   state.	   However	   this	   seems	   to	   raise	   the	  question;	  if	  a	  state	  is	  bad	  to	  be	  in,	  then	  why	  would	  one	  only	  count	  as	  harmed	  if	  this	  bad	  state	  follows	  from	  a	  better	  state,	  or	  if	  one	  could	  be	  in	  a	  better	  state?	  If	  we	  think	  that	  only	  certain	  states	  constitute	  harm,	  we	  may	  challenge	  the	  comparative	  aspect	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  of	  the	  account,	  and	  take	  it	  that	  harm	  is	  simply	  to	  be	  in	  a	  bad	  state.	  I	  shall	  explore	  non-­‐comparative	  accounts	  of	  harm	  shortly.	  	  	  However,	  the	  comparative	  aspect	  may	  be	  essential	  to	  an	  account	  of	  harm.	  Perhaps	  being	   in	  a	  bad	  state	   is	  not	  enough	  to	  qualify	  as	  being	  harmed.	  Additionally,	   there	  may	  be	  cases	  that	  we	  would	  wish	  to	  identify	  as	  harms	  where	  a	  person	  is	  not	   in	  a	  bad	  state.	  For	  example,	  if	  someone	  is	  defrauded	  out	  of	  much	  of	  their	  wealth	  yet	  left	  well-­‐off	  still,	  we	  might	   think	   they	  are	  harmed.	  However,	  others	  may	   insist	   that	   if	  one	   is	   made	   worse	   off	   but	   not	   put	   into	   a	   bad	   state	   then	   they	   are	   not	   harmed.	  Perhaps	  the	  most	  plausible	  view	  would	  not	  identify	  any	  worsening	  as	  a	  harm,	  nor	  require	   that	   one	  must	   be	   in	   a	   bad	   state	   to	   be	   harmed.	   Instead,	   perhaps	   harm	   is	  when	  one	  is	  made	  worse	  off	  in	  a	  morally	  significant	  way.	  We	  must	  specify	  what	  is	  to	   count	   as	   morally	   significant	   worsening.	   I	   shall	   discuss	   some	   accounts	   that	  identify	  harm	  in	  this	  way	  below.	  	  	  The	  benefit	  of	  the	  counterfactual	  account	  is	  that	  it	  can	  recognise	  failures	  to	  benefit	  as	   harms.	   However,	   harm	  may	   be	   over-­‐generated	   if	   the	   account	   identifies	   harm	  every	   time	   one	   fails	   to	   be	   benefited	  when	   one	   could	   be.	   However,	  we	  may	   limit	  cases	  of	  harm	  through	  failing	  to	  benefit	  to	  those	  where	  one	  who	  fails	  to	  receive	  a	  benefit	   is	   left	   in	  a	  particularly	  bad	  state.	  However,	  we	  may	  still	  doubt	   that	  one	   is	  harmed	  even	  when	  actively	  prevented	  from	  receiving	  a	  benefit	  that	  would	  rescue	  one	  from	  a	  particularly	  bad	  state.	  In	  the	  first	  example	  of	  the	  surgeon,	  if	  A	  does	  not	  know	  that	  a	  surgeon	  is	  making	  her	  way	  to	  him	  to	  restore	  his	  sight,	  then	  if	  someone	  blocks	  her	  way,	  A	  is	  deprived	  of	  an	  important	  benefit,	  but	  many	  would	  deny	  that	  he	  is	  harmed.	   It	  seems	  that	  something	  additional	   is	  needed	  for	  this	  prevention	  of	  an	  important	   benefit	   to	   be	   a	   harm.	   If,	   in	   the	   scenario,	   A	   has	   a	   fair	   expectation	   of	  receiving	   this	   benefit,	   or	   if	   this	   benefit	   is	   owed	   to	   A,	   it	   seems	  more	   plausible	   to	  claim	  that	  A	  has	  been	  harmed	  when	  A	  is	  prevented	  from	  receiving	  it.	  This	  does	  not	  undermine	  the	  counterfactual	  analysis	  of	  harm	  as	  such,	  but	  suggests	  that	  we	  need	  a	  more	   robust	   account	   of	   what	   counts	   as	   harm,	   which	   identifies	   preventions	   of	  benefits	  as	  harm	  only	  when	  there	  is	  a	  claim	  to	  the	  benefit.	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  Proponents	   of	   the	   counterfactual	   account	   draw	   a	   distinction	   between	   failing	   to	  benefit	  and	  preventing	  a	  benefit	  (Hanser	  2008:	  427).	  The	  category	  of	  harm	  may	  be	  confined	  to	  cases	  of	  thwarting	  another	  from	  receiving	  a	  forthcoming	  benefit,	  rather	  than	  merely	  failing	  to	  benefit.	  However,	  the	  morally	  significant	  distinction	  may	  not	  be	  between	   failing	   to	   benefit	   and	  preventing	   a	   benefit,	   or	   at	   least	   the	  distinction	  between	  these	   is	  not	  clear.	  For	  example,	   if	   I	  see	  you	  drowning,	  and	  choose	  not	  to	  rescue	  you,	  it	  seems	  more	  plausible	  to	  say	  I	  have	  failed	  to	  benefit	  you	  than	  I	  have	  prevented	  you	  from	  receiving	  a	  benefit.	  I	  have	  not	  prevented	  a	  benefit	  from	  coming	  to	  you	  because	  the	  benefit	  was	  only	  available	  if	  I	  chose	  to	  rescue	  you;	  which	  I	  had	  no	   intention	   of	   doing.	   It	   seems	   that	   I	   can	   commit	   a	  morally	   repugnant	   act,	   with	  more	  serious	  consequences	  through	  failing	  to	  benefit	  than	  preventing	  a	  benefit.	  	  	  There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  possible	  responses	  to	  this	  point.	  First,	  perhaps	  the	  concept	  of	  harm	  does	  not	  track	  what	  acts	  are	  worse	  than	  others,	  but	  only	  picks	  out	  a	  certain	  act	   type.	   It	   may	   pose	   no	   problem	   for	   there	   to	   be	   actions,	   which	   are	   not	   harms,	  which	  are	  worse	  than	  actions	  that	  are	  harms.	  Our	  theory	  of	  harm	  should	  capture	  why	  harms	  are	  treated	  so	  seriously.	  This	  does	  not	  mean	  there	  cannot	  be	  very	  bad	  actions	   that	   are	   not	   harms.	   A	   different	   response	   is	   that	   this	   scenario	   would	   be	  wrongly	  classified	  as	  failing	  to	  benefit,	  or	  preventing	  a	  benefit.	  Feinberg	  argues	  that	  rescuing	  a	  person	  in	  peril	  should	  not	  be	  considered	  a	  ‘benefit’;	  rather,	  it	  is	  a	  moral	  duty,	  and	  if	  we	  fail	  to	  meet	  it,	  we	  harm	  (Feinberg	  1987:	  143).	  I	  shall	  say	  more	  about	  this	  when	  I	  discuss	  Feinberg’s	  view	  of	  harm.	  However,	  this	  way	  of	  classifying	  failing	  to	   help	   as	   harm	   relies	   on	   a	   moralised	   conception	   of	   harm,	   according	   to	   which,	  failing	   to	   meet	   a	   duty,	   or	   violating	   a	   right	   is	   to	   harm.	   Alternatively,	   one	   could	  maintain	  that	   this	   is	  a	  case	  of	   failing	  to	  benefit.	  There	   is	  a	  possible	  benefit,	   in	   the	  form	   of	  my	   ability	   to	   help,	   and	   it	   is	  my	  will	   that	   prevents	   you	   from	   receiving	   it.	  More	  needs	  to	  be	  said	  by	  proponents	  of	  the	  non-­‐moralised,	  counterfactual	  view	  of	  harm	  about	  when	  failing	  to	  benefit	  or	  preventing	  a	  benefit	  counts	  as	  harm.	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  Even	   if	   a	   distinction	   between	   preventing	   a	   benefit	   and	   failing	   to	   benefit	   can	   be	  maintained,	   and	   an	   explanation	   of	   when	   this	   counts	   as	   harm	   provided,	   the	  counterfactual	   account	   may	   still	   be	   criticised	   for	   failing	   to	   distinguish	   between	  harm	  through	  preventing	  a	  benefit	  and	  ordinary	  harm	  (Hanser	  2008:	  428).	  It	  may	  seem	  worse	   to	  blind	  a	  person	   than	   to	  prevent	   someone	  else	   from	  restoring	   their	  sight.	   The	   counterfactual	   account	   fails	   to	   capture	   any	   moral	   difference	   between	  these	   two	   cases	   because,	   in	   both,	   the	   person	   is	  worse	   off	   than	   they	  would	   have	  been	   otherwise.	   However,	   one	   may	   also	   deny	   that	   this	   is	   a	   morally	   significant	  distinction.	   It	   may	   seem	   no	   worse	   to	   blind	   someone	   than	   to	   fail	   to	   restore	  someone’s	  sight.	  For	  example,	   if	  a	  surgeon	  is	  assigned	  your	  case	  for	  eye	  restoring	  surgery	  and	  decides	  during	  the	  operation	  to	  abandon	  the	  surgery	  out	  of	  boredom,	  leaving	  you	  blind	  still,	  this	  may	  seem	  as	  bad	  as	  if	  the	  surgeon	  actively	  blinded	  you.	  This	  seems	  to	  be	  because	  the	  surgeon	  had	  a	  duty	  to	  restore	  your	  sight.	  The	  reason,	  perhaps,	  why	  blinding	  a	  person	  seems	  worse	  is	  because	  to	  blind	  a	  person	  violates	  their	   right.	  On	  most	  occasions,	  a	  person	  does	  not	  have	  a	   right	   to	  have	   their	   sight	  restored,	  but	  where	   there	   is	  such	  a	  right,	   its	  violation	  seems	  as	  bad	  as	  blinding	  a	  person.	  This	  suggests	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  harm	  is	  linked	  to	  the	  violation	  of	  rights.14	  	  Does	  the	  counterfactual	  account	  of	  harm	  help	  support	  the	  harm	  approach?	  It	  seems	  that	  Pogge	  can	  draw	  only	  limited	  support	  from	  the	  counterfactual	  theory	  of	   harm.	   The	   counterfactual	   account	   is	   advantageous	   as	   it	   does	   not	   require	   a	  change	   in	   the	   agent	   to	   have	   occurred	   for	   there	   to	   be	   harm.	  This	   lends	   itself	   to	   a	  notion	   of	   institutional	   harm	   that	   Pogge	   wants	   to	   argue	   for.	   According	   to	   the	  counterfactual	   account,	   someone	   could	   be	   harmed	   by	   slavery	   even	   if	   they	   were	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  ‘born	  a	   slave’;	   because	   they	  would	  be	  better	  off	   if	   the	   institutional	   arrangements	  supporting	   slavery	   were	   not	   in	   place.	   However,	   the	   global	   institutional	  arrangements	  that	  favour	  the	  affluent	  states	  do	  not	  make	  the	  poor	  worse	  off	  than	  they	   would	   be	   if	   they	   did	   not	   exist.	   Rather,	   there	   are	   other	   institutional	  arrangements	  which,	  were	  they	  to	  be	  in	  place,	  would	  make	  the	  poor	  better	  off	  than	  they	  are.	  Thus,	  it	  seems	  that	  the	  rich	  merely	  fail	  to	  benefit	  the	  poor.	  The	  idea	  that	  the	   poor	   are	   harmed	   because	   the	   rich	   perpetuate	   a	   certain	   set	   of	   institutional	  arrangements	   when	   a	   feasible,	   alternative	   set	   would	   make	   the	   poor	   better	   off,	  would	  not	  find	  support	  from	  the	  counterfactual	  theory	  of	  harm.	  	  It,	   therefore,	  may	  be	  worth	   exploring	   an	   alternative	   account	   of	   harm	   in	   terms	  of	  gains	   or	   losses	   a	   person	   experiences,	   and	   not	   with	   respect	   to	   their	   state.	   I	   will	  explore	  such	  an	  account	  next.	  Event-­‐based	  harm	  Matthew	  Hanser	  puts	  forward	  an	  event-­‐based	  account	  of	  harm,	  according	  to	  which	  harm	   is	   the	   losing	   of	   a	   basic	   good,	   and	   benefits	   involve	   gaining	   a	   basic	   good	  (Hanser	  2008:	  441).	  The	  account	  identifies	  harm	  as	  the	  act	  of	  losing	  a	  good,	  and	  not	  as	   the	   state	   that	   follows.	  Hanser	  describes	  basic	   goods	  as	   ‘those	   the	  possession	  of	  
which	  makes	  possible	  the	  achievement	  of	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  the	  potential	  components	  
of	  a	  reasonably	  happy	   life’,	  they	   include	   ‘certain	   fairly	  general	  physical	  and	  mental	  
powers	  or	  abilities.	  The	  power	  of	  sight,	  for	  example’	  (2008:	  440).	  This	  account	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  version	  of	  harm	  as	  morally	  significant	  worsening.	  Harm	  is	  not	  identified	  as	  an	  overall	   bad	   state,	   nor,	   on	   this	   account,	   does	   any	  worsening	   count	   as	  harming.	  Rather,	   only	   worsening	   in	   terms	   of	   goods	   which	   are	   necessary	   for	   a	   good	   life	  counts	  as	  harm.	  	  The	  paradigmatic	  case	  of	  harm	  is	  ‘someone	  suffers	  a	  level-­1	  harm	  with	  respect	  to	  a	  
certain	  basic	  good	  if	  and	  only	  if	  he	  loses	  some	  quantity	  of	  that	  good’	  (2008:	  441).	  The	  event-­‐based	  account	  can	  accommodate	  different	  levels	  of	  harm;	  cases	  where	  one	  is	  prevented	  from	  being	  benefitted;	   ‘Someone	  suffers	  a	   level-­(n+1)	  harm	  with	  respect	  
to	  a	  certain	  basic	  good	  if	  and	  only	  if	  he	  is	  prevented	  from	  receiving	  a	  level-­n	  benefit	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with	   respect	   to	   that	   good’	   (2008:	   442).	   We	   can	   recognise	   harm	   at	   even	   higher	  levels:	  level	  4	  harms,	  level	  12	  harms	  even,	  if	  one	  can	  track	  a	  chain	  of	  preventative	  harms,	  whereby	   one	   is	   ‘being	   prevented	   from	   being	   prevented	   from’	   receiving	   a	  harm,	  and	  so	  on	  (2008:	  429).	  	  The	   advantage	  of	   such	   a	   ‘multi-­‐level’	   analysis	   is	   that	   its	   structure	   accommodates	  more	  complex	  cases	  of	  harm,	  such	  as	  failures	  to	  benefit.	  This	  account	  may	  support	  the	   harm	   approach	   as	   our	   analysis	   may	   be	   that	   the	   poor	   are	   prevented	   from	  receiving	   benefits	   by	   the	   rich,	   or	   even	   prevented	   from	   being	   prevented	   from	  suffering	  harm.	  This	   conception	  of	  harm	  can	  account	   for	   indirect	   chains	  of	  harm,	  and	  harm	  which	  does	  not	  leave	  a	  person	  worse	  off	  than	  before.	  Also,	  the	  advantage	  of	  this	  approach	  is	  that	  it	  can	  distinguish	  between	  ordinary	  harms	  and	  harms	  that	  are	  the	  preventions	  of	  benefits.	  The	   advantages	   of	   this	   account	   of	   harm,	   however,	   come	   at	   a	   cost.	   The	   account	  would	  over-­‐generate	  cases	  of	  harm.	  The	  conceptual	  means	  are	  in	  place	  to	  classify	  preventions	   of	   preventions	   of	   preventions	   of	   a	   benefit	   as	   harm.	   However,	   most	  would	  not	  count	  an	  instance	  of	  this	  as	  harm.	  It	  is	  one	  thing	  if	  a	  theory	  identifies	  X	  as	  harm	  when	  one	  is	  unsure	  about	  whether	  X	  is	  harm,	  it	  is	  another	  to	  do	  so	  when	  one	  has	  no	   inclination	   to	   label	  X	   as	  harm.	   If	   a	   theory	  would	   classify	  X	   as	  harm	  when	  people	   have	   strong	   intuitions	   that	   X	   is	   not	   harm,	   it	   is	   problematic.	   The	   question	  that	  arises	  from	  this	  concern	  is	  how	  do	  we	  identify	  an	  appropriate	  cut-­‐off	  point;	  at	  what	  level	  does	  something	  stop	  being	  harm?	  The	  wish,	  however,	  to	  avoid	  drawing	  an	  arbitrary	  line	  should	  not	  lead	  us	  to	  adopt	  this	  account.	  The	  problem	  of	  where	  to	  draw	   the	   line	   affects	   other	   concepts,	   for	   example	   what	   is	   to	   count	   as	   a	   need.	   It	  seems	  sufficient	  to	  have	  a	  clear	  conceptual	  notion,	  even	  if	  we	  are	  uncertain	  where	  the	  exact	   cut-­‐off	  point	   is,	   and	  are	   left	  with	  hard	   cases	  which	  we	  are	  not	   sure	   fall	  into	  our	  moral	  category	  or	  not.	  We	  should	  not	  try	  to	  identify	  harm	  at	  every	  level.	  Rather,	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  the	  conceptual	  clarity	  and	  moral	  significance	  of	  harm,	  we	  should	  have	  a	  clear	  account	  of	  what	  counts	  as	  harm,	  for	  example,	  violations	  of	  rights.	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  However,	  there	  still	  might	  be	  a	  difficulty	  in	  specifying	  when,	  for	  example,	  a	  rights	  violation	  has	  occurred.	  For	  example,	   if	   I	  have	  the	  right	   to	  bodily	   integrity,	  does	  B	  violate	   this	  right	   if	  B	  prevents	  C’s	  prevention	  of	  A’s	  attack	  on	  my	  person,	  or	  does	  only	   A	   violate	   my	   right?	   It	   seems	   that	   Hanser’s	   account	   suffers,	   not	   from	   an	  inadequate	   definition	   of	   harm,	   but	   from	   a	   troublesome	   account	   of	   action.	  When	  something	   counts	   as	   a	   specific	   act	   type	   is	   an	   important	   question.	   We	   need	   an	  account	  of	  causation,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  definition	  of	  harm	  to	  determine	  what	  counts	  as	  harm.	  This	  goes	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	   this	  thesis.	   It	  seems	  clear,	  however,	   that	  the	  multi-­‐level	  aspect	  of	  the	  event-­‐based	  account	  is	  not	  plausible.	  	  Another	  concern	  is	  that	  the	  list	  of	  basic	  goods	  is	  vague.	  It	  remains	  unclear	  exactly	  what	  would	  count	  as	  harm.	  However,	  perhaps	  this	   is	  sufficient	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  outlining	   the	   framework	   for	   a	   theory	   of	   harm.	   A	   full	   account	   of	   harm	   requires	   a	  unified	  account	  of	  the	  goods,	  losses	  of	  which,	  count	  as	  harm,	  but	  perhaps	  this	  can	  be	  worked	  out	  in	  due	  course.	  	  	  The	  event-­‐based	  account	  identifies	  harm	  as	  the	  act	  of	  losing	  a	  basic	  good,	  and	  not	  in	  reference	  to	  a	  person’s	  prior	  or	  subsequent	  state.	  Identifying	  harm	  as	  an	  event	  seems	  implausible	  when	  we	  consider	  how	  we	  assess	  the	  gravity	  of	  a	  harm.	  Factors	  such	  as	  severity	  and	  duration	  usually	  determine	  how	  serious	  a	  harm	  is;	  these	  relate	  to	  the	  state	  of	  harm	  and	  not	  the	  act	  of	  coming	  to	  be	  in	  that	  state.	  For	  example,	  if	  two	  people	   are	   in	   an	   accident	   and	   are	  both	  paralysed	   from	   the	  waist	   down,	   if	   one	  of	  them	   recovers	   the	   use	   of	   their	   legs,	   they	   are	   harmed	   less	   than	   the	   other.	   The	  harmful	  event	   is	   the	   losing	   the	  use	  of	   the	   legs.	  This	  happens	   in	   its	  entirety	  when	  both	  people	  become	  fully	  paralysed	  in	  their	  legs;	  there	  is	  not	  a	  continuous	  state	  of	  losing	   the	  good	  until	   the	  use	  of	  one’s	   legs	   is	   recovered.	  There	  also	  seems	   to	  be	  a	  state	  of	  harm,	  namely,	   lacking	  the	  use	  of	  one’s	   legs,	  and	  the	  duration	  of	   this	  state	  determines	   the	   seriousness	   of	   the	   harm.	   However,	   perhaps	   a	   proponent	   of	   the	  event-­‐based	  account	  can	  maintain	  that	  the	  state	  of	  harm	  dictates	  how	  serious	  the	  harm	   is	   and	   yet	   identify	   harm	   as	   the	   event	   and	   not	   the	   state	   (2008:	   444).	   This	  seems	  to	  be	  an	  inconsistent	  view;	  as	  the	  event-­‐based	  account	  takes	  it	  that	  an	  event	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  is	  harmful,	  not	  in	  virtue	  of	  the	  badness	  of	  an	  associated	  end	  state,	  and,	  yet,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  account	  assesses	  the	  seriousness	  of	  harm	  according	  to	  its	  end	  state	  (Thomson	  2011:	  457).	  	  	  However,	  perhaps	  an	  analogy	  may	  help	  lend	  this	  idea	  plausibility.	  If	  A	  goes	  away,	  and	   B	   is	   sad	   about	   this,	   this	   makes	   the	   event	   of	   A	   having	   gone	   away,	  retrospectively,	  a	  sad	  event.	   If	  B	   is	  very	  sad,	   this	  makes	  the	  event	  a	  very	  sad	  one.	  The	   effect	   of	   the	   event,	   the	   state	   of	   sadness,	   shapes	   how	  we	   evaluate	   the	   event.	  However,	  the	  badness	  of	  A	  going	  away	  is	  identified	  with	  reference	  to	  the	  badness	  of	  the	  end-­‐state	  of	   this	  event,	  namely	  B’s	   sadness.	   It	  does	  not	   seem	  plausible	   to	  say	  that	  the	  departure	  of	  A	  is	  bad	  merely	  because	  A	  is	  leaving,	  while	  allowing	  that	  how	  bad	   the	  departure	   is	  depends	  on	  how	  sad	  B	   is	  about	   it.	   It	   seems	  the	  departure	   is	  only	  bad	  because	  B	  is	  sad	  about	  it.	  Therefore,	  I	  think	  it	  is	  most	  plausible	  for	  harm	  to	  be	  identified	  as	  a	  harmful	  event	  with	  a	  harmful	  state	  that	  follows.	  The	  state	  of	  harm	  must	   be	   included	   in	   the	   account	   of	   what	   harm	   is,	   and	   not	   just	   referred	   to	   as	   a	  measure	  of	  its	  seriousness.	  It	  is	  not	  plausible	  to	  identify	  a	  harmful	  state	  without	  a	  harmful	  event,	  but	  conversely,	  harm	  should	  not	  be	  only	  identified	  as	  an	  event.	  	  	  The	  main	   problem	  with	   this	   event-­‐based	   account	   of	   harm	   is	   that	   it	   would	   over-­‐generate	   cases	   of	   harm	   by	   identifying	   an	   indefinite	   chain	   of	   preventions	   of	  preventions	  of	  benefits	  as	  harm.	  It	  also	  seems	  too	  broad	  to	  allow	  that	  any	  losing	  of	  extent	  of	  a	  basic	  good,	  to	  whatever	  extent,	  is	  necessarily	  a	  harm.	  	  Does	  the	  event-­‐based	  account	  of	  harm	  help	  support	  the	  harm	  approach?	  While	  the	  event-­‐based	  account	  seems	  advantageous	  in	  providing	  a	  structure	  which	  allows	  very	  indirect	  causal	  chains	  to	  be	  identified	  as	  harm,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  this	  would	  help	  make	  the	  harm	  approach	  more	  plausible.	  Though	  the	  theory	  would	  recognise	  very	  indirect	  acts	  as	  harm,	  most	  people	  would	  not.	  Given	  that	  the	  aim	  of	  the	  harm	  approach	   is	   to	  widely	  persuade	  people	   that	  we	  have	  duties	   to	   the	  poor	  based	  on	  harm,	   an	   argument	   that	   relies	   on	   a	   controversial	   notion	  of	   harm	  will	   not	   suffice.	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  Whether	   people	   are	   persuaded	   by	   a	   theory	   does	   not	   determine	   whether	   it	   is	  plausible	  but	  rather	  reflects	  whether	   it	   is.	  The	  point	   is	   that	  the	  harm	  approach,	   if	  based	  on	  the	  event-­‐based	  account	  of	  harm,	  would	  be	  implausible.	  	  The	  event-­‐based	  account	  may	  not	  help	  Pogge’s	  theory	  for	  additional	  reasons.	  The	  difficulty	   in	   showing	   that	   the	   rich	   states	   harm	   the	   poor	   is	   not	   because	   harm	   is	  meted	  out	  through	  a	  long	  chain	  of	  preventions	  of	  benefits.	  Rather,	  the	  harm	  is	  more	  direct	   but	   the	   result	   of	   small	   contributions	   from	   many	   different	   agents,	   which,	  when	   combined,	   have	   a	   harmful	   effect.	   The	   situation	   is	   more	   akin	   to	   Parfit’s	  harmless	   torturers	   scenario;	   in	   which	   each	   person	   dispenses	   a	   small	   amount	   of	  pain	  which	  alone	  is	  negligible,	  yet,	  in	  conjunction	  with	  the	  rest,	  amounts	  to	  torture	  (Parfit	   1984:	   80-­‐1).	   It	   does	   not	   seem	   that	   the	   multi-­‐level	   account	   helps	  accommodate	  the	  situation	  of	  the	  rich	  states	  harming	  the	  poor.	  	  The	   event-­‐based	   account,	   like	   the	   counterfactual	   account,	   limits	   harm	   caused	  through	  omission	  to	  when	  there	   is	  an	  act	  of	  preventing	  a	  benefit,	   rather	   than	  the	  absence	  of	  an	  action	  that	  benefits.	  As	  I	  already	  suggested,	  it	  does	  not	  seem	  that	  the	  rich	  prevent	  benefits	  to	  the	  poor,	  but	  rather,	  only	  fail	  to	  benefit	  them.	  Non-­‐comparative	  harm	  I	  suggested	  earlier	  that	  a	  comparative	  account	  of	  harm	  must	  identify	  a	  state	  that	  is	  not	  merely	  worse	  than	  a	  previous	  or	  an	  alternative	  one,	  but	  a	  state	  that	  is	  also,	  in	  itself,	   harmful,	   to	   be	   plausible.	   I	   raised	   the	   question	   why	   a	   harmful	   state	   alone	  would	  not	  count	  as	  harm.	  I,	  therefore,	  shall	  assess	  the	  ‘non-­‐comparative’	  account	  of	  harm.	  On	  this	  account,	  harm	  is	  identified	  purely	  with	  reference	  to	  the	  type	  of	  state	  the	  person	  is	  in,	  with	  no	  reference	  to	  changes	  occurring	  within	  the	  agent.	  A	  list	  of	  harmful	   states	   may	   include,	   ‘physical	   injuries,	   many	   physical	   disabilities,	   many	  
mental	  disabilities,	  some	  material	   inabilities,	   incidents	  of	  pain,	  the	  failure	  or	  ruin	  of	  
certain	  sorts	  of	  important	  projects	  and	  relationships,	  some	  losses,	  and	  death’	  (Shiffrin	  2013:	  5).	  If	  we	  judge	  someone	  to	  be	  in	  a	  harmed	  state,	  we	  make	  a	  comparison	  to	  a	  standard	   of	   normal	   or	   proper	   functioning.	   As	   this	   account	   of	   harm	   is	   still	  comparative	   in	   this	   respect,	   it	  might	   be	  misleading	   to	   label	   it	   ‘non-­‐comparative’.	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be	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  to	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  harm,	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  be	  
that	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  anotheer,	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  to	  
include	  non	  moralised	  cases	  in	  everyday,	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  comes	  to	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  negative	  arg	  remain	  true	  that	  
opogge	  certainly	  fails	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  However,	   the	   crucial	   distinction	   is	   that	   harm	   is	   assessed	   according	   to	   absolute	  standards	  rather	  than	  in	  relation	  to	  other	  states	  of	  the	  agent	  or	  the	  states	  of	  other	  agents,	   and	  as	   this	   term	   is	  used	   in	   the	   literature,	   I	  will	   continue	   to	   refer	   to	   ‘non-­‐comparative’	  harm.	  	  	  	  It	  may	  be	  more	  promising	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  non-­‐comparative	  account	  of	  harm	  to	  lend	  support	  to	  the	  harm	  approach.	  It	  seems	  surprising,	  given	  the	  problem	  of	  showing	  how	  the	  poor	  are	  harmed	  by	  the	  institutional	  order,	  even	  though	  they	  are	  not	  made	  worse	  off	  by	  it,	   that	  Pogge	  does	  not	  consider	  a	  non-­‐comparative	  account	  of	  harm.	  Pogge	   identifies	   harm	  with	   the	   lack	   of	   fulfilment	   of	   the	   basic	   needs	   of	   the	   poor	  under	  current	  global	  arrangements.	  Perhaps	  this	   is	  a	  non-­‐comparative	  account	  of	  harm.	  However,	  Pogge	  does	  not	   identify	  harm	  as	  the	  deprivation.	  Rather,	  harm	  is	  identified	  as	  injustice,	  and	  the	  failure	  of	  global	  institutions	  to	  meet	  the	  basic	  needs	  of	   the	   poor	   is	   how,	   according	   to	   Pogge,	   the	   institutions	   are	   unjust.	   Injustice	   is	  surely	  a	  wrong,	  but	  then	  the	  notion	  of	  harm	  is	  redundant.	  Instead,	  however,	  Pogge	  could	  focus	  on	  the	  dire	  situation	  of	  the	  poor.	  Many	  would	  agree	  that	  the	  poor	  are	  clearly	  in	  a	  harmful	  state.	  Perhaps	  Pogge	  could	  claim	  that	  the	  poor	  are	  harmed	  by	  the	  global	  order	  as	  they	  are	  in	  a	  state	  of	  harm,	  without	  arguing	  that	  they	  are	  worse	  off	  than	  they	  could	  be	  otherwise.	  	  A	  non-­‐comparative	  account	  of	  harm	  must	  do	  more	  than	  list	  states	  of	  harm;	  it	  must	  provide	   a	   unified	   explanation	   of	   what	   harmful	   states	   consist	   in.	   Such	   an	  explanation	  may	  be	  provided;	  according	  to	  Shiffrin,	  harm	  is	  to	  be	  in	  a	  state	  which	  ‘place	   agents	   in	   a	   relation	   of	   conflict	   with	   or	   estrangement	   or	   alienation	   from	  
significant	   aspects	   of	   themselves,	   their	   conscious	   experience,	   their	   lives,	   or	   their	  
circumstances’	  (2013:	  31).	  	  	  The	  non-­‐comparative	  account	  of	  harm	  only	  identifies	  someone	  as	  in	  a	  state	  of	  harm	  when	   they	   are	   badly-­‐off.	   However,	   others	   find	   this	   feature	   a	   weakness	   of	   the	  account.	  For	  example,	  if	  a	  Nobel	  prize	  winning	  genius	  suffers	  a	  stroke	  and	  comes	  to	  have	  only	  average	  intelligence,	  proponents	  of	  the	  non-­‐comparative	  account	  would	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  not	  register	  this	  as	  a	  harm,	  because	  having	  average	  intelligence	  is	  not	  a	  bad	  state	  for	  a	  person	  to	  be	   in	  (2011:	  440).	  However,	  others	  would	   insist	   that	   the	   loss	  of	  a	  valuable	  good,	  such	  as	  intelligence,	  should	  qualify	  as	  a	  harm.	  If	  we	  think	  the	  person	  is	  in	  a	  harmed	  state	  even	  though	  having	  average	  intelligence	  is	  not	  a	  bad	  state	  for	  other	  people,	  this	  can	  only	  be	  because	  we	  are	  comparing	  this	  present	  state	  to	  the	  agent’s	   former	   state	   (2011:	   440).	   It	   does	   not	   seem	   possible	   for	   the	   non-­‐comparativist	   to	   recognise	   this	   as	   harm.	   Perhaps	   losing	   the	   good	   life	   one	   had	   is	  clearly	  a	  harm,	  but	   this	  still	  makes	  reference	  to	   the	  agent’s	   former	  state.	  Perhaps	  non-­‐comparativists	  could	  argue	   that	   if	   the	  Nobel	  Prize	  winner	  were	  aware	  of	   the	  loss	   of	   her	   abilities,	   this	   may	   have	   harmful	   psychological	   consequences	   such	   as	  unhappiness.	  However,	  then	  we	  are	  referring	  to	  a	  different	  harm;	  her	  unhappiness,	  not	  the	  reduced	  intelligence.	  We	  may	  want	  to	  say	  that	  the	  reduced	  intelligence	  is	  a	  state	  of	  harm	  regardless	  of	  any	  unhappiness	  the	  prize	  winner	  may	  feel.	  Moreover,	  mere	   unhappiness	   may	   not	   count	   as	   harm.15	   Others	   may	  maintain	   that	   losing	   a	  good,	  which,	  nonetheless,	   leaves	  the	  person	  in	  a	  state	  that	   is	  not	  bad,	   is	  not	  to	  be	  harmed.	  However,	  it	  seems	  more	  needs	  to	  be	  said	  about	  what	  counts	  as	  a	  bad	  state.	  For	  example,	  having	   less	   than	  perfect	  vision	  may	  not	  be	   regarded	  as	  a	  bad	   state,	  however,	   if	  one	  has	   less	  than	  perfect	  vision	  and	  a	  desire	  to	  be	  a	   fighter	  pilot,	   this	  may	   be	   a	   bad	   state.	   What	   non-­‐comparativists	   recognise	   as	   harms	   depends	   on	  whether	  the	  basis	  of	  our	  theory	  of	  harm	  is	  an	  absolute	  standard	  of	  functioning	  or	  of	  flourishing.	  	  The	  reverse	  problem	  may	  afflict	  the	  non-­‐comparative	  account.	  If	  causing	  a	  person	  to	  be	  in	  a	  non-­‐comparatively	  bad	  state	  is	  to	  harm,	  one	  could	  harm	  someone	  even	  if	  they	  improve	  their	  situation.	  For	  example,	  a	  doctor	  C	  performs	  an	  operation	  on	  a	  blind	  person	  A,	  who	  was	  blinded	  by	  B,	  bringing	  A	  into	  a	  state	  of	  having	  dim	  vision.	  Dim	  vision	  is	  better	  than	  blindness	  but	  it	  is	  still	  a	  bad	  state.	  It	  is	  implausible	  to	  say	  that	  A	  has	  been	  harmed	  by	   the	  doctor.	  However	   it	   also	   seems	  hard	   to	   avoid	   this	  conclusion	  without	  making	  reference	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  doctor	  has	  made	  A	  better	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Shiffrin’s	  analysis	  of	  what	  is	  a	  harmful	  state	  would	  be	  able	  to	  accommodate	  such	  a	  case,	  as	  it	  allows	  that	  we	  can	  be	  harmed	  without	  being	  aware	  of	  this,	  if	  our	  current	  experience	  is	  in	  some	  way	  in	  conflict	  with	  other	  aspects	  of	  our	  circumstances	  or	  experiences	  (2013:	  28).	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  off	   than	  A	  was	  before.	  Perhaps,	   to	   avoid	   this	   conclusion	  we	   could	   reject	   the	   idea	  that	  the	  bad	  state	  is	  caused	  by	  the	  doctor.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  this	  conclusion	  would	  not	  be	   implausible	   in	  all	   cases.	  For	  example,	  perhaps,	   the	  doctor	  was	   tasked,	  and	  had	   the	   ability,	   to	   put	   the	   blind	   person	   into	   a	   state	   of	   good	   vision,	   but,	   due	   to	  culpable	  negligence,	  left	  him	  in	  dim	  vision;	  then	  it	  seems	  that	  C	  harms	  A.	  Moreover,	  A	  may	   still	   be	   harmed	   by	   C	   if	   it	   was	   C	   who	   blinded	   A.	   This	   suggests	   that	   harm	  cannot	  be	  sufficiently	  identified	  by	  assessing	  a	  person’s	  state	  without	  a	  comparison	  against	   past	   or	   future	   states.	   Whether	   a	   person	   harms	   another	   also	   seems	   to	  depend	  on	  what	   their	  duties	  are	   in	   the	  situation,	  and	  their	  role	   in	  bringing	  about	  the	  harm.	  	  Does	  the	  non-­‐comparative	  account	  of	  harm	  help	  support	  the	  harm	  approach?	  One	  of	  the	  implications	  of	  the	  non-­‐comparative	  account	  of	  harm	  seems	  to	  be	  that	  one	  can	  cause	  someone	  to	  be	  in	  a	  harmed	  state	  by	  bringing	  them	  into	  an	  improved	  state	   which	   is	   still,	   nonetheless,	   bad.	   This	   view	   would,	   in	   fact,	   benefit	   Pogge’s	  account,	  as	  one	  of	  the	  main	  objections	  to	  the	  harm	  approach	  is	  that	  it	  is	  implausible	  to	  claim	  that	  the	  global	  order	  harms	  the	  poor	  when	  it	  has	  improved	  their	  situation.	  However,	   as	   this	   is	   an	   implausible	   implication	   of	   the	   non-­‐comparative	   account,	  proponents	  would	  either	  adapt	  the	  theory	  to	  avoid	  this	  consequence,	  or	  we	  would	  be	  forced	  to	  reject	  the	  account.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  is	  plausible	  to	  say	  that	  I	  harm	  someone,	  even	  if	  I	  improve	  their	  situation,	  if	  I	  am	  responsible	  for	  their	  original	  bad	  state.	  This	  may	  be	  a	  fitting	  analysis	  of	  the	  global	  context.	  The	  rich	  countries,	  even	  if	  they	  bring	  advantages	  to	  the	  poor	  today,	  may	  be	  held	  responsible	  for	  poverty	  due	  to	  historical	  events,	  such	  as	  colonisation.	  This,	  however,	  would	  change	  the	  nature	  of	   our	   harm-­‐based	   duties.	   We	   would	   need	   to	   show	   that	   the	   rich	   states	   are	  responsible	   for	   the	   historical	   origins	   of	   poverty,	   and	   our	   duties	   would	   arise	   as	  duties	   of	   reparative	   justice,	   rather	   than	   duties	   of	   social	   justice.	   This	   approach	   to	  global	  justice	  may	  be	  most	  promising;	  however,	  Pogge	  wants	  to	  avoid	  this	  type	  of	  argument,	  because	  it	  is,	  he	  alleges,	  more	  controversial	  (2010:	  234).	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  Additionally,	   the	   non-­‐comparative	   approach	   poses	   a	   greater	   difficulty	   than	   the	  comparative	  accounts	  in	  a	  certain	  respect.	  If	  harming	  someone	  is	  causing	  them	  to	  be	  in	  a	  harmful	  state	  this	  places	  a	  stronger	  burden	  on	  proving	  the	  causation	  than	  if	  harm	  can	  be	  identified	  as	  merely	  making	  someone	  worse	  off	  than	  they	  were	  before	  or	   than	   they	   could	   or	   should	   be.	   It	   is	   a	   very	   difficult	   task	   to	   prove	   that	   the	   rich	  states	  are	  responsible	  for	  poverty.	  It	  is	  easier	  to	  show	  that	  the	  rich	  states	  make	  the	  poor	  worse	  off	  than	  they	  could	  be	  otherwise.	  	  	  The	  non-­‐comparative	  approach	  seems,	  on	  the	  whole,	  a	  plausible	  account	  of	  harm.	  However,	  it	  does	  not	  seem	  able	  to	  help	  the	  harm	  approach	  in	  the	  context	  of	  global	  justice.	   The	   non-­‐comparative	   account,	   as	  with	   the	   other	   non-­‐moralised	   accounts,	  identifies	  harm	  that	  may	  not	  give	  rise	  to	  any	  duties.	  For	  example,	  I	  may	  make	  you	  worse	  off	  in	  a	  normatively	  significant	  way	  by	  legitimately	  firing	  you	  from	  your	  job,	  however,	  I	  may	  not	  have	  any	  duties	  towards	  you	  arising	  from	  this.	  Non-­‐moralised	  accounts	  of	  harm	  aim	   to	   account	   for	  what	   is	  normatively	   significant	   about	  harm,	  but	  stop	  short	  of	  arguing	  that	  to	  cause	  harm	  is	  prima	  facie	  wrong.	  Thus	  duties	  of	  justice	   would	   not	   necessarily	   follow	   from	   showing	   that	   the	   rich	   harm	   the	   poor.	  Pogge’s	  aim	  is	  to	  show	  that	  we	  harm	  the	  global	  poor,	  and	  therefore,	  have	  duties	  of	  justice	   towards	   them.	   If	  we	  adopt	   a	  non-­‐moralised	  account	  of	  harm,	   there	   is	   still	  the	  need	  to	  show	  that,	  even	   if	   the	  rich	  harm	  the	  poor,	   they	  also	  wrong	   them.	  The	  real	   task	   then	   is	   to	   show	   that	   the	   rich	   states	   wrong	   the	   global	   poor.	   Moralised	  accounts,	   thus,	   seem	   more	   promising	   to	   lend	   support	   to	   the	   harm	   approach.	  Moreover,	  given	  that	  it	  seems	  that	  the	  duties	  one	  has	  in	  a	  situation	  have	  a	  bearing	  on	  whether	  harm	  occurs,	  moralised	  accounts	  of	  harm	  seem	  more	  plausible.	  	  	  Our	  reason	  for	  exploring	  harm	  is	  to	  see	  if	  its	  role	  as	  a	  reason	  for	  limiting	  conduct	  in	  society	  helps	   show	   that	   the	   rich	   states	  have	  duties	   to	   act	  differently	   towards	   the	  poor.	  We	  are	  interested	  in	  harm	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  Mill	  uses	  it	  when	  he	  writes	  that	  ‘the	  only	  purpose	  for	  which	  power	  can	  be	  rightfully	  exercised	  over	  any	  member	  of	  a	  
civilised	   community,	   against	  his	  will,	   is	   to	  prevent	  harm	   to	  others’	   (1982:	  67).	  Mill	  tells	  us	  there	  is	  something	  morally	  significant	  about	  harm.	  Given	  this,	  the	  notion	  of	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  harm	  as	  a	  non-­‐moralised	  concept,	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  mere	  damage,	  which	  can	  be	  used	  to	  describe	  inanimate	  objects	  being	  harmed,	  or	  forces	  of	  nature	  harming	  people,	  is	  not	  relevant.	  A	  moralised	  notion	  of	  harm	  is	  our	  appropriate	  focus.	  	  	  Moralised	  accounts	  of	  harm:	  harm	  as	  rights	  violations	  Given	  that	  we	  are	  interested	  in	  harm	  a	  basis	  for	  limiting	  actions	  and	  giving	  rise	  to	  duties,	  our	  concern	   is	  harm	  that	   is	  wrongful.	  Harms	  that	  are	  not	  wrongful	  do	  not	  give	  rise	  to	  any	  duties	  or	  prohibitions.	  Mill	  writes	  that	  the	  harm	  principle	  ensures	  that	  one	  not	  injure	  the	  interests	  of	  another	  ‘which	  either	  by	  express	  legal	  provision	  
or	   by	   tacit	   understanding	   ought	   to	   be	   considered	   as	   rights’	   (1982:	   191).	   It	   seems,	  according	   to	   Mill,	   that	   harm	   is	   an	   injury	   to	   interests	   which	   are	   rights.	   It	   seems	  plausible,	  following	  Mill,	  to	  define	  harm	  as	  a	  rights	  violation;	  a	  view	  which	  has	  been	  taken	   up	   in	   the	   literature.	   Feinberg	   puts	   forward	   a	   moralised	   counterfactual	  account	   of	   harm,	   according	   to	   which,	   harms	   are	   setbacks	   to	   interests	   that	   are	  wrongful,	   and	   by	   wrongful	   is	   meant	   rights-­‐violating	   (Feinberg	   1987:	   34).	   The	  rights	   that	   Feinberg	   has	   in	   mind	   are	   moral	   rights.	   Interests	   that	   may	   pre-­‐theoretically	  be	  considered	  rights	  may	  include	  rights	  to	   life,	  economic	  sufficiency,	  political	  liberty,	  and	  health	  (1987:	  41).	  	  A	   harm	   is	   wrongful	   in	   virtue	   of	   the	   attitude	   the	   agent	   has,	   which	   may	   include	  intention,	   recklessness,	   or	   negligence,	   and	   if	   the	  harm	   is	   unjustified	   (1987:	   107).	  The	  moralised	   account	   of	   harm	  may	   be	   counterfactual,	   taking	   the	   view	   that	   A	   is	  harmed	  when	  she	  is	  worse	  off	  than	  she	  would	  be	  if	  B	  had	  not	  acted	  as	  he	  did.	  There	  are	  many	  ways	   our	   interests	   can	   be	   injured.	   They	   can	   be	   thwarted,	   i.e.	   progress	  towards	  fulfilment	  is	  halted,	  or	  impeded,	  i.e.	  progress	  towards	  fulfilment	  is	  slowed.	  Progress	  does	  not	  need	  to	  be	  reversed	  to	  count	  as	  harm,	  though	  impeding	  interest	  fulfilment	  will	  qualify	  as	  a	  weaker	  harm	  than	  stopping	  or	  reversing	  it	  (1987:	  106).	  There	  is	  a	  baseline	  against	  which	  we	  measure	  harm,	  so,	  in	  this	  way,	  the	  account	  of	  harm	  is	  comparative.	  However,	  harm	  is	  not	  just	  assessed	  in	  relation	  to	  whether	  an	  agent	   is	  made	  worse	   off	   or	   better	   off.	   This	   account	   also	   takes	   into	   account	  what	  level	  a	  person	  is	  at	  on	  an	  absolute	  scale	  of	  interest-­‐fulfilment.	  If	  a	  person	  is	  well-­‐off	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  and	  events	  or	  actions	  keep	  a	  person	  at	  this	  level,	  without	  raising	  them	  higher,	  these	  may	   come	   to	   him	   as	   a	   benefit,	   whereas,	   if	   a	   person	   is	   badly-­‐off,	   and	   events	   or	  actions	  do	  not	  improve	  her	  situation,	  but	  keep	  her	  badly-­‐off,	  we	  may	  consider	  her	  to	  be	  harmed	  (Feinberg	  1994:	  5).	  	  The	  moralised	  counterfactual	  account	  also	  allows	  that	  harm	  can	  occur	  through	  not	  acting.	  According	   to	  Feinberg,	  we	  have	  duties	  of	   rescue	  when	  we	   can	  easily	  help	  someone	   in	   need.	   Feinberg	   argues	   that	  when	  we	   fail	   to	  meet	   our	   duties	   to	   help	  others,	   at	   reasonable	   cost	   to	  ourselves,	  we	  violate	   the	   rights	  of	   those	  people	  and	  commit	  an	  injustice.	  This	  is	  to	  harm	  them	  (1987:	  132).	  Others	  may	  resist	  the	  idea	  that	  we	  have	  a	  moral	  obligation	  in	  such	  a	  case,	  as	  we	  would	  be	  conferring	  a	  benefit	  onto	   another,	  which	  we	   cannot	   have	   a	   duty	   to	   do.	  However,	   it	  may	   be	  wrong	   to	  think	  of	   this	   as	   a	   case	  of	   ‘benefitting’	   another.	   Feinberg	  points	  out	   that	   there	  are	  different	  senses	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘benefitting’,	  which	  often	  are	  equivocated	  (1987:	  143).	   The	   generic	   sense	   of	   benefitting	   relates	   to	   acting	   favourably	   towards	  someone,	   which	   we	   may	   do	   by	   preventing	   a	   worsening	   of	   their	   interests	   or	  advancing	   their	   interests.	   The	   other	   sense	   of	   benefitting	   relates	   to	   raising	  someone’s	  level	  of	  interest	  fulfilment	  beyond	  its	  current	  or	  normal	  level.	  This	  latter	  sense	  of	  benefitting	  often	  involves	  going	  beyond	  one’s	  duty;	  and	  the	  recipient	  of	  the	  benefit	   experiences	  an	  advantage	  or	  windfall.	   Cases	  of	   the	   first	  kind	  may	   involve	  preventing	   a	   dramatic	   decline	   to	   someone’s	   interests,	   as	   in	   the	   case	   of	   rescuing	  someone	  drowning	  (1987:	  137).	   In	  this	  case	  we	  have	  a	  duty	  towards	  this	  person.	  We	  should	  not	  confuse	   the	  different	  ways	   in	  which	  we	  can	  benefit	   someone;	   this	  may	  lead	  one	  to	  think	  we	  are	  improperly	  assigning	  duties.	  If	  we	  cannot	  keep	  these	  senses	  apart,	  then,	  in	  the	  rescue	  case,	  it	  might	  be	  better	  not	  to	  regard	  this	  as	  a	  case	  of	  benefitting	  at	  all.	  One	  may	  ask	  why	  there	  is	  a	  difference	  between	  these	  two	  meanings	  of	  ‘benefit’,	  and	  what	   is	  more	  morally	   significant	   about	   preventing	   someone’s	   interest	   level	   from	  falling,	  rather	  than	  raising	  it.	  It	  would	  seem	  more	  important	  for	  us	  to	  improve	  the	  situation	   of	   a	   worse	   off	   person	   than	   to	   stop	   the	   situation	   of	   a	   well-­‐off	   person	  becoming	  worse.	  However,	  the	  point	  is	  not	  that	  we	  only	  have	  duties	  when	  we	  could	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  restore	  a	  person’s	  interest	  level	  to	  what	  it	  was	  before	  an	  event,	  or	  when	  we	  could	  preventing	   it	   from	  declining,	  and	  not	  when	  we	  could	   raise	   it	   above	   its	  normal	  or	  current	   level.	   Whether	   we	   have	   a	   duty	   depends	   on	   various	   factors,	   such	   as	   the	  relationship	   between	   the	   parties	   in	   the	   case.	   The	   point	   is	   that	   we	   should	   not	  assume	   that,	   because	   we	   are	   talking	   about	   acting	   favourably	   towards	   someone,	  there	  are	  not	  duties	  to	  benefit.	  	  The	  moralised	   counterfactual	   account	   of	   harm	   seems	   to	   do	   better	   than	   the	   non-­‐moralised	   counterfactual	   account	   in	   several	   respects.	   First,	   the	   moralised	  conception	   of	   harm	   provides	   a	   clear,	   unified	   account	   of	   what	   harm	   is,	   namely,	  violations	   of	   moral	   rights.	   Secondly,	   the	   moralised	   account	   gives	   a	   clear	   way	   of	  determining	  which	  failures	  to	  benefit	  are	  harms,	  namely	  those	  which	  violate	  a	  duty.	  On	   the	   one	   hand,	   the	  moralised	   counterfactual	   account	   is	   broader	   than	   the	   non-­‐moralised,	  as	  it	  allows	  that	  we	  can	  harm	  through	  omission,	  not	  only	  by	  preventing	  a	  benefit,	  but	  also	  through	  failing	  to	  benefit.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  it	  is	  narrower,	  as	  it	  takes	  it	  that	  we	  harm	  through	  omission	  only	  when	  we	  have	  a	  duty	  to	  help.	  	  However,	   the	   account	   raises	   some	   issues.	   First	   we	   require	   a	   comprehensive	  account	  of	  what	  welfare	  interests	  counts	  as	  moral	  rights	  to	  be	  certain	  about	  which	  situations	  count	  as	  harm.	  We	  may	  also	  question	  whether	  this	  account	  captures	  how	  we	  ordinarily	  think	  of	  harm.	  It	  states	  that	  harm	  is	  to	  violate	  a	  moral	  right.	  However,	  if	  someone	  has	  a	  moral	  right	  which	  they	  do	  not	  consider	  a	  live	  interest	  for	  them,	  if	  this	  is	   interfered	  with,	  we	  may	  doubt	  that	  they	  are	  harmed.	  The	  account	  makes	  it	  hard	  to	  distinguish	  harm	  from	  our	  other	  moral	  concepts,	  such	  as	  right	  violations.	  Harm	  is	  usually	  regarded	  as	  a	  distinct	  category	  with	  its	  own	  important	  role	  within	  our	  moral	  theory.	  While	  it	  is	  plausible	  to	  claim	  that	  a	  necessary	  feature	  of	  harm	  is	  that	  it	  violates	  a	  right,	  it	  seems	  less	  plausible	  that	  this	  is	  sufficient	  for	  something	  to	  be	  harm.	  	  For	   example,	   a	   land	   owner	   has	   a	   right,	   pertaining	   to	   an	   interest,	   in	   the	   free	   and	  exclusive	  use	  of	  their	  land.	  If	  someone	  trespasses	  on	  their	  land,	  even	  if	  this	  does	  not	  adversely	  affect	   the	   land,	  or	   the	   land	  owner,	  Feinberg	  takes	   it	   that	   the	  trespasser	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  harms	   the	   landowner	   because	   it	   violates	   the	   interest	   the	   land	   owner	   has	   in	   the	  exclusive	  enjoyment	  of	  his	  property	  (1987:	  107).	  According	  to	  Feinberg,	   if	   I	  cross	  your	   land,	   without	   leaving	   any	   trace	   or	   causing	   any	   damage,	   but	   without	   your	  consent,	  I	  harm	  you.	  This	  makes	  interests	  seem	  independent	  from	  the	  desires	  and	  aims	  of	  the	  interest	  holders.	  While	  we	  may	  plausibly	  assign	  interests	  to	  all	  people,	  in	  virtue	  of	  being	  human,	  we	  may	  still	  doubt	  that	  someone	  is	  harmed	  whenever	  one	  of	   these	   interests	   is	  violated	   if	   that	  person	  places	  no	   importance	  on	  that	   interest.	  Even	  for	  the	  important	  interests	  that	  are	  rights,	  such	  as	  life	  and	  economic	  security,	  there	  are	  people	  who	  do	  not	  value	  them,	  or	  come	  to	  stop	  valuing	  them.	  The	  main	  concern	  is	  that,	  on	  this	  view,	  one	  can	  harm	  without	  any	  harm	  having	  been	  caused.	  Nonetheless,	   whenever	   someone’s	   right	   is	   interfered	   with,	   this	   would	   seem	   to	  impinge	  on	  that	  person’s	  liberty,	  and	  it	  may	  be	  less	  plausible	  to	  argue	  that	  someone	  may	  not	  have	  any	  interest	  in	  their	  own	  liberty.	  So	  perhaps	  it	  is	  right	  to	  insist	  that	  whenever	  someone’s	  right	  is	  violated,	  they	  are	  harmed	  in	  that	  respect,	  even	  if	  they	  are	  not	  harmed	  overall.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  even	  if	  my	  right	  or	  liberty	  is	  interfered	  with	  by	  another,	  not	  all	   interferences	  of	  rights	  or	  liberties	  are	  morally	  significant.	  Feinberg	  states	  that	  claiming	  that	  all	  violations	  of	  rights	  are	  harms	  does	  not	  mean	  these	  are	  harms	  on	  balance,	  but	  insists	  that	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  find	  a	  wrong	  that	  is	  not,	  to	  some	  extent,	  a	  harm	  (1987:	  36).	  We	  may	  concede	  that	  the	  landowner	  has	  been,	  to	  some	  extent,	  in	  one	  aspect,	  harmed	  by	  the	  trespass,	  but	  we	  may	  remain	  reluctant	  to	  say	  this;	  it	  seems	  worth	  retaining	  identifications	  of	  harm	  for	  cases	  where	  the	  harm	  is	  morally	  significant,	  to	  preserve	  the	  importance	  of	  harm	  in	  our	  moral	  theory.	  	  Instead	  of	  describing	  all	  rights	  violations	  as	  harms,	  we	  may	  wish	  to	  say	  that	  harm	  is	  a	   type	   of	   rights	   violation,	   for	   example,	   a	   violation	   of	   rights	   that	   causes	  psychological	   or	   physical	   injury.	   However,	   we	   have	   seen	   that	   injury	   is	   neither	  necessary	   nor	   sufficient	   for	   something	   to	   be	   harm.	   It	   seems	   plausible	   to	   link	  together	   cases	  of	  harm	   through	   the	   feature	  of	   rights	  violations.	  However,	   on	   this	  account	   it	  becomes	  hard	  to	  see	  what	  the	  notion	  of	  harm	  adds.	  Given	  that	  harm	  is	  regarded	  as	  a	  distinct	  moral	  concept,	  and	  its	  distinctiveness	  should	  be	  preserved,	  it	  seems	  that	  our	  theory	  has	  gone	  wrong.	  This	  does	  not	  mean	  the	  moralised	  approach	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  is	   wrong.	   It	   still	   seems	   that	   harm	   must	   be	   wrongful	   to	   account	   for	   its	   moral	  significance.	  Perhaps	  it	  is	  correct	  to	  identify	  harm	  with	  rights	  violations.	  However	  we	   should	   insist	   on	   the	   subjective	   element	   of	   harm;	   rejecting	   the	   move	   that	   all	  rights	  violations	  are	  harms.	  	  One	  must	   conclude,	   therefore,	   that	   an	   interest	  must	   be	   a	   right	   for	   its	   setback	   to	  count	  as	  harm,	  but	  that	  not	  all	  rights	  are	  interests.	  Does	   the	   moralised	   counterfactual	   account	   of	   harm	   help	   support	   the	   harm	  approach?	  In	   many	   ways,	   the	   global	   context	   seems	   to	   be	   a	   case	   of	   harm	   according	   to	   the	  moralised	  counterfactual	  account.	  The	   rich	   states	  act	   in	  ways	   that	  demonstrate	  a	  wrongful	   attitude	   towards	   the	   poor,	   namely	   ‘negligence,	   and	   recklessness’.	   The	  interests	   of	   the	   poor	   that	   are	   interfered	   with	   through	   poverty	   are	   important	  welfare	  interests.	  It	  would	  also	  seem	  hard	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  harms	  of	  poverty	  can	  be	  justified	  by	  the	  rich	  states.	  We	  have	  already	  established	  that	  it	  is	  most	  promising	  to	   argue	   that	   the	   rich	   fail	   to	   benefit	   the	   poor,	  which,	   according	   to	   the	  moralised	  counterfactual	  account,	  can	  be	  a	  form	  of	  harm.	  The	  difficulty,	  however,	  in	  drawing	  on	   such	  an	  account	   to	   support	   the	  harm	  approach	   is	   that	  harm	   is	   identified	  only	  when	  there	  has	  been	  a	  wrongful	  act	  which	  is	  determined	  to	  be	  wrongful	  because	  it	  has	  violated	  a	  right.	  	  The	  harm	  approach	  aims	   to	  show	  that	  A	  has	  duties	   to	  B	  because	  A	  harms	  B.	   If	  A	  harms	  B	  by	  violating	  B’s	  right,	  A	  already	  had	  duties	  towards	  B.	  So	  while	  A	  now	  has	  duties	  towards	  B	  in	  virtue	  of	  this	  harm,	  there	   is	  no	  need	  to	  draw	  on	  this	  harm	  to	  establish	  that	  B	  has	  duties	  towards	  B.	   It	   is	  only	  plausible	  to	  claim	  that	  A	  harms	  B	  because	  A	  already	  has	  pre-­‐existing	  duties	  towards	  B.	  On	   the	  moralised	   counterfactual	   account,	  we	  harm	   someone	  by	   failing	   to	   benefit	  them	   when	   we	   have	   a	   moral	   obligation	   to	   do	   so.	   If	   we	   do	   not	   have	   a	   moral	  obligation	   to	   act	   then	   failing	   to	   benefit	   someone	   is	   not	   to	   harm	   them.	   Feinberg	  thinks	  that	  others	  have	  claims	  on	  us	  to	  come	  to	  their	  rescue	  when	  we	  can	  do	  so	  at	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  reasonable	  cost.	  If	  we	  do	  not	  rescue	  a	  person	  in	  need,	  this	  is	  unjust,	  and	  we	  harm	  them.	   This,	   however,	   is	   not	   the	   harm	   argument	   that	   Pogge	   is	   putting	   forward.	  Pogge	  argues	   that	  our	  duties	  of	   justice	   towards	   the	  poor	  arise	   from	  the	  harm	  we	  bring	  them.	  On	  Feinberg’	  view,	  the	  claim	  that	  we	  harm	  the	  poor,	  or	  treat	  the	  poor	  unjustly	  relies	  on	  the	  idea	  that	  we	  have	  duties	  to	  aid	  those	  in	  need.	  The	  notion	  of	  harm	  is	  doing	  no	  additional	  work.	  	  If	  we	  harm	  the	  poor	  through	  failing	  to	  prevent	  harm	  to	  the	  poor,	   it	  seems	  that	  at	  core	   is	   a	   positive	   duty	   to	   help	   the	   poor.	   Pogge’s	   aim	   is	   to	   base	   our	   duties	   on	  negative	  duties	  only.	  Pogge	  also	  wants	  to	  argue	  that	  our	  duties	  are	  duties	  of	  justice,	  and	  not	  duties	  of	  benevolence	  or	  charity.	  Feinberg,	  however,	  takes	  our	  duties	  to	  aid	  those	  in	  need	  to	  be	  duties	  of	  justice,	  and	  states	  that	  they	  are,	  at	  times,	  perfect	  duties	  (1987:	   149).	   So	   while	   Feinberg’s	   account	   of	   harm	   does	   not	   support	   the	   harm	  approach,	   Feinberg’s	   views	   would	   ground	   strong	   duties	   towards	   the	   poor,	   and	  seem	   to	   negate	   the	   need	   for	   the	   harm	   approach.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   Feinberg’s	  makes	   some	   claims	   that	   seem	   to	   lend	   strong	   support	   to	   the	   harm	   approach.	  Feinberg	  states	  ‘When	  a	  person’s	  situation	  is	  bad	  enough,	  simply	  to	  maintain	  it	  there	  
when	   one	   could	   let	   it	   improve,	   may	   be	   to	   harm	   that	   person’	   (1994:	   5).	   However,	  Feinberg	  does	  not	  say	  more	  than	  this,	  and	  as	  elsewhere	  Feinberg	  makes	  clear	  that	  we	  only	  harm	  where	  we	  violate	  a	  right,	  it	  seems	  we	  should	  interpret	  this	  statement	  as	  saying	  that	  to	  maintain	  a	  person’s	  bad	  situation	  is	  to	  violate	  their	  rights	  and	  thus	  to	  harm	  them	  (1987:	  34).	  The	  underlying	  framework	  remains	  that	  rights	  violation	  is	  prior,	  and	  harm	  is	  the	  secondary	  moral	  concept.	  	  The	   moralised	   counterfactual	   account,	   conceived	   as	   rights	   violations,	   seems	   to	  identify	  harm	  too	  widely,	  as	  it	  would	  take	  any	  violation	  of	  a	  right	  to	  be	  a	  setback	  to	  interests,	  even	  when	  one	  does	  not	  have	  an	   interest	   in	  the	  object	  of	   the	  right.	  One	  might	  speculate	  that	  a	  more	  plausible	  moralised	  account	  would	  not	  define	  all	  rights	  violations	  as	  harm.	  As	  an	  example	  of	  such	  a	  view,	  I	  shall	  turn	  next	  to	  Raz’s	  account	  of	  harm,	  which	  defines	  harm	  in	  relation	  to	  an	  infringement	  of	  autonomy,	  but	  does	  not	  claim	  that	  all	  interferences	  with	  autonomy	  are	  violations	  of	  a	  right.	  Raz	  claims	  that	  impingement	  on	  autonomy	  is	  necessary	  for	  something	  to	  be	  harm,	  but	  he	  does	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  not	   assert	   that	   it	   is	   sufficient.	   The	   autonomy-­‐based	   account	   may	   be	   a	   more	  plausible	  moralised	  account	  of	  harm,	  so	  it	  is	  worth	  exploring	  and	  assessing	  how	  far	  it	  may	  support	  the	  harm	  approach.	  	  Autonomy-­‐based	  harm	  On	   Raz’s	   view,	   harm	   is	   interference	   with	   one’s	   autonomy	   (Raz	   1988:	   419).	   As	  coercion	  is	  a	  restriction	  on	  one’s	  autonomy,	  it	  is	  only	  permitted	  where	  it	  leads	  to	  an	  autonomy	  gain	  overall,	   namely,	   by	   restricting	  harm	   (1988:	  413).	  We	  might	   think	  that	   other	   disvalues	   in	   society,	   and	   not	   just	   harm,	   should	   be	   restricted	   through	  coercion,	  such	  as	  harmless	  wrongings	  or	  worthless	  options.	  However,	  Raz’s	  view	  is	  that	  this	  would	  result	  in	  an	  autonomy	  loss	  overall.	  Raz’s	  aim	  is	  to	  use	  harm	  in	  a	  way	  that	   people	   usually	  mean	   it,	   but	   to	   bring	   out	   the	   connection	   between	   harm	   and	  autonomy.	  
Raz	   conceives	   of	   harm	   as	   a	   moralised	   concept.	   Raz	   claims	   that	   ‘causing	   harm’	  entails	  by	  its	  very	  meaning	  that	  the	  action	  is	  prima	  facie	  wrong.	  Harm	  acquires	  its	  specific	   meaning	   within	   a	   particular	   moral	   theory	   (1988:	   414).	   Without	   being	  grounded	   in	   a	  moral	   theory,	   harm,	   according	   to	  Raz,	  would	  be	   an	  empty,	  merely	  formal	   notion,	   and	   would	   not	   suggest	   any	   implications	   for	   policy	   (414).	   Raz’s	  notion	   of	   harm	   is	   embedded	   in	   his	  moral	   theory	  which	   values	   autonomy	   as	   the	  supreme	   value	   of	   society.	   We	   may	   harm	   a	   person	   by	   interfering	   with	   their	  autonomy	   by	   depriving	   them	   of	   opportunities	   or	   of	   the	   ability	   to	   pursue	   them	  (1988:	  413).	  We	  may	  also	  harm	  a	  person	  by	  frustrating	  their	  pursuit	  of	  the	  projects	  and	   relationships	   they	   have	   set	   upon	   (413).	   Other	   accounts	  would	   take	   harm	   to	  include	   mere	   injury;	   pain	   or	   hurt.	   However,	   the	   autonomy	   account	   would	   only	  count	  these	  as	  harm	  when	  they	  affect	  our	  ability	  to	  carry	  out	  our	  plans	  of	  life.	  	  
Raz	  notes	  that	  there	  is	  a	  common	  misconception	  that	  harming	  is	  to	  make	  someone	  worse	  off	  than	  they	  were	  before.	  We	  have	  already	  explored	  theories	  that	  take	  harm	  to	  be	  making	  someone	  worse	  off	  than	  they	  would	  be	  otherwise.	  According	  to	  Raz,	  we	  may	  also	  harm	  someone	  when	  one's	  actions	  make	  another	  worse	  off	  than	  they	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  are	  entitled	  to	  be,	   in	  a	  way	  which	  affects	  their	   future	  well-­‐being	  (1988:	  414).	  Raz	  states	  that	  sometimes	  failing	  to	  improve	  the	  situation	  of	  another	  is	  to	  harm	  them;	  by	  denying	  them	  what	  is	  due	  to	  them.	  It	   is	  not	  clear	  if	  this	   is	  Raz’s	  explanation	  of	  how	  we	  harm	  someone	  through	  omission,	  or	  merely	  one	  way.	  Raz	  seems	  to	  stress	  that	  the	  way	  in	  which	  we	  harm	  someone	  by	  not	  making	  them	  better	  off	  is	  by	  failing	  in	  one's	  duty	   to	   them.	   It	   seems	   that	  we	  harm	  when	  we	  make	   someone	  worse	  off	  than	  they	  should	  be,	  and	  not	  merely	  worse	  off	  than	  they	  could	  be.	  So	  according	  to	  Raz,	   failing	   to	   fulfill	   a	  duty	   is	   itself	   a	   form	  of	  harm,	   even	   though	   this	   is	   a	  duty	   to	  improve	   their	   situation	   and	   the	   failure	   does	   not	   leave	   them	  worse	   off	   than	   they	  were	  before.	  For	  example,	  a	  disabled	  person,	  who	  has	  a	  legal	  right	  to	  be	  employed	  by	   any	   employer	   to	   whom	   she	   applies	   and	   who	   has	   fewer	   than	   four	   per	   cent	  disabled	  employees	   in	  his	  work	   force,	   is	  harmed	  by	  such	  an	  employer	   if	  he	   turns	  her	   down,	   though	   he	   does	   not	   worsen	   her	   situation	   (1988:	   416).	   Raz’s	   account	  shares,	  with	  Feinberg’s,	   the	  view	   that	   the	  category	  of	  harm	   includes	  cases	  where	  one	  fails	  in	  their	  duty	  towards	  others.	  	  According	  to	  Raz,	  one	  can	  harm	  groups	  of	  people	  if	  one	  fails	  in	  one's	  duty	  to	  a	  class	  of	   persons	   and	   a	   member	   of	   that	   class	   suffers	   as	   a	   result.	   For	   example,	   a	  government	  which	   has	   a	  moral	   duty	   to	   increase	   pensions	   harms	   pensioners	   if	   it	  fails	  to	  do	  so	  (1988:	  417).	  Raz’s	  view,	  however,	  is	  that	  particular	  individuals	  within	  this	   class	   cannot	   claim	   they	   are	   harmed	   (1988:	   417).	   Raz	   claims	   that	   ‘an	   action	  
harms	   a	   particular	   person	   only	   if	   it	   affects	   him	   directly	   and	   significantly	   by	   itself’	  (1998:	  416). The	  allocation	  of	   loss	  among	  particular	  people	   is	  determined	  by	   the	  actions	  of	  many	  other	  agents	  (1988:	  417).	  Many	  of	  Raz’s	  claims	  seem	  to	  lend	  support	  to	  Pogge’s	  harm	  approach.	  Pogge’s	  view	  takes	   it	   that	   the	   rich	   harm	   the	   poor	   because	   they	   fail	   to	   implement	   a	  more	   just	  alternative	   set	   of	   global	   arrangements.	   I	   suggested	   that	   this	   would	   not	   strike	  people	   as	   harming,	   as	   this	   seems	   to	   be	   a	  mere	   failure	   to	   benefit	   the	   poor.	   Raz’s	  account,	  however,	  suggests	  that	  failing	  to	  improve	  a	  person’s	  situation	  may	  count	  as	  harm.	  In	  addition,	  Raz’s	  view	  that	  harm’s	  meaning	  come	  from	  whichever	  moral	  theory	  it	  is	  embedded	  within	  seems	  to	  fit	  with	  Pogge’s	  ecumenical	  approach.	  Also,	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  Raz’s	  view	  that	  we	  can	  harm	  a	  class	  of	  people	  through	  failing	  to	  fulfill	  a	  duty	  helps	  make	  the	  case	  that	  we	  can	  harm	  the	  global	  poor	  as	  a	  large	  group,	  even	  if	  we	  cannot	  show	  how	  our	  actions	  harm	  particular	  individuals.	  	  However,	  we	  may	  question	  whether	  Raz’s	  theory	  of	  harm	  is	  persuasive.	  Raz’s	  view	  is	  that	  coercion	  is	  only	  permissible	  to	  restrict	  harm,	  because	  only	  harm	  diminishes	  autonomy.	   However,	   it	   seems	   a	   largely	   empirical	   claim	   that	   only	   harm	   detracts	  from	   autonomy.	   We	   can	   imagine	   other	   worthless	   but	   harmless	   options	  compromising	  one’s	  autonomy,	   for	  example,	  gambling	   (Stanton-­‐Ife	  2006).	   It	  does	  not	   seem	   that	   restrictions	   on	   coercion	  match	   onto	   our	   concerns	   about	   harms	   if	  autonomy	   is	   what	   matters.	   However,	   if	   the	   criticism	   is	   that	   other	   repugnant	  options	  inhibit	  autonomy	  and	  thus	  coercion	  should	  apply	  to	  these	  too,	  this	  may	  not	  undermine	   Raz’s	   account.	   Perhaps	   they	   should	   also	   be	   considered	   harms,	   and	  coercion	  against	  these	  would	  be	  justified.	  	  The	  difficulty	   is	   that,	  although	  Raz	  emphasises	  the	  connection	  between	  harm	  and	  autonomy,	  he	  does	  not	  give	  a	  definition	  of	  harm	  in	  terms	  of	  loss	  of	  autonomy.	  Raz	  states	  that	  the	  meaning	  of	  harm	  is	  that	  ‘one	  harms	  another	  when	  one's	  action	  makes	  
the	  other	  person	  worse	  off	  than	  he	  was,	  or	  is	  entitled	  to	  be,	  in	  a	  way	  which	  affects	  his	  
future	  wellbeing’	   (1988:	   414).	   It	   seems	   that	   diminishing	   autonomy	   is	   the	  way	   in	  which	   a	   person	   is	   made	   worse	   off.	   However,	   this	   leaves	   it	   unclear	   whether	   all	  restrictions	  of	  autonomy	  are	  harms,	  or	  only	  that	  all	  harms	  involve	  adverse	  effects	  on	  autonomy.	  If	   it	   is	  the	  former,	  repugnant	  options	  that	  inhibit	  autonomy	  may	  be	  considered	   harms,	   and	   included	   within	   the	   scope	   of	   coercive	   principles.	   If,	  however,	  not	  all	  infringements	  on	  autonomy	  are	  harms,	  Raz’s	  account	  may	  face	  the	  tension	   that	   Stanton-­‐Ife	   identifies.	   Raz’s	   theory	   raises	   the	   same	   question	   as	  Feinberg’s.	  While	  most	   cases	  of	  violating	  a	  duty	  would	   seem	   to	   count	  as	  harm,	   it	  may	  seem	  implausible	  to	  claim	  that	  any	  violation	  of	  a	  duty	  is	  a	  harm.	  This	  may	  lead	  to	  the	  identification	  of	  harms	  that	  are	  not	  morally	  significant.	  Raz	  might	  insist	  that	  any	  violation	  of	  a	  duty	  is	  an	  interference	  with	  autonomy	  and	  thus	  any	  violation	  is	  morally	   significant.	   However,	   Raz’s	   discussion	   suggests	   that,	   while	   all	   harms	  involve	  interferences	  with	  autonomy,	  not	  all	  infringements	  of	  autonomy	  are	  harms.	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  This	  is	  a	  strength	  of	  the	  account,	  as	  it	  maintains	  a	  conceptual	  space	  between	  harm	  and	  interferences	  with	  autonomy.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  this	  makes	  Raz	  vulnerable	  to	  the	   objections	   raised	   by	   Stanton-­‐Ife.	   If	   there	   are	   practices	   which	   diminish	   our	  autonomy,	   but	   may	   not	   be	   considered	   harms,	   then	   Stanton-­‐Ife	   may	   be	   right	   in	  saying	   that	   coercion	   should	  not	   only	   limit	   harms,	   but	   also	  other	   repugnant,	   non-­‐harmful	  options.	  	  Does	  the	  autonomy-­‐based	  account	  of	  harm	  help	  support	  the	  harm	  approach?	  It	  is	  not	  clear	  that	  Raz’s	  notion	  of	  harm	  would	  provide	  Pogge’s	  theory	  with	  added	  support.	  Raz	  includes	  as	  harm	  failure	  to	  improve	  a	  person’s	  situation,	  however,	  as	  with	   Feinberg’s	   account,	   this	   seems	   only	   to	   be	  when	   there	   is	   an	   existing	   duty	   in	  place.	  What	  is	  at	  issue	  is	  whether	  the	  rich	  have	  duties	  to	  the	  poor.	  If	  harm	  can	  be	  shown	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  these	  duties	  are	  violated,	  then	  it	  seems	  that	  we	  do	  not	  need	  to	   invoke	   harm.	   We	   cannot	   rely	   on	   harm	   to	   define	   our	   duties	   if	   duties	   are	   the	  conceptual	  basis	  of	  our	  notion	  of	  harm.	  	  However,	  perhaps	   these	  duties	  would	  be	  of	  a	  different	  kind;	  we	  could	  argue	   that	  there	  are	  duties	  of	  justice	  to	  the	  poor	  based	  on	  harm	  in	  a	  more	  indirect	  way	  using	  Raz’s	  account.	  The	  argument	  could	  be	  stated	  as	  follows:	  1. We	  have	  duties	  of	  charity	  to	  the	  poor	  	  2. If	  we	  fail	  to	  fulfill	  our	  duties	  to	  a	  person	  we	  harm	  them	  3. If	  we	  harm	  a	  person	  we	  have	  duties	  of	  justice	  towards	  them	  4. We	  fail	  to	  fulfill	  our	  duties	  of	  charity	  to	  the	  poor	  Therefore	  5. We	  harm	  the	  poor	  Therefore	  6. We	  have	  duties	  of	  justice	  to	  the	  poor	  	  This	   seems	   coherent.	   However,	   we	  may	   ask	  what	  we	   gain	   from	   establishing	   the	  conclusion	   in	   (6)	   beyond	  what	   our	   starting	   premise	   (1)	   provides.	   This	   approach	  relies	  on	  the	  assumption,	  which	  is	  not	  explained	  by	  Pogge,	  that	  duties	  of	  charity	  are	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  insufficient,	  and	  that	  duties	  of	   justice	  are	  required.	  The	  reason	  I	  briefly	  suggested	  in	  the	  first	  chapter,	  which	  I	  shall	  discuss	  in	  the	  third	  chapter,	  for	  wanting	  a	  justice	  approach	   is	   that	   duties	   of	   justice	   can	   fail	   to	   be	  met	   sufficiently;	   they	   are	   perfect	  duties,	  unlike	  imperfect	  duties	  of	  charity.	  It	  may	  seem	  inadequate	  for	  our	  duties	  to	  the	  global	  poor	  to	  be	  based	  on	  charity	  if	  it	  cannot	  be	  specified	  what	  complying	  with	  these	  duties	  would	  require.	  	  However,	   on	   the	   argument	   just	   proposed,	   the	   claim	   that	   we	   harm	   the	   poor;	  conclusion	   (5),	   relies	   on	   the	   claim	   that	   we	   fail	   to	   meet	   our	   duties	   of	   charity;	  premise	   (4).	   The	   argument	   that	   we	   harm	   the	   poor	   thus	   relies	   on	   the	   idea	   that	  duties	   of	   charity	   are	   the	   kinds	   of	   duties	   we	   can	   fail	   to	   fulfill.	   This,	   therefore,	  removes	  the	  motivation	  we	  identified	  for	  arguing	  that	  our	  duties	  to	  the	  global	  poor	  are	  duties	  of	  justice,	  instead	  of	  being	  satisfied	  with	  duties	  of	  assistance.	  	  Moreover,	  in	  Raz’s	  discussion	  of	  how	  we	  harm	  someone	  by	  failing	  to	  make	  them	  as	  well-­‐off	   as	   they	   should	   be,	   Raz	   gives	   examples	   of	   clear	   duties	   of	   justice,	   such	   as	  owing	   someone	   money,	   or	   having	   a	   legal	   duty	   of	   fair	   employment	   (1988:	   416).	  Perhaps	   Raz	   would	   not	   consider	   failing	   to	   fulfill	   a	   duty	   of	   charity	   a	   harm.	   The	  examples	   Raz	   draws	   on	   suggests	   that	   he	   thinks	   that	   we	   can	   harm	   someone	   by	  failing	  to	  enhance	  their	  autonomy,	  only	  when	  there	  is	  a	  duty	  of	  justice	  to	  do	  so.	  This	  is	   the	   very	   thing	   in	   question	   in	   the	   global	   justice	   debate.	   As	   with	   Feinberg’s	  account,	   the	  key	  reason	  why	  Raz’s	  account	  of	  harm	  does	  not	  help	  make	  the	  harm	  approach,	  as	  exemplified	  by	  Pogge,	  more	  plausible	   is	   that	   it	  negates	   the	  need	   for	  basing	  duties	  on	  harm.	  At	   the	  basis	  of	  both	  Feinberg’s	  and	  Raz’s	  view	  of	  how	  we	  harm	  by	   failing	   to	   benefit	   are	   positive	  moral	   obligations,	   only	  when	   these	   are	   in	  place	  does	  harm	  arise.	   The	  notion	  of	   harm	   thus	  becomes	  otiose.	   These	   accounts,	  therefore,	  do	  not	  help	  Pogge	  fulfil	  the	  aims	  of	  his	  theory.	  	  Moreover,	   moralised	   conceptions	   of	   harm	   get	   their	   content	   from	   within	   a	  particular	  moral	  theory.	  This	  may	  give	  rise	  to	  disagreement.	  Some	  may	  reject	  that	  interference	   with	   autonomy	   is	   what	  makes	   something	   harmful;	   if	   they	   deny	   the	  centrality	  of	  autonomy	  as	  a	  value.	  If	  harm	  is	  defined	  in	  relation	  to	  rights	  violations,	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  proponents	   of	   different	   moral	   theories	   will	   disagree	   about	   when	   something	   is	  harm,	  as	  they	  have	  different	  views	  of	  what	  counts	  as	  a	  rights	  violation.	  Libertarians	  accept	   that	   we	   harm	   someone	   by	   violating	   their	   rights,	   but	   only	   recognise	   a	  minimal	   set	   of	   rights.	   Basing	   our	   duties	   on	   harm	   may	   not	   help	   transcend	   the	  disagreements	  between	  proponents	  of	  different	  moral	  theories	  regarding	  what	  our	  duties	  are	  to	  the	  poor.	  Perhaps	  we	  could	  point	  to	  rights	  violations	  that	  any	  theory	  would	   recognise,	   for	   example,	   the	   right	   to	   life.	   Even	   this,	   however,	   is	   not	  uncontested.	  Moreover,	  there	  will	  still	  be	  disagreement	  across	  different	  theories	  on	  when	   a	   right	   has	   been	   violated.	   For	   example,	   different	   theories	   have	   different	  positions	  on	  when	  not	  saving	  a	  person’s	  life	  is	  to	  violate	  a	  right	  to	  life.	  The	  question	  of	  when	  harm	  occurs	  is	  highly	  contestable,	  and	  thus,	  basing	  our	  duties	  on	  harm	  will	  be	   unlikely	   to	   help	   gather	  widespread	   acceptance	   of	   duties	   of	   justice	   towards	   to	  poor.	  	  An	   interpretation	   of	   Raz’s	   account	   of	   harm	   has	   been	   suggested	  which	  may	   lend	  stronger	   support	   to	   the	   harm	   approach.	   I	   shall	   briefly	   consider	   this	   before	  concluding	  the	  chapter.	  	  Threshold	  accounts	  of	  harm	  While	  not	  prominent	   in	   the	   literature,	   an	  account	  of	  harm	  has	  been	  put	   forward,	  based	   on	   Raz’s	   approach,	   which	   may	   provide	   support	   to	   Pogge.	   Lukas	   Meyer	  interprets	  Raz’s	  account	  of	  harm	  as	  based	  on	  a	  subjunctive-­‐threshold,	  expressed	  as	  follows:	  ‘Having	  acted	  in	  a	  certain	  way	  (or	  having	  refrained	  from	  acting	  in	  that	  way)	  
at	  a	  time	  t1,	  we	  thereby	  harm	  someone	  only	  if	  we	  cause	  this	  person’s	  life	  to	  fall	  below	  
some	   specified	   threshold’	   (Meyer	   2003:	   147).	   This	   appears	   similar	   to	   the	   non-­‐comparative	  account.	  However,	  the	  difference	  is	  that,	  here,	  one	  must	  have	  caused	  the	  other	  person	  to	  fall	  below	  a	  threshold,	  for	  harm	  to	  have	  occurred.	  It	  is	  hard	  to	  see	  how	  this	  is	  other	  than	  very	  loosely	  based	  on	  a	  formulation	  of	  Raz’s	  account	  of	  harm,	  given	  that	  Raz	  does	  not	  define	  harm	  in	  relation	  to	  a	  threshold.	  Nonetheless,	  it	  is	  worth	  assessing	  this	  conception	  of	  harm	  in	  its	  own	  right.	  	  
64	  
	  Meyer	   suggests	   how	  we	   could	   devise	   a	   plausible	   egalitarian	   conception	   of	   harm,	  proposing	  that	  one	  is	  harmed	  if	  caused	  to	  fall	  below	  the	  level	  of	  well-­‐being	  of	  one’s	  contemporaries,	  and	  also	   that	  one	  causes	  harm	   if	  one	   leaves	  people	   in	   the	   future	  with	   the	   possibility	   of	   falling	   below	   current	   levels	   of	   well-­‐being	   (2003:	   149).	  Conceiving	  of	  harm	  in	  terms	  of	  an	  egalitarian	  threshold	  seems	  in	  line	  with	  Pogge’s	  approach.	  If	  harming	  is	  to	  act	  in	  a	  way	  that	  causes	  a	  person	  to	  fall	  below	  the	  level	  of	  well-­‐being	  experienced	  by	  one’s	   contemporaries,	   then	   it	  may	  seem	  plausible	   that	  the	  rich	  harm	  the	  poor,	  if	  ‘contemporaries’	  includes	  people	  in	  other	  countries,	  and	  not	  just	  one’s	  co-­‐citizens.	  Meyer	  suggests	  that	  we	  can	  harm	  people	  by	  ‘causing	  them	  
to	  fall	  below	  this	  threshold	  or	  by	  not	  helping	  them	  to	  reach	  the	  threshold’	  (149).	  This	  helps	  accommodate	  the	  global	  case,	  where	  it	  seems	  most	  plausible	  to	  claim	  that	  the	  rich	  states	  fail	  to	  help	  the	  poor	  but	  do	  not	  cause	  their	  bad	  situation. 	  Many	   situations	   that	  we	  would	  want	   to	   regard	   as	   harm	  would	   not	   fall	   under	   an	  egalitarian	  conception	  of	  harm.	  For	  example,	  if	  a	  wealthy	  person	  was	  robbed	  of	  all	  but	  a	   fraction	  of	   their	  possessions,	   they	  may	  be	  better	  off	   in	  material	   terms	   than	  most	   other	   members	   of	   their	   society	   and	   yet,	   on	   some	   conceptions	   of	   harm	   as	  rights,	   they	  would	  have	  been	  harmed.	  There	   are,	   of	   course,	  many	  harms	   that	  we	  can	  think	  of	  that	  would	  not	  affect	  future	  generations.	  Perhaps,	  however,	  this	  notion	  of	   egalitarian	  harm	  does	  not	   specify	  what	  harm	   is	   generally,	   but	   rather	  provides	  just	   one	   example	   of	   a	   relevant	   threshold	   level,	   and	   these	   cases	  may	   just	   be	   two	  examples	  of	  egalitarian	  harm.	  	  However,	  we	  may	  reject	  this	  egalitarian	  threshold	  as	  appropriate.	  This	  would	  not	  strike	  most	  people	  as	  what	  harm	  is.	  The	  task	  I	  pursue	  in	  this	  chapter,	  on	  behalf	  of	  Pogge,	   is	   not	   only	   to	   find	   an	   account	   of	   harm	   in	   the	   literature	   that	   can	  accommodate	   institutional	   harm,	   but	   an	   account	   of	   harm	   that	   would	   persuade	  people	  that	  we	  harm	  the	  poor,	  and	  have	  duties	  of	  justice	  in	  virtue	  of	  this	  harm.	  The	  egalitarian	  subjunctive-­‐threshold	  account	  can	  support	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  rich	  harm	  the	  poor;	  however,	  this	  would	  not	  help	  make	  the	  argument	  more	  plausible.	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  However,	  there	  may	  be	  other	  possible,	  more	  plausible	  threshold	  levels	  that	  would	  still	   identify	   the	   global	   poor	   as	   harmed.	   Meyer	   suggests	   we	   may	   invoke	   a	  ‘sufficientarian	  threshold	   defined	   in	   terms	   of	   absolute,	   non-­comparative	   conditions’ (2003:	   149).	   However,	   the	   subjunctive	   threshold	   account	   of	   harm,	   however	   it	   is	  specified,	  seems	  to	  face	  the	  same	  difficulties	  that	  we	  have	  discussed	  in	  reference	  to	  the	   other	   conceptions	   of	   harm	   in	   this	   chapter.	   If	   Meyer	   thinks	   we	   can	   harm	  someone	  by	   failing	   to	  help	   them	  rise	   above	  a	   certain	   threshold	   level	   then	   that	   is	  because	  we	  have	  pre-­‐existing	  duties	  towards	  this	  person.	  	  The	   key	   problem	   is	   not	   that	   Pogge’s	   account	   of	   harm	   is	   in	   itself	   flawed.	   Pogge	  identifies	  harm	  where	  there	  is	  injustice,	  where	  this	  means	  the	  failure	  to	  meet	  basic	  rights.	  This	  may	  be	  a	  plausible	  assessment	  of	  harm.	  The	  problem	  is	  that	  identifying	  that	  harm	  has	  occurred	  relies	  on	  showing	  that	  we	  fail	  to	  fulfill	  the	  positive	  duties	  that	  we	  have	  to	  the	  poor.	  Thus,	  as	  previously	  stressed,	  the	  harm	  approach	  does	  not	  add	  anything	  to	  the	  common	  sense	  ways	  of	  thinking	  of	  our	  duties	  to	  the	  poor.	  	  Harm	  in	  the	  global	  sphere	  I	  have	  argued	  that	  Pogge’s	  account	  of	  institutional	  harm	  does	  not	  fit	  among	  any	  of	  the	  leading	  theories	  of	  harm.	  However,	  it	  still	  may	  be	  true	  that	  the	  rich	  states	  harm	  the	  poor	  in	  certain	  ways.	  There	  are	  individual	  instances	  of	  interaction	  in	  the	  global	  sphere	  that	  uncontroversially	  would	  count	  as	  cases	  of	  harm.	  For	  example,	  western-­‐owned	   companies	   operating	   in	   poor	   countries	   often	   have	   negative	   externalities	  such	  as	  pollution	  and	  waste	  that	  cause	  health	  and	  environmental	  problems	  for	  the	  local	   population.	   This	   would	   count	   as	   harm	   on	   even	   the	   temporal	   comparative	  view,	  as	  it	  makes	  the	  poor	  worse	  off	  than	  they	  were	  before.	  	  Within	   the	   global	   development	   literature,	   frequent	   reference	   is	   made	   to	   the	  Washington	  Consensus	  as	  contributing	  to	  today’s	  global	  poverty.	  The	  Washington	  Consensus	   involved	   the	   IMF	   and	  World	   Bank,	   led	   by	   representatives	   of	   affluent	  countries,	   establishing	  polices	   to	   reform	   the	   economies	   of	   countries	   in	   economic	  crisis,	   regarded	   as	   neo-­‐liberal	   policies,	   such	   as	   trade-­‐liberalisation,	   which	   had	   a	  crippling	   effect	   on	   these	   countries.	   It	   is	   argued	   that	   for	   many	   countries,	   these	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  reforms	  made	  them	  worse	  off	  than	  before,	  and	  for	  others,	  allowed	  their	  growth	  to	  stagnate	  while	   other	   countries,	   not	   included	   in	   the	   Consensus,	   experienced	   huge	  growth.	  Arguably,	  these	  countries	  were	  harmed	  by	  these	  policies,	  according	  to	  the	  historical	   and	   counterfactual	   accounts	   of	   harm,	   as	   they	  were	  made	  worse	   off	   by	  them	  and	  would	  have	  been	  better	  off	  had	  they	  not	  been	  implemented.	  We	  need	   to	   know	  more	   about	   the	   attitudes	   of	   the	   agents	   in	   these	   cases,	   and	   the	  causation	  to	  know	  if	   it	   is	  plausible	   to	  count	   these	  as	  cases	  of	  harm.	  However,	   the	  way	   that	   the	   actions	  of	   the	   rich	   affect	   the	   interests	   of	   the	  poor	   seems	   to	   fit	  with	  accounts	  of	  harm	  we	  have	  explored.	  Earlier,	   I	   listed	  Pogge’s	  examples	  of	  how	  the	  rich	   states	   harm	   the	   poor.	   Some	   of	   these	   would	   not	   seem	   to	   be	   harm,	   having	  explored	   the	   concept	  more	   closely,	   while	   others	   would	   seem	   to	   be.	   It	   would	   be	  worth	  assessing	  each	  case	  closely,	  however,	  there	  is	  not	  the	  space	  for	  this	  exercise	  here.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  this	  may	  not	  be	  required,	  because	  even	  if	  some	  situations	  are	  clear	  harms,	  this	  seems	  insufficient	  to	  support	  the	  harm	  approach.	  We	  cannot	  construct	  a	  general	  theory	  of	  global	   justice	  from	  these	  select	  cases	  alone.	  It	   is	  not	  plausible	  to	  ground	  the	  duties	  that	  we	  all	  have	  towards	  every	  needy	  person	  based	  on	  isolated	  cases	  of	  harming.	  Not	  everyone	  is	  connected	  to	  these	  incidents	  of	  harm.	  	  Perhaps	  Pogge’s	   idea	   is	   that	   the	  only	  way	   to	   rectify	  or	  prevent	   these	  harms	   is	   to	  reform	  the	  global	  institutions	  that	  enable	  these	  harms,	  to	  make	  them	  less	  weighted	  in	  the	  favour	  of	  the	  rich	  and	  powerful.	  The	  thought	  would	  go	  as	  follows.	  If	  we	  harm,	  we	  must	   stop	   harming.	   If	   the	   only	   way	   to	   stop	   harming	   is	   to	   reform	   the	   global	  order,	  then	  we	  would	  have	  duties	  of	  justice	  to	  do	  this.	  This	  way	  of	  stating	  the	  harm	  approach	   is	   not	   philosophically	   unsound.	   However,	   it	   still	   seems	   an	   inferior	  approach	  to	  global	  justice	  than	  the	  alternatives.	  First,	  we	  would	  need	  to	  make	  the	  empirical	   case	   that	   these	   harms	   are	   only	   preventable	   with	   an	   upheaval	   of	   the	  global	  order,	  instead	  of	  more	  targeted	  reform.	  Secondly,	  we	  would	  need	  to	  address	  the	  difficult	  question	  of	  who	  bears	  this	  duty.	  Whereas,	  if	  we	  base	  our	  duties	  merely	  on	  the	  claim	  that	  people	  are	  in	  need	  of	  our	  assistance,	  and	  that	  we	  are	  in	  a	  position	  to	   give	   it	   at	   little	   cost	   to	   ourselves,	   these	   tasks	   and	   potential	   obstacles	   are	  bypassed.	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Comment: Not	  bypass	  question	  of	  who	  bears	  
duty.	  	  Or	  easier,	  because	  all	  have	  duty,	  just	  need	  to	  
allocate	  it	  fairly.	  Rather	  than	  question	  of	  whether	  
responsible	  at	  all	  in	  harm	  case.	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  What	  now	  for	  the	  harm	  approach?	  Having	  explored	  the	  concept	  of	  harm	  more	  closely,	  the	  claim	  that	  we	  harm	  the	  poor	  by	  supporting	  unjust	  institutions	  instead	  of	  establishing	  more	  just	  ones	  seems	  hard	  to	   defend.	   Rather	   than	   harming	   the	   poor,	   the	   rich	   seem	   to	   fail	   to	   benefit	   them.	  While	  moralised	  accounts	  of	  harm	  identify	  failing	  to	  benefit	  as	  harm,	  failing	  to	  help	  is	  only	  a	  harm	  when	  we	  have	  a	  duty	  to	  help,	  and	  if	  we	  have	  a	  duty	  to	  help	  there	  is	  no	  need	  to	  ground	  duties	  on	  harm.	  	  I	   argued	   that	   the	   moralised	   accounts	   of	   harm,	   such	   as	   Feinberg’s	   and	   Raz’s	   are	  most	  plausible.	  Without	  basing	  harm	  on	  a	  moral	  concept	  such	  as	  rights	  violations,	  we	   struggle	   to	   unite	   different	   types	   of	   harm,	   or	   to	   distinguish	   mere	   failures	   to	  benefit	  from	  harm	  through	  omissions.	  However,	  moralised	  accounts	  of	  harm	  show	  that	  the	  harm	  approach	  has	  little	  to	  offer.	  This	  chapter	  has	  shown	  that	  the	  harm	  approach	  is	  not	  widely	  persuasive,	  and	  thus	  we	   should	   not	   aim	   to	   circumvent	   the	   usual	   positions	   within	   the	   global	   justice	  debate	  by	  basing	  our	  duties	  on	  harm.	  In	  the	  third	  chapter	  I	  will	  return	  to	  the	  global	  justice	  debate.	  I	  will	  suggest	  that	  we	  may	  have	  duties	  of	   justice	  based	  on	  need,	  as	  Feinberg	  argues,	  which	  undermines	  the	  motivation	  for	  basing	  our	  duties	  on	  harm.	  I	  will	   also	   consider	   the	   strengths	   of	   an	   approach	   to	   justice	   based	   on	   egalitarian	  principles.	   However,	   I	   regard	   the	   harm	   approach	   as	   an	   illustration	   that	   our	  thinking	   regarding	   global	   justice	   has	   gone	   wrong.	   I	   suggest	   that	   the	   intractable	  nature	  of	  the	  debate	  about	  whether	  ideas	  of	  justice	  within	  the	  state	  are	  applicable	  to	   the	  global	  sphere	  motivates	  Pogge	  to	   find	  an	  alternative	  way	  of	  grounding	  our	  duties	   to	   the	   poor	   as	   duties	   of	   justice,	  which	   bypasses	   the	   debate.	   However,	   the	  view	   I	   shall	   suggest	   is	   that	   we	   do	   not	   need	   to	   formulate	   our	   global	   duties	   with	  reference	  to	  the	  duties	  we	  have	  within	  a	  state.	  Rather,	  our	  approach	  should	  be	  to	  assess	  the	  global	  situation	  itself,	  and	  to	  build	  an	  account	  of	  our	  duties	  that	  seems	  to	  best	   capture	   the	  moral	   facts	  of	   the	  case.	  This	  goes	  beyond	   the	  stalemated	  debate	  about	  the	  scope	  of	  justice,	  without	  relying	  on	  the	  implausible	  claim	  that	  we	  owe	  the	  global	  poor	  duties	  of	  justice	  because	  we	  harm	  them.	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Chapter	  Three:	  What	  is	  the	  most	  plausible	  basis	  for	  our	  duties	  to	  the	  distant	  
needy?	  
	  	  The	   previous	   chapters	   explored	   whether	   the	   harm	   approach	   succeeds	   as	   a	  plausible	   grounding	   of	   our	   duties	   to	   the	   poor.	   In	   chapter	   one	   I	   identified	   the	  absence	   of	   an	   account	   of	   harm	   as	   the	   key	   problem	  with	   the	   harm	   approach.	   In	  chapter	  two	  I	  explored	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  plausible	  account	  of	  harm.	  I	  argued	  that	  no	  account	  of	  harm	  would	  lend	  support	  to	  the	  harm	  approach	  in	  a	  way	  that	  would	  allow	  the	  kind	  of	  claims	  made	  in	  the	  literature.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  we	  ought	  to	  abandon	   the	   task	  of	   finding	  a	   coherent	  narrative	   for	   explaining	  our	  duties	   to	   the	  distant	   needy.	   In	   this	   chapter	   I	   wish	   to	   suggest	   how	   we	   should	   proceed	   in	  establishing	  the	  basis	  of	  our	  duties	  to	  the	  global	  poor.	  	  My	  main	   conviction	   is	   that	   while	   the	   global	   and	   domestic	   spheres	   are	   different,	  they	   are	   not	   so	   different	   that	   they	   require	   different	   moral	   frameworks.	   Both	  contexts	   raise	   considerations	   of	   justice.	   This	   thought	   may	   be	   generated	   by	   two	  views.	  One	  is	  that	  our	  theory	  of	   justice	  in	  the	  state	  seems	  applicable	  to	  the	  global	  situation,	  thus,	  we	  have	  duties	  of	  justice	  to	  the	  global	  poor,	  but	  the	  content	  of	  these	  are	   not	   the	   same	   as	   our	   duties	   to	   our	   fellow	   citizens.	   The	   other	   thought	   is	   that,	  without	  having	  a	  fully	  worked	  out	  theory	  of	  justice,	  we	  have	  a	  pre-­‐theoretical	  sense	  that	   the	   global	   context	   is	   unjust.	   It	   seems	   that	   there	   are	   inequalities	   that	   need	  addressing	  and	  ways	  in	  which	  global	  arrangements	  are	  wrongfully	  unfair.	  Though	  we	  may	  hold	   that	   the	  global	  order	  raises	  considerations	  of	   justice,	  we	  should	  not	  begin	  with	  the	  objective	  of	  proving	  that	  our	  duties	  to	  the	  global	  poor	  are	  duties	  of	  justice.	  This	  is	  where	  the	  harm	  approach	  goes	  wrong.	  The	  harm	  approach	  tries	  to	  paint	  a	  picture	  of	  the	  global	  situation,	  claiming	  that	  the	  rich	  states	  harm	  the	  poor,	  that	   leads	   to	   the	   conclusion	   that	   we	   have	   duties	   of	   justice.	   Instead,	   for	   a	   more	  plausible	  view,	  we	  should	  asses	  the	  global	  situation	  itself	  as	  our	  starting	  point,	  and	  see	  what	  moral	  considerations	  it	  raises.	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  First,	   I	   shall	   discuss	  whether	   our	   duties	   to	   distant	   others	   are	   best	   thought	   of	   as	  duties	   to	   help	   based	   on	   need.	   I	   shall	   then	   discuss	   whether	   our	   duties	   are	   most	  plausibly	  based	  on	  a	  relational	  justice	  approach.	  I	  shall	  then	  suggest	  that	  the	  way	  to	  proceed	  is	  to	  focus	  on	  what	  seems	  least	  contestable,	  which	  the	  theoretical	  debate	  obscures,	   namely,	   that	   there	   are	   inequalities	   and	   injustices	   in	   the	   global	   domain	  that	  need	  addressing.	  	  Needs	  It	   seems	   that	   the	  harm	  approach	   is	  born	  out	  of	   the	  desire	   to	  show	  that	  while	  we	  disagree	  about	  what	  justice	  is,	  we	  can	  at	  least	  agree	  that	  we	  have	  duties	  of	  justice	  towards	   those	   we	   harm,	   and	   as	   we	   harm	   the	   poor,	   we	   have	   duties	   of	   justice	  towards	   them.	  However,	  we	  might	  question	  the	  need	  to	  ground	  our	  duties	   to	   the	  global	  poor	  as	  duties	  of	  justice.	  Justice	  is	  only	  one	  virtue.	  It	  may	  be	  that	  justice	  is	  a	  value	   that	   arises	   in	   a	   particular	   institutional	   context,	   yet	   other	   duties	   of	   charity,	  compassion,	  and	  humanity	  are	  required	  outside	  of	   this	  context.	   Instead	  of	  basing	  our	   duties	   to	   the	   poor	   on	   harm,	  we	   should	   instead,	   perhaps	   ground	   them	   in	   the	  idea	  that	  the	  poor	  clearly	  are	  in	  urgent	  need	  and	  we	  are	  in	  a	  position	  to	  meet	  these	  needs,	  and	  thus,	  we	  have	  a	  duty	  to	  help.	  However,	  there	  are	  perceived	  to	  be	  key	  differences	  between	  duties	  of	  charity	  and	  justice;	  which	  may	   lead	   one	   to	   conclude	   that	   a	   charity	   approach	   is	   not	   the	  most	  plausible	   basis	   of	   our	   duties	   to	   distant	   others.	   One	   concern	   is	   that	   a	   charity	  approach	  would	   leave	   the	  claims	  of	   the	  needy	  under-­‐fulfilled.	  The	  other	   is	   that	   it	  fails	  to	  capture	  accurately	  the	  moral	  facts	  of	  the	  situation.	  	  Duties	   of	   charity	   are	   often	   regarded	   as	   less	   stringent	   or	   extensive	   than	  duties	   of	  justice	   because,	   first,	   it	   seems	   we	   only	   have	   duties	   when	   people	   are	   in	   need,	  secondly,	  we	  only	  have	  duties	  when	  we	  can	  help	  at	   reasonable	  cost	   to	  ourselves,	  and	  thirdly,	  duties	  of	  charity	  are	  imperfect	  duties;	  there	  is	  no	  way	  of	  acting	  so	  that	  one	  discharges	  exactly	  what	  one	  owes.	  I	  shall	  develop	  these	  points.	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  The	  first	  point	  of	  difference	  is	  that	  duties	  of	  charity	  arise	  when	  someone	  is	  in	  need,	  whereas	   a	   justice	   approach	   is	   aimed	   at	   achieving	   a	   fair	   distribution	   of	   resources	  among	  people,	   regardless	  of	  whether	   they	  are	   in	  need.	  However,	  while	   there	   is	  a	  distinction	   between	   these	   approaches	   in	   principle,	   there	  may	   not	   be	   in	   practice.	  First,	   needs	   may	   not	   be	   desperate	   for	   there	   to	   be	   duties	   of	   charity.	   There	   are	  charitable	   causes	   aimed	   at	   fulfilling	   non-­‐urgent	   needs,	   to	   which	   we	  may	   have	   a	  duty	  to	  contribute,	  for	  example,	  a	  fund	  for	  setting	  up	  a	  local	  youth	  club,	  or	  a	  project	  to	  widen	  access	  to	  computers	  around	  the	  world.	  Secondly,	  it	  is	  rare	  for	  people	  to	  be	  worse	   off	   than	   others	   and	   not	   in	   some	   form	  of	   need.	   Thirdly,	   a	   justice	   approach	  may	  not	  mandate	  redistribution	  in	  a	  case	  where	  some	  are	  worse	  off	  than	  others	  but	  still	  well-­‐off.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  there	  may	  be	  reasons	  for	  caring	  about	  equality	  that	  a	   needs	   approach	   overlooks,	   for	   example,	   social	   cohesion.	   Moreover,	   our	   main	  concern	  may	  be	  whether	   a	  distribution	   is	   fair	   rather	   than	  whether	   everyone	  has	  their	  needs	  met.	  	  Another	   feature	   of	   charitable	   duties	   is	   that	   they	   only	   arise	  when	  we	   can	   help	   at	  reasonable	   cost	   to	   ourselves.	   The	   point	   is	   not	   that	  we	   have	   no	   duties	  when	   this	  requires	  self-­‐sacrifice,	  but	  that	  when	  the	  cost	  is	  reasonable,	  it	  would	  be	  wrong	  not	  to	   help.	   This	   raises	   the	   question	   of	  what	   is	   an	   unreasonable	   cost.	   However,	   this	  question	   is	   also	   posed	   with	   respect	   to	   duties	   of	   justice.	   If	   a	   duty	   would	   be	   too	  demanding,	  then	  it	  may	  not	  qualify	  as	  a	  duty	  of	  justice.	  All	  the	  same,	  it	  seems	  that	  what	  is	  considered	  reasonable	  is	  affected	  by	  the	  type	  of	  duties	  we	  have.	  When	  we	  owe	   someone	   something,	  we	   are	  willing	   or	   required	   to	  make	   a	   greater	   personal	  sacrifice	  to	  fulfil	  this,	  than	  if	  someone	  has	  a	  need	  that	  we	  are	  not	  responsible	  for.	  I	  will,	  however,	  postpone	  this	  discussion	  of	  the	  issue	  of	  demandingness	  until	  later.	  	  Another	   distinction,	   touched	   on	   in	   the	   first	   chapter,	   is	   that	   duties	   of	   charity	   are	  imperfect	   duties,	   while	   duties	   of	   justice	   are	   perfect	   duties.	   The	   key	   difference	  between	   these	   is	   that	   we	   are	   able	   to	   specify	   what	   it	   is	   for	   a	   perfect	   duty	   to	   be	  fulfilled,	   whereas,	   there	   is	   no	   upper	   or	   lower	   limit	   on	   what	   complying	   with	   an	  imperfect	  duty	  requires.	  Why	  should	  this	  matter?	  We	  might	  think	  that	  duties	  to	  the	  global	  worse	  off	  should	  be	  duties	   that	  can	  be	  under-­‐fulfilled.	  Duties	  of	   justice	  are	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  directed	  towards	  achieving	  a	  goal.	  We	  have	  an	  idea	  of	  what	  a	  just	  situation	  would	  look	   like,	   and	   aim	   to	   achieve	   that.	   However,	   duties	   of	   charity	   are	   also	   goal-­‐orientated.	  In	  the	  global	  case,	  the	  point	  of	  charity	  may	  be	  to	  eradicate	  poverty,	  or	  to	  decrease	   poverty	   by	   a	   given	   amount.	   However,	   if	   what	   is	   required	   is	   not	   just	  meeting	  needs,	  but	  redistribution	  and	  fair	  procedures	  across	  the	  global	  domain,	  it	  does	  not	  seem	  that	  an	  approach	  which	  allows	  duties	  to	  be	  met	  to	  varying	  degrees,	  and	  with	  leeway	  in	  how	  this	  duty	  is	  fulfilled,	  would	  be	  sufficient.	  	  	  While	   imperfect	   duties	   of	   charity	   are	   not	   less	   stringent	   than	   perfect	   duties	   of	  justice	  per	  se,	  it	  seems	  there	  is	  a	  relevant	  distinction	  with	  regards	  to	  stringency.	  It	  is	  hard	  to	  say	  that	  someone	  has	  under-­‐fulfilled	  their	  imperfect	  duty	  of	  charity.	  Any	  contribution	  may	  be	  regarded	  as	  fulfilling	  a	  duty	  of	  charity.	  However,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  duties	  of	  justice,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  state	  what	  is	  required	  and	  show	  that	  one	  has	  failed	  to	  meet	   this	  standard.	  People	  may	   face	  condemnation,	  or	  coercion,	   if	   they	  do	  not	  adequately	  meet	   their	  duties	  of	   justice.	  Duties	  of	   justice	  may	  be	   thus	  regarded	  as	  more	  directly	  constraining.	  	  	  Given	   these	   differences,	   needs-­‐based	   duties	   of	   charity	   and	   egalitarian	   duties	   of	  justice	  may	  mandate	  different	  courses	  of	  action.	  This	  may	  be	  a	  reason	  for	  opting	  for	  a	   justice	   based	   approach.	  This	   is	   not	   because	  our	  motive	   is	   to	   adopt	   an	   effective	  response	  to	  poverty.	  My	  aim	  is	  to	  identify	  the	  most	  plausible	  basis	  for	  our	  duties	  to	  the	  global	  worse	  off.	  The	  reason	  why	   I	   think	   these	  distinctions	  may	  highlight	   the	  need	  for	  a	  justice	  approach	  is	  because	  it	  does	  not	  seem	  plausible	  that	  our	  duties	  to	  those	   outside	   our	   borders	   should	   be	   so	   different	   –	   less	   stringent	   and	   less	  demanding	   –	   than	   to	   those	  within	   them.	   The	   same	   sorts	   of	   reasons	  we	   have	   for	  thinking	  we	  have	  duties	  to	  our	  fellow	  citizens	  seem	  to	  apply	  in	  the	  global	  sphere,	  so	  the	  duties	  we	  have	  should	  be	  more	  equivalent.	  As	  in	  the	  domestic	  sphere,	  people	  in	  the	  global	  sphere	  are	  worse	  off	  than	  others	  due	  to	  morally	  arbitrary	  factors,	  while	  joined	   together	   in	   coercive	   and	   cooperative	   relations	   that	   produce	   social	   and	  economic	   benefits.	   I	   shall	   say	   more	   about	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   the	   global	   sphere	  seems	  to	  trigger	  requirements	  of	  justice	  shortly.	  While	  the	  value	  of	  justice	  need	  not	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  account	   for	  all	   the	  duties	  we	  have,	   it	  does	  seem	  that	   justice	   is	  appropriate	   in	   the	  global	   context.	  When	   we	   compare	   the	   global	   context	   to	   the	   domestic	   context,	   it	  seems	  plausible	  that	  similar	  approaches	  should	  apply.	  More	  important,	  however,	  is	  to	   assess	   the	   global	   situation	   itself,	   and	  what	  would	   be	   appropriate	   in	   this	   case,	  regardless	  of	  how	  it	  compares	  with	  the	  domestic	  case.	  	  The	   main	   reason	   for	   doubting	   that	   our	   duties	   to	   distant	   others	   would	   be	  appropriately	  captured	  as	  duties	  of	  charity	  is	  not	  because	  a	  charity	  approach	  would	  be	  deficient.	  Rather	  it	  is	  because	  it	  misrepresents	  the	  moral	  relations	  in	  the	  global	  sphere.	   Framing	   a	   duty	   as	   charity	   implies	   that	   one	   is	   an	   outsider	   to	   the	   other	  person’s	  situation,	  rather	  than	  implicated	  in	  it.	  Acting	  charitably	  is	  to	  act	  virtuously	  from	   goodwill.	   If	   we	   encountered	   a	   needy	   people	   on	   a	   distant	   planet	   we	  would	  have	  duties	  of	  charity	  to	  them	  (Pogge	  2008:	  204).	  Yet	  charity	  is	  also	  being	  posited	  as	   the	   appropriate	   moral	   duty	   to	   those	   with	   whom	   we	   are	   closely	   related	   in	  cooperative	   and	   coercive	   relationships.	   Our	   theory	   should	   capture	   the	   relevant	  distinction	  between	  these	  situations.	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  duties	  of	  charity,	  the	  relationship	  is	  perceived	  as	  one	  party	  doing	  the	  other	  party	  a	  favour.	  Even	  if	  I	  am	  required	  to	  give	  charity,	  I	  can	  set	  provisos	  on	  the	  receipt	  of	  my	  aid.	  Rich	  countries	  impose	  conditions	  on	  how	  their	  money	  should	  be	  spent;	   those	  who	   spend	   it	  must	   report	   to	  donors,	   and	  aid	   is	  often	  withheld	   from	  leaders	  who	  are	  corrupt	  or	  who	  are	  assumed	  to	  squander	  the	  money	  (Barry	  1982:	  248).	   This	   may	   not	   be	   wrong,	   but,	   it	   shows	   an	   important	   difference	   between	  charity	   and	   justice.	   If	   I	   have	   a	   duty	   of	   justice	   towards	   you,	   what	   I	   owe	   you	   is	  essentially	  yours;	  I	  am	  not	  in	  a	  position	  to	  set	  conditions	  on	  what	  you	  are	  entitled	  to.	  If	  I	  borrow	  or	  even	  steal	  money	  from	  you,	  when	  I	  give	  the	  money	  back,	  I	  cannot	  set	   limits	  on	  how	  you	  spend	  it.	  According	  to	  Barry,	  this	  is	  an	  appropriate	  analogy	  for	  the	  global	  case	  (1982:	  249).	  	  It	  seems	  that	  if	  we	  frame	  our	  global	  duties	  as	  duties	  of	  charity,	  rejecting	  duties	  of	  justice	  as	  relevant	  or	  necessary,	  we	  may	  distort	  the	  moral	  relations	  in	  the	  situation.	  Whether	  or	  not	  we	  agree	  that	  the	  way	  resources	  were	  acquired	  and	  transferred	  by	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  different	  countries	  over	  time	  is	  akin	  to	  theft	  or	  borrowing,	  we	  may	  still	  challenge	  the	  fairness	  of	  the	  discrepancy	  between	  the	  positions	  of	  rich	  and	  poor.16	  Therefore,	  we	   may	   resist	   framing	   our	   duties	   as	   charity,	   because	   charity	   tends	   to	   reinforce	  disparities	  in	  power	  and	  maintain	  differential	  positions.	  Reduced	  inequality	  may	  be	  a	  by-­‐product	  of	   giving	  up	  some	  of	  one’s	   resources	   to	  another.	  However,	   a	   justice	  approach	   challenges	   the	   fairness	   of	   these	   disparities,	   and	   aims	   to	   redistribute	  resources	   more	   fairly.	   Additionally,	   charity	   does	   not	   seem	   to	   address	   all	   the	  relevant	   aspects	   of	   justice,	   focusing	   most	   naturally	   on	   wealth,	   and	   not	   on	  opportunities	  or	  liberties.	  I	  have	  argued	  against	  framing	  our	  duties	  to	  the	  global	  worse	  off	  solely	  as	  duties	  of	  charity	   based	   on	   need.	   However,	   duties	   based	   on	   need	   may	   not	   necessarily	   be	  duties	  of	  charity.	  Scanlon	  posits	  that	  we	  have	  a	  duty	  of	  rescue;	  he	  writes	  ‘if	  you	  are	  
presented	   with	   a	   situation	   in	   which	   you	   can	   prevent	   something	   very	   bad	   from	  
happening,	   or	   alleviate	   someone’s	   dire	   plight,	   by	   making	   only	   a	   slight	   (or	   even	  
moderate)	  sacrifice,	  then	  it	  would	  be	  wrong	  not	  to	  do	  so’	  (Scanlon	  1998:	  224).	  Yet,	  Scanlon	  states	  that	  the	  duty	  of	  rescue	  may	  not	  be	  a	  case	  of	  ‘mere	  charity’,	  where	  it	  would	  be	  good	  to	  give	  aid,	  rather	  there	  is	  a	  duty	  to	  give	  aid	  that	  it	  would	  be	  wrong	  to	  violate	   (Scanlon	  1998:	  225).	   Similarly,	  Feinberg	   states	   that	   if	  we	   fail	   to	   rescue	  someone	  in	  need	  when	  we	  could	  easily	  do	  so,	  we	  violate	  their	  rights	  and	  commit	  an	  injustice	   (1987:	   132).	   Scanlon	   also	   posits	   a	   ‘duty	   of	   helpfulness’	   (Scanlon	   1998:	  224).	  This	  requires	  us	  to	  help,	  when	  we	  are	  able	  to,	  when	  the	  stakes	  are	  lower,	  for	  example,	  when	  we	  can	  save	  someone	  time	  or	  effort	  through	  helping.	  For	  example,	  if	  someone	   asks	   us	   for	   directions,	   it	   would	   be	  wrong	   not	   to	   help	   if	   we	   can.	   These	  writers	   identify	   duties	   based	   on	   the	   needs	   of	   a	   person	   that	   go	   beyond	   duties	   of	  charity.	  	  However,	  duties	  of	   rescue	  and	  helpfulness,	   even	   if	   they	  are	  not	  duties	  of	   charity,	  still	  do	  not	  rise	  to	  the	  level	  of	  duties	  of	  justice.	  These	  types	  of	  duties	  seem	  to	  rely	  on	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Wenar	  supports	  such	  a	  view,	  Wenar,	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  the	  fact	  that	  it	  is	  easy	  for	  us	  to	  help.	  Feinberg	  qualifies	  the	  duty	  to	  rescue	  as	  a	  duty	  of	  easy	   rescue	   (1987:	  137).	   Scanlon	   requires	  us	   to	  help	  when	   this	  would	   require	  only	   a	  moderate	   sacrifice	   from	   us.	   However,	   Feinberg	   also	   states	   that	  we	   have	   a	  duty	   to	   help	   when	   we	   can	   do	   so	   at	   reasonable	   cost	   to	   ourselves	   (1987:	   153).	  Scanlon	   also	   states	   that	   we	   may	   have	   duties	   which	   require	   a	   higher	   level	   of	  sacrifice	  at	  times	  (1998:	  224).	  Scanlon	  claims	  that	  we	  cannot	  say	  exactly	  what	  level	  of	  sacrifice	  would	  be	  reasonable,	  but	  states	  that	  giving	  our	  own	  interests	  no	  weight	  in	  a	  situation	  would	  be	  unreasonable	  (1998:	  225).	  These	  duties	  may	  not	   leave	  us	  worried	  that	  claims	  of	  the	  worse	  off	  would	  go	  unmet.	  Nonetheless,	  they	  do	  not	  go	  far	   enough	   in	   capturing	   the	  moral	   facts	   of	   the	   global	   situation.	   I	  maintain	   that	   a	  needs-­‐based	  approach	  is	  inferior	  to	  a	  justice	  approach.	  	  I	  am	  concerned	  with	  finding	  the	  most	  plausible	  way	  of	  grounding	  our	  duties	  to	  the	  distant	  needy.	  Whether	  our	  duties	  would	  be	  effective	  is	  one	  aspect	  of	  this.	  It	  is	  also	  important	  to	  reflect	  the	  moral	  features	  of	  the	  situation.	  Without	  being	  able	  to	  state	  a	  complete	   theory	  of	   justice,	   the	  global	  situation	  seems	  to	  raise	  considerations	  of	  justice.	  It	  seems	  that	  we	  are	  not	  only	  in	  a	  position	  to	  help	  those	  worse	  off	  than	  us,	  but	  also	  implicated	  in	  their	  situation.	  Benefits	  that	  we	  enjoy	  are	  related	  to	  burdens	  that	  those	  worse	  off	  than	  us	  endure.	  Without	  going	  so	  far	  as	  to	  apply	  directly	  our	  theory	  of	  justice	  from	  the	  state	  context	  to	  the	  global	  case,	  given	  that	  there	  seem	  to	  be	  relevant	  moral	  features	  in	  both	  cases,	  it	  seems	  we	  should	  not	  rule	  out	  that	  the	  global	   situation	   raises	   justice	   considerations.	   The	   most	   plausible	   approach,	  however,	   is	   to	   investigate	   the	  moral	   features	   of	   the	   global	   situation	   rather	   than	  starting	  with	  a	  particular	  theory.	  	  As	   Rawls	   suggests	   ‘the	   correct	   regulative	   principles	   of	   anything	   depends	   on	   the	  
nature	  of	  that	  thing’	  (Rawls	  1999:	  25).	  The	  obvious	  and	  most	  appropriate	  starting	  place	  for	  working	  out	  the	  duties	  we	  have	  in	  a	  situation	  is	  to	  assess	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  situation.	  I	  suggest	  we	  should	  take	  seriously	  the	  views	  of	  those	  who	  argue	  that	  we	  should	   not	   blindly	   extend	   principles	   of	   justice	   to	   the	   global	   sphere	   without	  assessing	  whether	   they	  are	  appropriate	   in	   that	  context	  (Sangiovanni	  2008,	   James	  2005).	  It	  is	  right	  that	  we	  should	  construct	  a	  theory	  of	  justice	  taking	  into	  account	  the	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  nature	   of	   the	   culture,	   social	   and	   economic	   relations	   and	   institutions	   within	   the	  context	  hand.	  However,	  this	  approach	  requires	  us	  not	  to	  reject,	  without	  discussion,	  the	  possibility	  that	  principles	  of	  justice	  are	  also	  required	  in	  the	  global	  sphere.	  Before	   turning	   to	   put	   forward	   considerations	   in	   favour	   of	   this	   approach,	   I	   will	  return	   to	   the	   global	   justice	   debate	   to	   show	   why	   there	   is	   a	   need	   for	   a	   different	  approach.	  	  Global	  egalitarianism	  	  A	   needs-­‐based	   approach	   to	   our	   duties	   to	   the	   global	   poor	   is	   straightforward	   and	  convincing	  in	  its	  reasoning,	  and	  would	  not	  leave	  us	  worried	  that	  the	  situation	  of	  the	  poor	  will	   be	   insufficiently	   addressed.	  However,	   I	  maintain	   that	   it	   seems	  puzzling	  why	  we	  would	  have,	  in	  the	  global	  sphere,	  only	  duties	  of	  charity,	  and	  in	  the	  domestic	  case,	   duties	   of	   justice,	   as	   well	   as	   charity.	   It	   seems	   plausible	   to	   many	   that	  considerations	  of	  justice	  apply	  at	  the	  global	  level.	  The	  idea	  of	  justice	  is	  that	  it	  is	  not	  fair	   that	   morally	   arbitrary	   factors	   dictate	   how	   well-­‐off	   someone	   is	   in	   society;	  therefore,	   redistribution	   of	  wealth,	   liberties	   and	   opportunities	   is	   required.	   Given	  that	  the	  country	  into	  which	  one	  is	  born	  is	  a	  morally	  arbitrary	  factor,	  it	  seems	  unfair	  that	  people	   in	   some	  countries	   are	  worse	  off	   than	   in	  others,	   and	   so	   redistributive	  principles	  should	  apply.17	  	  However,	  on	  other	  hand,	   it	  does	  not	   seem	  straightforward	  or	  plausible	   to	  extend	  our	   theory	   of	   domestic	   justice	   to	   the	   global	   sphere.	   Redistribution	   seems	   too	  demanding,	   and	  unfeasible	  between	   citizens	  of	  different	  nations.	   Some	  also	  deny	  that	  the	  moral	  grounds	  for	  justice	  are	  present	  in	  the	  global	  domain.	  This	  includes	  not	   just	   libertarians,	   who	   share	   very	   different	   premises	   regarding	   justice,	   and	  whom	  our	  theory	  of	  global	  justice	  need	  not,	  I	  maintain,	  persuade.	  We	  cannot	  hope	  to	  supply	  a	  theory	  of	  distributive	  justice	  that	  meets	  the	  convictions	  of	  all	  positions,	  and	  in	  particular	  of	  people	  who	  start	  from	  premises	  so	  opposed	  to	  the	  very	  idea	  of	  distributive	  justice.	  In	  fact,	  this	  is	  not	  what	  theories	  of	  domestic	  distributive	  justice	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  typically	  aim	  at	  doing:	  converting	  libertarians	  to	  adopting	  principles	  of	  distributive	  justice.	   Moreover	   the	   starting	   assumptions	   of	   libertarians	   are,	   as	   is	   widely	  discussed,	   highly	   questionable.	   However,	   egalitarians	   who	   argue	   that	   we	   have	  extensive	   duties	   of	   justice	   within	   a	   state,	   have	   also	   voiced	   doubts	   that	   we	   have	  duties	   of	   justice	   to	   those	   worse	   off	   than	   us	   in	   other	   parts	   of	   the	   world.	   This	  disagreement	  is	  more	  noteworthy.	  Such	  ‘anti-­‐global	  justice	  egalitarians’	  hold	  that	  it	  is	   not	   significant	   in	   itself	   that	   morally	   arbitrary	   factors	   influence	   positions	   in	  society.	   Rather,	   this	   only	   gives	   rise	   to	   injustice	  within	   certain	   types	   of	   relations,	  which	  only	  exist	  within	  a	  state.	  This	  view	  is	  often	  referred	  to	  as	  ‘relational	  justice’.	  I	  shall	   explain	   this	  position	  next,	   before	   turning	   to	   explore	   the	   suggestion	   that	   the	  relations	  which	  make	  justice	  appropriate	  exist	  at	  the	  global	  level	  too.	  	  Relational	  justice	  According	   to	   the	   relational	   justice	   view,	   justice	   is	   only	   a	   relevant	   value	  within	   a	  state,	  where	  certain	  morally	  significant	  relations	  feature.	  It	  is	  argued	  that	  coercion	  is	   what	   triggers	   duties	   of	   justice	   (Nagel	   2005,	   Blake	   2001).	   Coercion	   limits	   our	  autonomy.	  Therefore,	   for	  coercion	  in	  society	  to	  be	  morally	  permissible	   it	  must	  be	  justifiable.	   Something	   is	   justifiable	   if	   we	   could	   consent	   to	   it;	   the	   appropriate	  consent	  here	   is	  hypothetical	   consent	   (Blake	  2001:	  274).	  We	  could	  consent	   to	   the	  system	   of	   coercive	   laws	   in	   the	   state	   if	   they	   distribute	   resources	   in	   a	   just	   way.	  However,	   even	   if	   we	   accept	   Nagel	   and	   Blake’s	   link	   between	   coercion	   and	  distributive	   justice,	  we	  may	  note	   that	  coercion	  also	   features	   in	   the	  global	   sphere,	  and	  therefore	  doubt	  that	  justice	  demands	  only	  arise	  in	  the	  state.	  According	   to	   Nagel,	   however,	   it	   is	   not	   mere	   coercion	   in	   a	   state	   that	   is	   morally	  significant,	   but	   the	   fact	   that	   we	   are	   coerced	   by	   institutions	   in	   which	   our	  membership	  is	  non-­voluntary,	  and	  that	  we	  are	  not	  just	  coerced	  in	  society	  but	  play	  a	  part	  in	  coercing	  others.	  It	  is	  these	  features,	  Nagel	  argues,	  which	  generate	  the	  need	  for	   justification	   and	   make	   arbitrary	   inequalities	   within	   the	   state	   morally	  problematic.	   Nagel	   states	   that	  while	   there	   are	   coercive	   institutions	   at	   the	   global	  level,	   these	   are	   of	   a	   kind	   crucially	   different	   to	   those	  which	  obtain	  within	   a	   state.	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  Global	  coercive	   institutions	  arise	  voluntarily.	  Additionally,	   they	  do	  not	  purport	   to	  represent	   all	   citizens,	   but	   only	   states	   and	   their	   functions.	   As	   they	   only	   indirectly	  coerce	  individuals,	  only	  citizens’	  own	  states	  have	  responsibilities	  to	  them,	  and	  not	  all	  members	  of	  these	  institutions.	   	  Therefore,	  Nagel	  concludes,	  demands	  of	  justice	  only	  arise	  within	  a	  state.	  	  Another	  view	  that	   is	  put	   forward	   is	   that	  duties	  of	   justice	  are	  essentially	  duties	  of	  reciprocity	   (Sangiovanni	   2007).	   Citizens,	   but	   not	   non-­‐citizens,	   play	   a	   role	   in	  upholding	   institutions	   that	   create	   the	   conditions	   that	   allow	   each	   individual	   to	  pursue	   their	   plan	   of	   life.	   In	   order	   to	   enjoy	   the	   benefits	   of	   the	   state,	   such	   as	  enforcement	   of	   property	   rights,	   public	   services,	   and	  protection	   from	  attack,	   each	  citizen	  must	   accept	   the	   full	   scope	   of	   obligations	   that	   state	  membership	   imposes.	  Submitting	   to	   the	   rules	   of	   the	   state	   produces	   benefits	   for	   other	   members.	   This	  creates	  a	  web	  of	  reciprocity.	  When	  we	  are	  in	  reciprocal	  relationships	  with	  others,	  it	  is	   morally	   significant	   that	   morally	   arbitrary	   factors	   among	   us	   influence	   our	  positions	   in	   society	   (Sangiovanni	   2007:	   26).	   Arbitrary	   factors	   giving	   rise	   to	  differences	   in	   well-­‐being	   alone	   do	   not	   ground	   principles	   of	   justice.	   Thus	  distributive	  justice	  is	  required	  within	  a	  state,	  but	  not	  outside	  of	  it.	  	  Rawls,	  famously,	  also	  limits	  the	  scope	  of	  distributive	  justice	  to	  the	  state.	  For	  Rawls,	  cooperation	   is	   the	   key	   moral	   feature	   of	   relations	   within	   a	   state	   that	   triggers	  demands	  of	  justice	  (Scanlon	  1997:	  209,	  Wolff	  2009:	  11).	  On	  Rawls’	  view,	  members	  of	   a	   state	   cooperate	   in	   the	   collective	   production	   of	   social	   goods.	   It	   is	   unjust,	  according	   to	   Rawls,	   if	   some	   people	   are	   worse	   off	   than	   others	   due	   to	   morally	  arbitrary	   factors	   when	   all	   share	   the	   burdens	   of	   cooperation,	   and	   collectively	  produce	   its	  benefits.	  Outside	  of	   the	  state,	   it	   is	  argued,	   these	  cooperative	  relations	  do	  not	  exist,	  and	  so,	  considerations	  of	  justice	  do	  not	  arise.	  	  The	  key	  idea	  that	  these	  views	  have	  in	  common	  is	  that	  justice	  is	  appropriate	  when	  citizens	  play	  a	  role	   in	  upholding	  the	  state.	  The	  functions	  of	  the	  state	  make	  up	  the	  essential	  elements	  of	  the	  basic	  structure	  of	  society,	  and	  this	  basic	  structure	  is	  the	  site	  of	  distributive	   justice.	  Through	  one’s	  role	   in	  supporting	  the	  state,	  relations	  of	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  coercion,	  cooperation	  and	  of	  reciprocity	  arise,	  and	  only	  within	  such	  relations,	  it	  is	  argued,	  is	  it	  morally	  significant	  that	  some	  are	  worse	  off	  than	  others	  due	  to	  morally	  arbitrary	  factors.	  However,	  some	  have	  argued	  that	  there	  is	  a	  global	  basic	  structure,	  and	  therefore,	  principles	  of	  global	   justice	  are	  required.	   I	  shall	  discuss	  this	   type	  of	  view	  next.	  	  Global	  basic	  structure	  In	  arguing	  against	  the	  exclusive	  application	  of	  principles	  of	  justice	  to	  the	  domestic	  sphere,	   there	   are	   two	   main	   possibilities.	   One	   may	   deny	   that	   these	   features,	  supposedly	   present	   within	   a	   state	   and	   absent	   beyond	   it,	   are	  morally	   significant.	  The	  other	  approach	  is	  to	  argue	  that	  these	  features	  are	  present	  in	  both	  spheres.	  The	  best	   approach	   makes	   both	   claims;	   first	   demonstrating	   that	   these	   features	   are	  present	   in	   the	   global	   domain,	   and	   secondly	   arguing	   that	   the	  way	   in	  which	   these	  relations	  feature	  is	  not	  less	  morally	  significant	  than	  in	  the	  state.	  	  Cooperation	   and	   coercion	   feature	   at	   the	   global	   level.	   Many	   countries	   amass	   and	  maintain	   their	  wealth	   by	   operating	   companies	   extracting	   resources	  within	   other	  countries,	  or	  using	  labour	  from	  poorer	  countries	  to	  help	  produce	  goods.	  Citizens	  in	  other	   countries,	   thus,	   help	   collectively	   produce	   goods	   and	   generate	   wealth	   for	  affluent	  countries.	  There	  are	  many	  international	  institutions	  with	  coercive	  effects,	  a	  few	   examples	   being	   the	   WTO,	   multi-­‐national	   corporations,	   monetary	   laws,	   and	  immigration	  policy.	  The	  distinction	  that	  Nagel	  points	  out	  is	  that	  these	  institutions	  do	  not	  coerce	  in	  the	  name	  of	  all	  citizens	  (Nagel	  2005:	  128).	  However,	   we	   may	   ask	   why	   this	   is	   a	   particularly	   morally	   significant	   form	   of	  coercion.	   Coercion	  within	   a	   state	   is	   largely	   attributable	   to	   policies	  which	   protect	  citizens’	   interests.	   For	   example,	   we	   face	   coercion	   in	   the	   form	   of	   taxation,	   which	  helps	   to	   support	   public	   services.	   Coercive	   laws	   against	   criminal	   behaviour	   help	  protect	  us	   from	  harm.	  These	  benefits,	  we	  may	   suggest,	   are	   sufficient	   justification	  for	   the	   coercion.	   Coercion	   in	   the	   global	   sphere,	   by	   contrast,	   is	   usually	   a	   result	   of	  decisions	  which	  benefit	  more	  powerful	   states	  disproportionally	   to	  weaker	   states.	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  While	  coercion	   in	   the	  global	   sphere	   is	   less	  direct,	   and	   is	  not	   carried	  out	  with	   the	  supposed	  legitimacy	  of	  a	  state,	  it	  seems	  more	  morally	  problematic	  in	  other	  ways.	  	  It	  seems	  that	  we	  can	  identify	  in	  the	  global	  sphere	  the	  relevant	  moral	  features	  that	  make	   justice	   appropriate.	   However,	   proponents	   of	   the	   relational	   view	   recognise	  that	  there	  is	  global	  interdependence	  and	  integration;	  that	  markets	  and	  legal	  bodies	  span	  borders,	  yet	  deny	   that	   the	  cooperation	  and	  coercion	  present	  rises	   to	  a	   level	  that	  triggers	  duties	  of	  justice.	  On	  this	  point	  there	  is	  somewhat	  of	  a	  stalemate.	  	  It	  is	  true	  that	  coercion	  in	  the	  global	  domain	  differs	  to	  coercion	  within	  a	  state.	  Not	  only	  is	  state	  coercion	  supposedly	  imposed	  with	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  people,	  but	  it	  is	  also	  more	  direct	  and	  more	  widespread	   than	  coercion	   in	   the	  global	   sphere,	  and	  backed	  up	  by	  force.	  However,	  perhaps	  the	  way	  to	  break	  the	  stalemate	  is	  to	  suggest	  that,	  while	   the	  situations	  are	  not	   identical,	  given	   that	   the	  relevant	  moral	   features	  are	   present	   in	   the	   global	   sphere,	   considerations	   of	   justice	   are	   required,	   though	  identical	  principles	  of	  justice	  are	  not.	  For	  example,	  perhaps	  the	  difference	  principle	  is	  appropriate	  within	  a	  state,	  but	  only	  some	   level	  of	  sufficiency	   is	  required	   in	   the	  global	  case.	  This	  may	  appeal	   to	   those	  who	  argue	   that	  global	   justice	  would	  be	   too	  demanding	  given	  that	  our	  moral	  ties	  are	  weaker	  at	  the	  global	  level.	  Even	  if	  we	  think	  there	   is	  moral	   justification	   for	   equivalent	   principles	   in	   both	   contexts,	   sufficiency	  may	   meet	   our	   concerns	   about	   the	   feasibility	   of	   a	   global	   difference	   principle.	  Reaching	   a	   level	   of	   sufficiency	   throughout	   the	   global	   sphere	   would	   still	   be	  demanding.	  However,	  we	  should	  not	  reject,	  at	   the	  outset,	   the	  possibility	  of	  global	  redistribution	   as	   a	   matter	   of	   justice,	   simply	   because	   the	   global	   sphere	   is	   not	  identical	   to	   the	   domestic	   sphere.	   The	   contexts	   are	   not	   so	   different	   that	  we	  must	  adopt	  a	  different	  moral	  framework	  in	  the	  global	  case.	  We	  may	  design	  principles	  of	  justice	   that	   correspond	   to	   the	   moral	   features	   and	   practical	   facts	   of	   the	   global	  situation.	  	  Opponents	  of	  global	  justice	  take	  too	  much	  of	  an	  ‘all-­‐or-­‐nothing’	  approach	  towards	  the	  question	  of	  whether	   there	   is	  a	  global	  basic	  structure.	  They	  analyse	   the	  global	  situation	   taking	   too	   broad	   a	   brush.	   Some	   institutions	   and	   practices	   are	   more	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  coercive	  than	  others.	  Relations	  at	  the	  global	  level	  are	  more	  varied.	  Because	  not	  all	  individuals	   are	  brought	   into	   coercive,	   cooperative	   relations	   and	  because	   some	  of	  these	  arrangements	  are	   informal,	   voluntary,	   and	  more	   localised,	   they	  perhaps	  do	  not	   meet	   a	   standard	   to	   ground	   duties	   of	   justice.	   However,	   in	   other	   cases,	  interactions	  are	  closer	  and	  more	  coercive.	  So	  perhaps	  it	  would	  be	  better	  to	  take	  a	  more	   piecemeal	   approach	   to	   capture	   accurately	   the	   moral	   relations	   within	   the	  global	  sphere.	  I	  shall	  explore	  such	  an	  approach	  next.	  	  Variable	  notions	  of	  justice	  Nagel	   suggests	   a	   sliding-­‐scale	   notion	   of	   justice	   as	   a	   possible	   approach	   to	   global	  justice	   (2005:	   140).	   Nagel	   points	   out	   that	   while	   our	   cooperative	   relations	   are	  stronger	   among	   our	   fellow	   citizens,	   we	   are,	   nonetheless,	   connected	   to	   people	  beyond	   our	   borders	   in	   coercive	   and	   cooperative	   relations.	   There	   are	   many	  collective	  practices	  and	  associations,	  which	  transcend	  borders,	  that	  we	  participate	  in	   jointly	   with	   distant	   others,	   such	   as	   international	   currency	   markets,	   or	  agreements	   made	   under	   the	  WTO.	   For	   example,	   we	   are	   related	   to	   the	   Brazilian	  farmer	   who	   grows	   the	   coffee	   we	   purchase	   through	   the	   system	   of	   international	  trade	  (2005:	  141).	  Given	  that	  this	  system,	  in	  which	  we	  participate,	  is	  pervaded	  by	  inequalities	  based	  on	  morally	  arbitrary	  factors,	  this	  may	  give	  rise	  to	  considerations	  of	  justice.	  This	  may	  not	  require	  extensive	  duties	  such	  as	  redistribution	  of	  wealth,	  or	  large	  scale	  reform	  of	  the	  global	  order,	  but	  only	  the	  fulfilment	  of	  certain	  policies	  as	  a	  condition	  on	  participation	  in	  this	  system;	  for	  example,	  fair	  labour	  practices	  (2005:	  141).	  Our	  obligations	  could	  vary	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  degree	  of	  collective	  engagement	  there	  is.	  	  	  This	   seems	  a	  plausible	  proposal.	  Nagel,	   however,	   rejects	   it.	  Nagel	   insists	   that	   the	  level	  of	  collective	  engagement	  in	  such	  situations	  does	  not	  generate	  duties	  of	  justice,	  as	   this	   level	   is	  only	   reached	  when	  rules	  are	  enforced	  by	  a	  collectively	  authorised	  sovereign	  (2005:	  141).	  	  However,	  Nagel’s	  rejection	  of	  this	  approach	  does	  not	  seem	  persuasive.	  As	  already	  suggested,	  it	  does	  not	  seem	  necessary	  to	  take	  an	  ‘all	  or	  nothing’	  approach.	  We	  may	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  argue	   that	  even	  minimal	   forms	  of	   cooperation,	   such	  as	  mutual	  advantage,	   trigger	  some	  duties	  of	  justice.	  I	  shall	  discuss	  this	  idea	  further	  below.	  Alternatively,	  one	  may	  agree	   with	   Nagel,	   that	   this	   feature	   of	   coercion	   which	   engages	   one’s	   will	   is	   the	  relevant	  moral	   feature	  which	   triggers	   duties	   of	   justice,	   yet	   deny	   that	   it	   is	   absent	  beyond	  state	  borders.	  A.J.	   Julius	  takes	  seriously	  Nagel’s	  view	  that	  duties	  of	   justice	  arise	  when	  we	  co-­‐author	  coercion.	   Julius	  aims	  to	  give	  the	  best	  explanation	  of	  this	  associative	  duty,	  and	  finds	  that	  it	  arises	  beyond	  the	  state	  as	  well	  as	  within	  it	  (Julius	  2006:	  178).	  	  Julius	   identifies	  one	  way	   in	  which	  coercion	  may	   invoke	  our	  acceptance.	   If	   I	  know	  that	  you	  will	  uphold	  the	  terms	  that	  I	  set,	  because	  I	  know	  you	  hold	  yourself	  to	  have	  a	   moral	   reason	   to	   obey	  me,	   I	   have	   a	   duty	   to	   impose	   terms	   that	   you	   can	   accept	  (2006:	  180).	  The	  problem	  with	  making	  justice	  entirely	  conditional	  on	  the	  existence	  of	   co-­‐authorship,	   however,	   is	   that	   no	   considerations	   of	   justice	   would	   arise	   in	   a	  tyrannous	  society	  in	  which	  no	  acceptance	  from	  citizens	  is	  sought,	  and	  citizens	  take	  themselves	  to	  have	  no	  moral	  reason	  to	  obey	  the	  terms	  of	  their	  society	  (2006:	  183).	  Julius,	   thus,	   formulates	   a	  different	   account	  of	  when	  coercion	  gives	   rise	   to	   justice.	  Julius	  explains	  that	  considerations	  of	  justice	  arise	  when	  one	  directs	  other	  people	  to	  conform	  to	  their	  will	  through	  the	  social	  positions	  they	  occupy.	  Some	  people	  are	  in	  positions	  where	  they	  can	  make	  people	  who	  occupy	  certain	  social	  roles	  act	  in	  a	  way	  which	  suits	  their	  purposes	  (2006:	  188).	  Julius	  invokes	  the	  moral	  principle	  that	  one	  should	   not	   use	   other	   people	   to	   fulfil	   one’s	   will,	   unless	   this	   course	   of	   action	   is	  justifiable	  to	  them	  (2006:	  188).	  	  To	  explain	  our	  relations	  to	  our	  fellow	  citizens	  within	  the	  grouping	  of	  a	  state,	  Julius	  describes	  a	  group	  of	  people	  where	  each	  person	  may	  direct	  the	  actions	  of	  people	  in	  certain	   roles	   to	   achieve	   the	   aims	   of	   their	   projects,	  while,	   at	   the	   same	   time,	   each	  person	  is	  able	  to	  be	  directed	  by	  each	  other	  person	  (2006:	  189).	  Each	  person	  must	  be	   able	   to	   justify	   their	   policy	   for	   pursuing	   their	   projects	   to	   everyone	   else.	   Julius	  cites	  Rawls’	  view	  that	  the	  difference	  principle	  is	  the	  closest	  we	  can	  come	  to	  a	  policy	  that	  is	  agreeable	  to	  each	  person	  (2006:	  189).	  Therefore,	  the	  difference	  principle	  is	  a	  required	  principle	  of	  justice	  within	  a	  state.	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  This	   is	   Julius’	   illuminating	   explanation	   of	   Nagel’s	   position.	   Where	   Julius’	   view	  differs	   to	   Nagel’s	   is	   that	   Julius	   holds	   that	   we	   do	   not	   only	   bear	   such	   relations	   to	  people	  within	  a	  state.	  We	  have	  projects,	  which,	  in	  order	  to	  fulfil,	  require	  us	  to	  direct	  people	  occupying	  social	  positions	  beyond	  our	  borders	   (2006:	  190).	  However,	   the	  global	   sphere	   is	   not	   a	   group	   like	   a	   state,	  where	   each	   person	   is	   both	   directed	   by	  others	   and	   directs	   others.	  Many	   people	   are	   not	   in	   a	   position	   to	   direct	   people	   in	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  world.	  We	  then	  are	  faced	  with	  the	  option	  of	  a	  society	  by	  society	  application	  of	   the	  difference	  principle,	   leaving	   the	  effects	  on	  people	  beyond	  state	  borders	  unregulated.	  Or,	  we	  could	  adopt	  a	  global	  application	  of	   the	  principle,	  but	  this	   would	   distort	   the	   fact	   that	   most	   people’s	   projects	   are	   concentrated	   locally.	  Instead,	  Julius	  suggests	  that	  the	  most	  appropriate	  approach	  is	  to	  move	  between	  the	  two	  applications,	  in	  accordance	  with	  how	  closely	  tied	  we	  are	  to	  people	  outside	  our	  borders	  (2006:	  191).	  This	   sliding	   scale	   approach	   seems	   plausible,	   as	   we	   cannot	   ignore	   these	   two	  different	  features	  of	  the	  global	  picture.	  However,	  we	  may	  raise	  two	  doubts.	  On	  the	  one	   hand,	   this	   picture	  may	   seem	   too	   limited.	  We	  may	   press	   the	   same	   challenge	  against	  Julius	  as	  we	  did	  with	  Nagel;	  rejecting	  the	  idea	  that	  coercion	  that	  implies	  our	  acceptance	   is	  more	  morally	   significant	   than	   coercion	   that	  does	  not.	   For	   example,	  coercion	   that	   does	   not	   invoke	   one’s	   will	   may	   have	   worse	   consequences.	   On	   the	  other	  hand,	  Julius’	  account	  may	  seem	  too	  unbounded.	  Julius	  argues	  that	  we	  should	  move	   between	   a	   society	   by	   society	   and	   global	   application	   of	   the	   difference	  principle.	  However,	   the	  difference	  principle	   is	  very	  demanding.	   It	   is	  hard	   to	  even	  conceive	  of	  how	  the	  difference	  principle	  would	  function	  across	  borders.	  Given	  that	  the	   difference	   principle	   requires	   an	   overall	   assessment	   of	   who	   is	   the	   worst	   off	  group,	  and	  that	  forms	  of	  life	  vary	  dramatically	  across	  the	  globe,	  it	  would	  be	  hard	  to	  come	  to	  any	  conclusive	  judgment	  of	  how	  different	  people	  fare	  against	  each	  other.	  The	  difference	  principle	  would	  require	  a	  transformation	  of	  global	  arrangements	  in	  order	   to	   distribute	   the	   burdens	   and	   benefits	   of	   social	   cooperation	   according	   to	  what	   makes	   the	   worst	   off	   as	   well-­‐off	   as	   possible.	   It	   is	   hard	   to	   see	   how	   this	  distribution	  would	  only	  occur	  some	  of	  the	  time.	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  The	  worry	  here	   is	   not	   only	   that	   the	   global	   difference	  principle	  would	  be	  hard	   to	  implement	  in	  practice,	  but	  that	  it	  is	  not	  a	  coherent	  possibility,	  given	  that	  we	  cannot	  make	   sense	   of	   the	   notion	   of	   ‘the	  worst	   off’	   in	   the	   global	   context.	   Because	   global	  justice	  seems	  implausible,	  some	  egalitarians	  want	  to	  reject	  the	  idea.	  The	  worry	  may	  be	  that,	  as	  global	  justice	  seems	  to	  follow	  from	  the	  premises	  of	  domestic	  justice,	  the	  idea	  of	  domestic	  justice	  may	  be	  rejected	  by	  reductio	  ad	  absurdum	  (Wolff	  2009:	  2).	  The	   problem	   is	   that	   what	   Julius	   proposes	   seems	   demanding	   and	   unfeasible.	  However,	  we	  may	  ask	  why	  that	  would	  make	  it	  an	  implausible	  approach,	  given	  that	  local	   justice	  would	  also	  be	  demanding	  and	  difficult	   to	  realise	   in	  practice.	  Perhaps	  there	  are	  relevant	  differences	  in	  the	  two	  cases.	  Or,	  the	  more	  appropriate	  response	  may	   be	   to	   question	   our	   approach	   to	   justice	   in	   both	   contexts.	   I	   shall	   pursue	   this	  suggestion	  shortly.	  Perhaps,	  however,	  one	  may	  reject	   these	  difficulties,	   as	  even	   if	  we	  cannot	  conclusively	  identify	  who	  is	  worse	  off	  overall,	  we	  are	  still	  in	  a	  position	  to	  make	  comparisons.	  	  Even	   if	   a	   global	   difference	   principle	   is	   conceivable,	   it	   still	   does	   not	   seem	  appropriate,	  overall,	   in	   the	  global	  case.	  Nonetheless,	   Julius	   is	  right	   that	   the	  global	  case	   is	   not	   so	   markedly	   different	   from	   the	   domestic	   case	   in	   the	   respects	   that	  warrant	  distributive	  justice.	  	  Faced	   with	   the	   difficulties	   we	   have	   identified,	   I	   suggest	   that	   the	   most	   sensible	  approach	  is	  to	  start	  with	  an	  assessment	  of	  the	  global	  situation	  itself	  and	  ask	  what	  principles	  would	  be	  suitable.	  I	  shall	  pursue	  this	  suggestion	  shortly.	  First,	  we	  must	  explore	   whether	   there	   are	   good	   reasons	   for	   considering	   the	   requirements	   of	  distributive	  justice	  problematic	  in	  the	  global	  case	  but	  not	  within	  a	  state.	  Working	  out	  what	  is	  required	  of	  us	  Perhaps	   redistribution	   within	   a	   state	   is	   not	   excessively	   demanding	   because	   we	  have	   more	   fellow	   feeling	   for	   our	   co-­‐citizens.	   However,	   that	   is	   a	   contingent,	  empirical	   claim.	   People	   belong	   to	  many	   different	   identify	   groups,	   some	   of	  which	  span	  borders.	  The	  strongest	  attachment	  is	  not	  necessarily	  to	  one’s	  national	  group;	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  one	   may	   have	   more	   intense	   affiliation	   to	   fellow	   members	   of	   one’s	   religion,	   or	  profession,	   or	   with	   those	  with	  whom	   one	   shares	   a	   particular	  medical	   condition.	  Often,	  ties	  of	  solidarity	  are	  weak	  within	  a	  nation	  state.	  	  Perhaps,	  we	   treat	   the	   cases	   differently	   because	   the	   global	   justice	   debate	   is	  more	  focused	   on	   non-­‐ideal	   theory;	   proponents	   of	   global	   justice	   tend	   to	   refer	   to	  inequalities	  in	  the	  world	  today	  and	  the	  unfairness	  of	  current	  global	  arrangements,	  when	  making	   the	   case	   for	   global	   redistributive	   justice.	   Formulating	   principles	   of	  justice	  within	  a	  state,	  by	  contrast,	  seems	  more	  of	  a	  theoretical,	  idealised	  project	  at	  the	  outset,	  with	  discussions	  taking	  place	  at	  a	  greater	  level	  of	  abstraction.	  This	  may	  help	  explain	  why	  demandingness	  and	  unfeasibility	  are	  regarded	  as	  problems	  in	  the	  global	  case,	  but	  not	   the	   local.	  However,	   if	  we	  consider	   justice	  within	  a	  state	   from	  the	   perspective	   of	   non-­‐ideal	   theory,	  we	  may	   be	   similarly	   concerned	   about	   these	  issues.	  	  Perhaps	  the	  distinction	  between	  the	  two	  cases,	  with	  respect	  to	  demandingness,	  is	  a	  normative	  one.	  It	  may	  not	  be	  that	  duties	  in	  the	  domestic	  case	  are	  less	  demanding,	  but	  that	  this	  level	  of	  demandingness	  is	  more	  appropriate	  within	  the	  state.	  However,	  this	  takes	  us	  back	  to	  the	  question	  at	  hand	  of	  what	  is	  required	  in	  the	  global	  sphere.	  	  I	   leave	   the	   feasibility	   concern	   aside	   for	   now	   but	   I	   wish	   to	   explore	   the	  demandingness	  objection	  further.	  Global	  justice	  is	  often	  opposed	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  the	  absolute	  low	  level	  of	  the	  poor	  and	  the	  discrepancy	  between	  the	  global	  rich	  and	  poor	  would	  make	  global	  equality	  very	  demanding	   (Miller	  2007:	  63).	  To	   raise	   the	  poor	   to	   a	   level	   of	   sufficiency,	   let	   alone	   equality,	   may	   require	   us	   to	   sacrifice	   our	  personal	  projects	   and	  non-­‐basic	   interests	   (2007:	  185).	  The	  demands	  of	  morality,	  the	   thought	   goes,	   cannot	   alienate	   us	   from	   our	   own	   concerns	   and	   commitments	  (Williams	   1973).	   So	   if	   a	   duty	   or	   set	   of	   duties	   would	   be	   too	   demanding,	   this	  undermines	  its	  appropriateness	  in	  that	  situation.	  	  	  However,	  it	  seems	  that	  how	  demanding	  a	  duty	  is	  does	  not	  only	  determine	  whether	  it	   is	   appropriate,	   but	   also,	   whether	   a	   duty	   is	   appropriate	   determines	   how	  demanding	  it	  permissibly	  can	  be.	  I	  suggest	  that	  the	  demandingness	  objection	  is	  bit	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  of	  a	  misnomer.	  We	  do	  not	  regard	  something	  as	  demanding	  in	  and	  of	  itself.	  Rather,	  we	   experience	   something	   as	   demanding	   in	   relation	   to	   what	   we	   believe	   to	   be	  expected	  of	  us.	  For	  example,	  common	  humanity	  posits	  a	  duty	  to	  help	  an	  old	  lady	  to	  cross	  the	  street.	  However,	   it	  would	  seem	  too	  demanding	  if	   I	  was	  also	  expected	  to	  assist	   the	   woman	   all	   the	   way	   home,	   to	   then	   help	   her	   at	   her	   home	   and	   on	  subsequent	  days.	  This	  would	  not	  be	  too	  demanding,	  however,	  if	  the	  old	  lady	  is	  my	  own	  mother.	  If	  I	  am	  present	  when	  a	  person	  is	  hit	  by	  a	  car,	  I	  have	  a	  duty	  to	  call	  an	  ambulance	   and	   wait	   until	   I	   see	   that	   they	   are	   given	   sufficient	   care.	   It	   may	   seem	  beyond	  what	  is	  required	  of	  me	  to	  visit	  the	  victim	  in	  the	  hospital,	  and	  to	  give	  them	  compensation	  for	  the	  accident.	  However	  this	  may	  not	  seem	  too	  demanding	  if	  I	  am	  the	  driver	  who	  hit	  the	  person.	  	  It	  seems,	  therefore,	  that	  the	  type	  of	  a	  situation	  we	  are	  addressing,	   factors	  such	  as	  the	  relationships	  between	  the	  people	  involved,	  at	  least	  to	  some	  extent,	  determines	  what	   is	  or	   is	  not	  too	  demanding.	  This	  thought	  seems	  to	  be	  part	  of	   the	  motivation	  for	   the	   harm	   approach.	   Redistributing	   wealth	   across	   the	   globe	   may	   seem	   too	  demanding,	  but	  not	  if	  we	  cause	  global	  poverty.	  	  What	   I	   am	   suggesting,	   therefore,	   is	   that	   instead	   of	   positing	   a	   set	   of	   duties	   and	  assessing	  how	  demanding	  they	  are,	  we	  might	  start	  with	  our	  underlying	  convictions	  of	  what	  is	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  situation	  we	  are	  dealing	  with.	  Global	  injustice	  I	   suggest	   that	   the	   way	   to	   proceed	   in	   formulating	   our	   duties	   to	   people	   in	   need	  beyond	  the	  state	   is	   to	  start	  by	  assessing	  the	  global	  situation.	  What	  seems	  clear	   is	  that	   there	   are	   urgent	   injustices	   and	   inequalities	   in	   the	   global	   sphere	   that	   need	  addressing	  (Scanlon	  2004,	  Sen	  2009).	  	  	  The	  project	  of	  global	   justice	   is	   largely	   focused	  on	  applying	   ideas	  of	   justice	  drawn	  from	   our	   approach	   to	   justice	   within	   a	   state	   to	   the	   global	   sphere,	   and	   on	   the	  demonstration	   that	   we	   have	   duties	   of	   global	   justice.	   This	   seems	   the	   wrong	  approach.	   Proponents	   of	   global	   justice	   face	   a	   doubly	   demanding	   task	   of	   first	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  defending	  a	  demanding	  set	  of	  principles	  within	  a	  state,	  and	  then	  applying	  these	  at	  the	   global	   level.	   This	   involves	   the	   heavy	   argumentative	   burden	   of	   showing	   that	  individuals	  across	  the	  world	  are	  engaged	  in	  coercive	  and	  cooperative	  relationships	  within	   global	   institutions	   to	   an	   extent	   akin	   to	   relations	   within	   a	   state.	   Thus	   the	  discussion	   tends	   to	   focus	   on	   the	  meaning	   of	   ‘institution’,	   and	   ‘coercion’,	   and	   the	  extent	   to	   which	   these	   features	   are	   present.	   Proponents	   of	   global	   justice	   are	  vulnerable	  to	  the	  criticism	  that	  they	  overstretch	  these	  concepts	  to	  argue	  that	  there	  is	  a	  global	  basic	  structure.	  	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	   others,	  who	   find	   the	   idea	  of	   justice	   inapplicable	   to	   the	   global	  domain,	   may	   be	   vulnerable	   to	   the	   criticism	   of	   being	   dogmatic.	   Moreover,	   they	  adopt	   a	   libertarian	   type	   position,	   denying	   that	   we	   have	   any	   duties	   of	   justice	   to	  those	   beyond	   the	   state	   unless	   we	   harm	   them,	   without	   showing	   why	   libertarian	  premises	  are	  plausible.	  It	  seems	  that	  assessing	  whether	  justice	  claims	  arise	  in	  the	  global	  sphere	  only	  through	  comparison	  with	  the	  domestic	  sphere	  forces	  opponents	  of	  the	  view	  that	  the	  contexts	  are	  similar	  into	  an	  implausible	  position.	  	  	  	  We	  might	  see	  the	  harm	  approach	  as	  a	  symptom	  of	  this	  more	  general	  problematic	  approach	  to	  global	  justice.	  Pogge’s	  failed	  strategy	  is	  to	  find	  an	  alternative	  route	  to	  grounding	  our	  duties	  to	  the	  global	  poor	  as	  duties	  of	  justice.	  Pogge	  focuses	  on	  harm	  because,	  whatever	  else	   justice	   is	   taken	  to	  be,	  all	  can	  agree	  that	  we	  have	  duties	  of	  justice	   not	   to	   harm	   others,	   and	   that	   if	   we	   harm,	   we	   have	   duties	   of	   justice	   to	  compensate.	  	  The	  theoretical	  debate	  about	  whether	  justice	  is	  the	  right	  virtue	  at	  the	  global	  level	  seems	  to	  start	  in	  the	  wrong	  place.	  We	  should	  begin	  by	  identifying	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  conviction	  that	  the	  global	  situation	  raises	  considerations	  of	  justice.	  This	  view	  may	  come	  from	  our	  theoretical	  engagement	  with	  justice.	  One	  might	  think	  that,	  given	  our	  approach	   to	   justice	  within	   a	   state,	   the	   global	   situation	   shares	   the	   relevant	  moral	  features	   and	   so	   also	   gives	   rise	   to	   considerations	   of	   justice.	   Or	   perhaps,	   it	   seems	  clear,	  without	  being	  able	  to	  articulate	  a	  full	  theory,	  that,	  given	  that	  we	  interact	  with	  a	  wider	   community	   than	   just	   the	   state,	   and	   that	  historically	   and	  presently	  play	  a	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  part	  in	  shaping	  global	  arrangements,	  we	  have	  obligations	  to	  help	  those	  who	  do	  less	  well	   than	  us,	  which	   seem	  best	   captured	   as	  duties	   of	   justice,	   rather	   than	  virtuous	  acts	  of	  charity.	  Even	  if	  we	  cannot	  state	  what	  justice	  is	  and	  what	  equality	  is,	  we	  can	  recognise	   global	   arrangements	   to	   be	   unfair,	   and,	   from	   a	   pre-­‐theoretical	  perspective,	  unjust.	  As	  Nagel	  himself	  states	  ‘We	  do	  not	  live	  in	  a	  just	  world.	  This	  may	  
be	  the	  least	  controversial	  claim	  one	  could	  make	  in	  political	  theory’	  (2005:	  1).	  	  Perhaps	   one	   may	   insist	   that	   we	   cannot	   speak	   of	   injustice	   before	   formulating	   a	  theory	  of	   justice	  and	  demonstrating	   its	   relevance	   to	   the	  global	   sphere.	  One	  could	  maintain	  a	  definitional	   limitation	  to	  the	  application	  of	   justice	  to	  state	  institutions.	  However,	   there	   seems	   no	   reason	   to	   accept	   this	   thought.	   The	   concept	   of	   justice	  strikes	  us	  as	  relevant	  beyond	  this	  context.	  Perhaps,	   this	   is	  referring	  to	  a	  different	  idea	  of	  justice.	  Perhaps	  neither	  view	  –	  justice	  as	  applied	  to	  institutions,	  and	  justice	  applied	   more	   generally	   -­‐	   is	   wrong,	   but	   rather,	   they	   are	   approaches	   directed	  towards	   different	   projects.	   Establishing	   standards	   for	   institutions	   within	   a	   state	  may	  be	  worthwhile.	  Yet	  we	  may	  also	  explore	  the	  idea	  of	  justice	  in	  a	  more	  general	  sense.	  While	  the	  arrangements	  of	  institutions	  need	  to	  be	  assessed	  as	  just	  or	  unjust,	  as	   their	   influence	   is	   so	  pervasive,	   our	  ultimate	   concern	   is	  with	  how	  people,	  with	  whom	  we	  interact,	  fare.	  We	  must	  not	  overlook	  any	  justice	  claims	  that	  may	  arise	  out	  of	   our	   cooperative	   relationships	  with	   those	  we	   interact	  with	   outside	   of	   the	   state	  system.	  	  It	   seems	   plausible	   to	   suggest	   that,	   at	   a	  minimum,	   considerations	   of	   justice	   arise	  from	   such	   practices	   as	   climate	   change	   policy,	   immigration	   laws,	   and	   labour	  practices	   of	   multi-­‐national	   corporations,	   and	   that	   if	   a	   theory	   could	   not	  accommodate	   this	   view,	   this	  would	   be	   grounds	   to	   question	   it.	  We	  might	   still	   be	  pressed	   to	   say	   why	   these	   would	   be	   justice	   claims.	   I	   think	   we	   can	   draw	   on	   a	  rudimentary	  notion	  of	  justice	  as	  fairness	  to	  explain	  this	  conviction,	  though	  I	  cannot	  explore	  this	  in	  detail	  here	  (Sen	  2009:	  54).	  	  I	  suggest	  that	  our	  approach	  to	  global	  justice	  should	  be	  to	  start	  by	  identifying	  ways	  in	  which	  global	   arrangements	   seem	  unfair	   and	  unjust.	   I	   shall	   raise	  and	  deal	  with	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  three	   objections	   that	   I	   anticipate	   against	   this	   suggestion.	   First,	   this	   seems	   to	  undermine	  my	  claim	  that	  the	  global	  sphere	  and	  the	  state	  are	  similar	  in	  the	  morally	  significant	   respects	   and	   so	  we	   should	   not	   adopt	   a	   different	  moral	   framework	   in	  each	  case.	  However,	  though	  I	  am	  suggesting	  we	  take	  a	  different	  approach	  towards	  assessing	   injustice	   in	   the	   global	   case,	   this	   is	   not	   to	   employ	   a	   different	   moral	  framework.	   The	   concept	   of	   justice	   is	   relevant	   in	   both	   contexts.	   Nonetheless,	   the	  contrasts	   between	   these	   approaches	   may	   reflect	   that	   the	   two	   situations	   are	  different.	   Perhaps	   the	   theoretical	   justice	   project	   is	  more	   fruitful	   in	   the	   domestic	  case,	  as	  there	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  greater	  consensus	  in	  a	  more	  homogenized	  society,	  than	  across	   the	   globe.	  While	   the	   theoretical	   project	   of	   global	   justice	   appears	   to	   be	   in	  constant	   stalemate,	   the	   theoretical	   project	   of	   justice	   within	   a	   state	   is	   more	  established,	  and	  better	  understood.	  	  	  An	   alternative	   response	   is	   to	   argue	   that	   our	   theory	   of	   justice	   in	   the	   domestic	  context	  should	  also	  be	  revised.	  The	  difficulties	  of	  the	  global	  justice	  debate	  may	  be	  symptomatic	  of	   the	  problems	  with	   the	  dominant,	  general	   theoretical	  approach	   to	  justice.	  It	  is	  difficult	  in	  any	  society	  to	  make	  summary	  judgements	  about	  how	  well-­‐off	   people	   are.	   It	  may	   seem	   unrealistic	   that	   we	   could	   come	   to	   any	   consensus	   of	  what	  would	  be	  a	  fair	  distribution,	  even	  under	  conditions	  of	  impartiality	  (Sen	  2009:	  15).	  Our	  approach	  to	  domestic	  justice,	  perhaps,	  should	  be	  less	  focused	  on	  an	  ideal,	  and	   more	   concentrated	   on	   assessing	   and	   making	   comparisons	   between	   existing	  arrangements	  and	  feasible	  alternatives	  (Sen	  2009:	  7).	  We	  have	  nothing	  close	  to	  a	  just	   society	   in	   reality.	   Given	   that	   the	   difference	   principle	   seems	   hard	   to	   realise,	  even	  within	   a	   state,	   our	   project	   of	   justice	   should,	   perhaps,	   take	   a	  more	   realistic	  approach.	  Alternatively,	  perhaps	  this	  emphasis	  on	  identifying	  unjust	  practices	  and	  institutions	  and	  reforming	  them	  is	  required	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  theoretical	  project	  in	  both	   cases.	   What	   is	   required	   in	   the	   domestic	   sphere	   cannot	   be	   settled	   here.	  Regarding	  global	  justice,	  however,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  we	  must	  rethink	  our	  approach.	  	  	  Secondly,	  one	  may	  worry	  that	  our	  application	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  justice	  would	  be	  too	  wide.	  However,	  the	  idea	  here	  is	  not	  that	  anything	  that	  seems	  very	  bad	  in	  the	  world	  is	   an	   injustice.	  We	  must	   still	   apply	   reasoning	   to	   the	   identification	  of	   an	   injustice.	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  However,	  we	  may	   start	  with	  what	   strikes	   us	   as	   unjust,	   and	   build	   from	   that	   to	   a	  diagnosis	   of	   injustice,	   and	   from	   that	   to	   a	   theory	   of	   justice.	   Additionally,	   we	  may	  limit	   the	   scope	  of	   justice	   to	   systems	  of	   cooperative	   interaction,	   and	   subjection	   to	  rules,	   for	   example,	   global	   trade	   agreements.	   Taking	   our	   convictions	   of	   what	   is	  unjust	   as	   our	   starting	   point	   does	   not	   mean	   that	   we	   will	   find	   injustice	   in	   every	  interaction.	  	  Thirdly,	  earlier	  I	  voiced	  the	  concern	  that	  framing	  what	  we	  owe	  to	  distant	  others	  as	  charity	  would	  be	  inadequate	  because	  charity	  is	  primarily	  concerned	  with	  absolute	  deprivation.	   However,	  my	   suggestion	   that	  we	   begin	   by	   identifying	   clear	   cases	   of	  injustice	  seems	  to	  be	  vulnerable	  to	  the	  same	  critique.	  However,	  manifest	  injustice	  and	  absolute	  deprivation	  are	  not	  the	  same.	  We	  might	  be	  struck	  by	  the	  mere	  fact	  of	  inequality,	   or	   by	   the	   lack	   of	   equal	   participation	   and	  power	  differentials	   in	   global	  bargaining	  processes.	   These	   seem	   to	  be	   injustices	   that	   a	   charity	   approach	  would	  not	  acknowledge	  as	  absolute	  deprivations.	  Moreover,	  while	  our	  starting	  point	  may	  be	  identifying	  manifest	  injustice,	  we	  may,	  from	  here,	  develop	  a	  theory	  of	  justice	  in	  the	  global	  context	  that	  would	  recognise	  less	  extreme	  forms	  of	  injustice.	  	  We	  may	  require	  more	  of	  an	  idea	  of	  how	  we	  would	  build	  a	  comprehensive	  theory.	  This	  is	  a	  task	  for	  another	  time.	  Perhaps,	  however,	  two	  roughly	  drawn	  suggestions	  may	   be	   offered.	   One	   starting	   approach	  would	   be	   to	   identify	   the	   inequalities	   that	  raise	   moral	   concern	   in	   the	   global	   domain	   and	   assess	   the	   different	   reasons	   for	  objecting	  to	  them	  (Scanlon	  1997).	  We	  may	  have	  humanitarian	  concerns;	  wishing	  to	  take	  from	  some	  to	  give	  to	  others	  to	  raise	  their	  level	  of	  well-­‐being.	  Some	  reasons	  for	  caring	  about	  inequality	  may	  be	  more	  egalitarian;	  some	  inequalities	  seem	  to	  violate	  the	  idea	  of	  fair	  cooperation,	  other	  inequalities	  may	  undermine	  self-­‐determination,	  and	  lead	  to	  power	  differentials,	  from	  which	  exploitation	  can	  arise	  (Scanlon	  1997).	  We	  may	  aim	  to	  avoid	  injustice	  in	  a	  more	  rudimentary	  sense,	  rather	  than	  pursuing	  equality	   under	   the	   belief	   that	   every	   person	   deserves	   equal	   treatment	   or	   equal	  opportunities	   (Miller	   2005:	   75).	   We	   should	   not	   assume	   at	   the	   outset	   that	  inequalities	  do	  or	  do	  not	  raise	  considerations	  of	  justice.	  Rather,	  we	  should	  start	  by	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  assessing	  the	  moral	  significance	  of	  the	  social	  and	  material	  inequalities	  that	  pervade	  the	  global	  sphere.	  	  	  	  Another	   possibility	  would	   be	   to	   start	  with	   existing	   practices.	   A	   key	   objection	   for	  extending	  principles	   of	   justice	   from	   the	   state	   context	   is	   that	   they	   are	  based	  on	   a	  notion	   of	   justice	   as	   impartiality	   that	   seems	   inappropriate	   in	   the	   global	   context.	  Demanding	  principles	  that,	  for	  example,	  require	  us	  to	  arrange	  institutions	  so	  as	  to	  benefit	  the	  worse	  off,	  only	  seem	  appropriate	  in	  a	  society	  where	  people	  feel	  a	  sense	  of	  responsibility	  for	  others,	  where	  there	  is	  a	  sense	  that	  people’s	  fates	  and	  lives	  are	  bound	  together.	  However,	  other	  conceptions	  of	   justice	  may	  be	  appropriate	   in	   the	  global	  context,	  where	  ties	  and	  cooperation	  are	  weaker.	  	  Within	   a	   state	   there	   are	   weaker	   forms	   of	   cooperation	   which	   still	   give	   rise	   to	  considerations	  of	   justice.	  For	  example,	   in	   corporate	   relationships,	   companies	  aim	  to	  get	  the	  most	  that	  they	  can	  get,	  and	  do	  not	  regard	  each	  other	  as	  co-­‐members	  of	  a	  cooperative	  project	  to	  support	  the	  social	  goods	  of	  the	  state.	  Yet	  duties	  of	  justice	  still	  arise	   in	   commercial	   transactions.	   If	   people	   group	   together	   out	   of	   mutual	   self-­‐interest,	   and	   formulate	   rules	   that,	   if	   followed	   by	   all,	   yield	   a	   greater	   gain	   for	   all	  participants,	   then	  they	  have	  duties	  of	   justice	   to	  abide	  by	  these	  rules.	  Moreover,	   if	  the	  arrangement	  makes	  anyone	  worse	  off	   than	  they	  were	  without	   it,	   this	  violates	  the	  idea	  of	  mutual	  advantage,	  and	  the	  arrangements	  would	  be	  unjust	  (Wolff	  2009:	  17).	   Cooperative	   relations	   between	   employers	   and	   employees	  may	   give	   rise	   to	   a	  stronger	  notion	  of	  justice;	  duties	  of	  fair	  reward	  (Wolff	  2009:	  17).	  Therefore,	  forms	  of	   cooperation	   present	   within	   the	   global	   sphere,	   which	   may	   be	   agreements	   of	  mutual	  advantage,	  or	  ones	  that	  mirror	  employments	  relations,	  should	  give	  rise	  to	  principles	  of	  justice,	  based	  on	  weaker	  notions	  of	  justice,	  which	  are	  applicable	  at	  the	  global	  level.	  	  I	  have	  suggested	  two	  approaches	  from	  the	  literature	  of	  building	  an	  account	  of	  what	  duties	  we	  have	  to	  others	  worse	  off	  than	  us	  in	  the	  global	  sphere.	  These	  approaches	  address	  what	  strikes	  us	  as	  appropriate	  in	  the	  situation,	  rather	  than	  applying	  a	  pre-­‐existing	  theory.	  Much	  more	  work	  needs	  to	  be	  done	  to	  develop	  an	  account	  of	  global	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  justice.	  The	  most	  plausible	  way,	  however,	  to	  approach	  this	  task	  is	  to	  begin	  from	  an	  assessment	  of	  the	  global	  situation.	  Conclusion	  In	   this	   chapter	   I	   suggested	   how	  we	   should	   proceed	   in	   the	   global	   justice	   debate,	  given	   that	   the	  harm	  approach	   fails	   in	  achieving	   its	  aims.	   I	   first	  explored	  a	  needs-­‐based	  approach,	  which	  would	  seem	  to	  address	  the	  situation	  of	  the	  poor	  sufficiently,	  yet,	  would	  not	  adequately	  reflect	  the	  moral	  features	  of	  the	  global	  situation.	  I	  then	  explored	   a	   variable,	   relational	   approach	   to	   justice,	   which	   argues	   that	  considerations	  of	  justice	  arise	  in	  the	  global	  sphere,	  but	  the	  application	  of	  principles	  of	   justice	  should	  vary	  according	   to	  how	  far	  coercive	  and	  cooperative	   interactions	  are	  present.	  However,	   I	   raised	   the	  concern	   that	  duties	  of	   justice	   that	  would	  arise	  seem	  too	  unfeasible	  and	  demanding.	  I	  then	  assessed	  the	  demandingness	  objection	  further,	   discussing	   that	   what	   is	   too	   demanding	   depends	   on	   what	   are	   the	  appropriate	   duties	   in	   the	   situation.	   I	   then	   put	   forward	   the	   view	   that	   the	   most	  appropriate	  starting	  point	  in	  developing	  a	  theory	  of	  global	  justice	  is	  our	  convictions	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  situation.	  My	  view	  is	  not	  that	  our	  theory	  of	  justice	  cannot	  be	  applied	  to	  the	  global	  sphere,	  but	  that	  the	  theoretical	  debate	  obscures	  what	  is	  most	  clear,	   namely	   that	   there	   are	   urgent	   needs,	   and	   unacceptable	   inequalities	   and	  injustices	  within	  the	  global	  sphere.	  This	  should	  be	  the	  starting	  point	  from	  which	  to	  develop	  our	  account	  of	  our	  duties	  to	  the	  distant	  needy.	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Conclusion	  	  My	   project	  may	   be	   regarded	   as	   a	   largely	   negative	   diagnosis	   of	   the	   global	   justice	  debate.	   Through	   this	   perspective,	   we	   can	   understand	   the	   harm	   approach	   as	  reflective	   of	   what	   goes	   wrong	   in	   the	   debate.	   It	   seems	   that	   given	   the	   impasse	  between	  proponents	  and	  opponents	  of	   the	  project	  of	  extending	  domestic	   ideas	  of	  justice	   to	   the	   global	   sphere,	   Pogge,	   out	   of	   a	   conviction	   that	   the	   global	   order	   is	  unjust,	   and	   that	  our	  duties	   to	   those	  worse	  off	   than	  us	  around	   the	  world	  are	  best	  framed	  as	  duties	  of	   justice,	  tries	  to	  base	  our	  duties	  on	  harm,	  as	  a	  way	  of	  avoiding	  the	  points	  of	  contention	  in	  the	  debate.	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  harm	  approach	  seems	  well-­‐motivated;	   it	   is	   a	   worthy	   aim	   to	   get	   clearer	   on	   the	   nature	   of	   our	   duties,	   while	  avoiding	  this	  seemingly	  intractable	  debate.	  The	  harm	  approach	  tries	  to	  bypass	  the	  debate	   regarding	  whether	   notions	   of	   justice	  within	   the	   state	   apply	   in	   the	   global	  case	  by	  basing	  our	  duties	  on	  what	  anyone	  could	  recognise	  as	  grounding	  duties	  of	  justice.	  	  	  However,	  in	  assessing	  the	  harm	  approach,	  I	  found	  that	  Pogge	  does	  not	  provide	  an	  account	  of	  harm	  that	  achieves	  the	  aims	  of	  the	  theory.	  Moreover,	  there	  are	  reasons	  to	  doubt	  that	  a	  theory	  of	  harm	  can	  be	  formulated	  to	  lend	  the	  required	  support.	  The	  approach	   lacks	   plausibility	   as,	   in	   order	   to	   show	   that	   we	   harm	   in	   a	   way	   which	  grounds	  duties,	  we	  have	  presupposed	  that	  we	  have	  moral	  obligations	  to	  those	  that	  we	  harm.	  In	  many	  ways	  Pogge’s	  aims	  seem	  misconceived.	  Firstly,	  we	  should	  not	  set	  out	   to	  prove	  that	  our	  duties	  are	  duties	  of	   justice.	  What	   is	   important	   is	   to	  capture	  the	  moral	  facts	  of	  the	  global	  situation.	  Secondly,	  while	  we	  want	  to	  make	  progress	  in	  the	  debate,	  we	  should	  not	  set	  out	  to	  convince	  everyone	  with	  our	  theory.	  This	  seems	  to	  confuse	  our	  philosophical	  project	  with	  a	  political	  one.	  	  I	  argued	  that	  we	  should	  not	  aim	  to	  bypass	  the	  debate	  by	  basing	  our	  duties	  on	  harm,	  but	   nor	   need	   we	   take	   a	   stance	   on	   whether	   our	   theory	   of	   justice	   for	   the	   state	  extends	   to	   the	   global	   sphere.	   Instead,	   our	   starting	   point	   should	   be	   the	   global	  situation	   itself.	   My	   aim	   was	   to	   work	   towards	   the	   most	   plausible	   approach	   of	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